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Abstract 
This dissertation examines and disrupts the way key scholarly, technical, and cultural discourses 
distinguish video games as a medium from film by shifting critical attention to how these media are 
experienced during reception. This premise of this intervention is that a medium-specific outlook of 
video games suppresses significant dissimilarities among video games, and also overlooks video 
games’ lineage in relation to how other media are experienced as aesthetic expressions. This has also 
meant that the vast critical resources within film and media studies remains extensively underutilized 
within video game scholarship. Beyond noting crucial formal resonances between certain video 
games and films, this project enhances our understanding of both forms by critiquing the specific 
presumptions used to define video games in significant by powerful cultural gatekeepers including 
the United States Supreme Court and the Museum of Modern Art. The premises challenged include 
the notion that video games are all principally games, that video games have a computational 
materiality that warrants a distinct critical approach compared to film, that video games are designed 
to be interactive in way that other aesthetic forms are not, that video games provide a way of 
inhabiting fictional worlds that films cannot, and that video games lack a capacity to reflect our 
historical world back to us in manner comparable to film’s documentary capacity. The point is not 
to suppress distinctions between film and video games, but to understand overlooked facets 
common to the forms as experienced, thus better situating video games in relation to film studies. 
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INTRODUCTION
Video Games and Film Studies 
This dissertation seeks to disrupt the critical, technical, and cultural discursive practices used to 
distinguish video games from films by shifting attention to the shared experiential facets of these 
forms. Beyond merely noting similarities between certain video games and films, this dissertation 
will enhance our apprehension of both forms by demonstrating that many ostensible distinctions 
between them rely on misguided notions about what video games are, and how we encounter them. 
Utilizing several different approaches to both video games and film reception, the chapters of this 
dissertation each critique some of the pervasive assumptions used to differentiate video games as 
expressive media, as cultural objects, and as formal experiences. The premises challenged include the 
notion that we experience video games principally by playing them as games, that video games have 
a computational materiality that warrants a distinct critical approach compared to film, that video 
games are designed to be interactive in way that other aesthetic forms are not, that video games 
provide a way of inhabiting fictional worlds that films cannot, and that video games lack a capacity 
to reflect our historical world back to us in manner comparable to film’s documentary capacity. The 
point is not to suppress distinctions between film and video games, but to understand overlooked 
facets common to these receptive experiences, thus better situating video games in relation to film 
studies. 
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0.1 PLAYING THE GAME: LINEAGES FOR VIDEO 
GAMES 
Roughly seven decades after physicist William Higinbotham and Robert Dvorak developed Tennis for 
Two (1958) at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in Long Island, New York, video games remain a 
distinctly challenging cultural form for scholars to apprehend through existing disciplinary 
configurations.1 As it stands, several branches within the humanities, social sciences, and the 
sciences have made the case for providing the most fitting home for the study of video games, 
which is one reason the appendix of the 2009 anthology Video Game Theory Reader 2 provides what is 
effectively a list of dozens of potential disciplinary homes along with short explanatory blurbs by 
respective academic proponents.2 This is perhaps not all that surprising considering a given video 
game could justifiably be studied as a game, a narrative, a social networking platform, a graphical 
interface, a series of (graphical) moving images, a set of software protocols, a representation, a 
simulation, a virtual world, and even an artwork. For most scholars, the complications caused by 
video games’ manifold identities provides ample justification for either implicitly or explicitly 
regarding video games as a unique and distinguishable medium. The problem with this medium-
specific outlook is not only that it suppresses crucial dissimilarities among video games, but also that 
it overlooks video games’ lineage in relation to other expressive media.3 In particular this has meant 
1In most accounts of video game history, Tennis for Two is identified as the first video game. Mark JP Wolf, The Medium of 
the Video Game (University of Texas Press, 2001), xi. 
I will use the term “video game” in a descriptive sense referring to those cultural objects thought of as video games. We 
could say this refers to any electronic game or narrative relying on computation to produce a visual and/or aural 
expression and appears responsive user input. I am not drawing distinctions between arcade, computer and video games 
(although I recognize the historical reasons for doing so), because these forms are no longer distinguished in any popular 
discourse.  
2 Bernard Perron and Mark J. P. Wolf, The Video Game Theory Reader 2 (New York: Routledge, 2009), 331-88. 
3 By “expressive media” I am referring to any established process for communicating and disseminating messages, ideas, 
and/or experiences. That is to say, media that can disseminate expressions. Whether an expression is functional, 
aesthetic, and/or authored is something we will deal with over the course of the dissertation. 
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that the vast critical resources within film and media studies remain extensively underutilized within 
video game scholarship.  
One way to articulate how popular and scholarly discourses currently position video games 
in relation to other forms of media is to recognize the formulation already ingrained into the 
language we use to describe the video game experience as “playing a game.” At the risk of sounding 
pedantic, returning to the deceptively simple and frequently overlooked terms “play” and “game” at 
the outset is important because it reminds us just how many of the taxonomical constructions of 
media categories we continue to take for granted. Of course, pointing out that the terms game and 
play are difficult to define is hardly a revelation; after all, just about every scholarly work focused on 
related topics will at some point recount how, in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations,4 the 
term and concept game served as the prototypical illustration for language’s lack of specificity. True 
to form, I am also beginning my inquiry with this reference. However, instead of disputing 
Wittgenstein’s central thesis about “games,” I will reveal an even more expansive notion of games and 
play than Wittgenstein’s, one that provides the footing for revealing critically overlooked connections 
between video games and film forged directly through these terms.  
0.1.1 Video Games and Gameplay 
While Wittgenstein’s brief discussion of games mostly serves as a pretense for his larger analysis 
of communication and language, it still offers a succinct analysis of the difficulties in defining what 
constitutes a game. In short, Wittgenstein explains that those activities we call and think of as 
typical games—chess, tennis, ring-around-the-rosy, and hide-and-seek being some of his 
4 For example, see Ian Bogost, How to Talk About Videogames, vol. 47;47.; (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2015), 124-5; Grant Tavinor, The Art of Videogames (John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 86; Gordon Calleja, In-Game : From 
Immersion to Incorporation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011), 8; George Skaff Elias, Richard Garfield, and Karl Robert 
Gutschera, Characteristics of Games (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,, 2012), 5. 
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examples—lack clear, unanimously shared characteristics, and suggest only a “complicated network 
of similarities.” For every identifiable reoccurring attribute like “competition,” “rules,” 
“amusement,” “skill,” “luck,” or “patience,” there is an inevitable counter-example: a game which 
lacks the particular attribute in question, but nonetheless shares other common game-related 
characteristics. In other words, no single characteristic is shared by all games, but each game shares 
characteristics with other games. (If Wittgenstein were to imagine games as a Venn diagram based on 
game-related qualities, the diagram would lack any universally shared component.) This leads 
Wittgenstein to the conclusion that despite networks of “overlapping and crisscrossing… 
similarities,” games cannot be defined outright. Thus, he famously deems all games to be part of a 
“family,” united only by “family resemblances.”5  
In spite of this assertion, however, what Wittgenstein’s games have in common is their 
relationship with gameplay, the playful mode of experience that is shared by each of Wittgenstein’s 
examples. We play chess, we play ring-around-the-rosy, we play tennis; the games Wittgenstein is 
initially describing are all activities that are played because they entail a mode of engagement that we 
think of as gameplay. On the other hand, gameplay may not be the most effective characteristic for 
defining games considering play—and by extension gameplay—is just as nebulous a term as game. This 
critique is compounded by the additional point that the German language, in which Wittgenstein 
was writing, uses the same signifier, “speil,” to connote both play and game interchangeably. As it 
happens, the nebulousness inherent in speil is exactly what many critical theorists have relied on in 
                                                 
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), sections 66-67. It is precisely the 
nebulousness and flexibility of “games” that leads Wittgenstein to assert the practicality in the “the analogy between 
language and games.” Accordingly, he argues that communication itself occurs through “language-games” with shifting, 
relational rules, which can be employed strategically to various ends. Without belaboring the significance of this analogy, 
it is worth recognizing that making the analogy between language and games can have some fairly significant 
consequences considering how this equation relativizes what can be accomplished through the use of language, 
potentially reorienting critical theory inquiry more broadly. If language is a game, perhaps all criticism should be 
understood as form of play, which would makes sense because, to Wittgenstein, communication via language entails 
something like playing a game where we operate according to implicit or explicit rules. Ibid., sections 71, 81-83. 
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their theories of experience, something we see in, for example, Miriam Hansen’s comprehensive 
exegesis of the writings of Walter Benjamin—demonstrating how his use of spiel connotes any or all 
of the terms “‘play,’ ‘game,’ ‘performance,’ and ‘gamble.’”6 There is a comparable muddling of 
“game” and “play” in the French word jeu. This enables certain abstract elasticity, as demonstrated in 
the translator’s note to Derrida’s foundational post-structuralist essay, “Structure, Sign and Play in 
the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” which explains that “the word ‘jeu’ is variously 
translated…as ‘play,’ ‘interplay,’ ‘game,’ and ‘stake,’ besides the normative translation ‘freeplay.’”7 Of 
course, speil and jeu appeal to Benjamin and Derrida, precisely because of these terms’ elasticity as 
signifiers, however it also means that it may seem futile or tautological to define game in terms of 
play. It would seem that, when it comes to gameplay, game and playare incapable of being disentangled. 
Still, when it comes to how these words are used in relation to video games in the English 
language, there often does appears to be more of a lexical distinction between games and play. In 
common usage, game is more likely to be used as a noun (and the subject of a sentence) connoting 
the activity itself, while play is usually the verb (and the predicate of a sentence) referring to the 
mode of engagement.8 The suggestion is that video games are types of games, and, as such, they are 
designated activities that one engages in through play. Consequently, Tetris (Alexey Pajitnov, 1984), 
                                                 
6 Miriam Hansen, Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno, vol. 44 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012), 183. 
7 Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in Writing and Difference, ed. Alan 
Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
8 Regarding gameplay, it is worth acknowledging, however, the less frequent usage of both terms in which play is used as a 
noun/subject and game is used as a verb/predicate. For instance, in a sport like American Football, one can “make a play” 
or “run a play.” Also, a turn or a move within in a board game might be called “a play.”  
“Gaming,” meanwhile is gerund used to connote the act of playing video games. This leads to further associations where 
“gamers” are those whose identities revolve around an interest in video games (“gamers are those enjoy gaming”). My chief 
motivation for avoiding this connotation is because of the incendiary identity politics around the term “gamer,” which 
has increasingly become associated with a “toxic” subculture. Mia Consalvo, "Confronting Toxic Gamer Culture: A 
Challenge for Feminist Game Studies Scholars," Ada: A Journal of Gender, New Media, and Technology, no. 1 (2012). This 
became particularly the case after the “Gamer-Gate” controversy which self-identified “gamers” lashed out at woman 
and minority influences within video game culture. See Adrienne Shaw, Gaming at the Edge: Sexuality and Gender at the 
Margins of Gamer Culture (Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2015). Without discounting the importance of these politics, they are 
not my primary focus in thinking about these terms here. 
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Super Mario Bros. (Nintendo, 1985) and Bioshock (2K Boston, 2007) are all games that can be played 
much in the same way that chess, tennis, and Monopoly are games that can be played.  
The unquestioned assumption in this formulation is that video games are undoubtedly part 
of Wittgenstein’s “family” of games, and that playing a video game should inevitably be apprehended 
in terms of gameplay. This would mean that we play video games in the same or comparable manner 
to how we engage with a single-player game like spider solitaire, a competitive team-sport like 
football, a strategic battle of wits like chess, an individual sport like tennis, a role-playing campaign 
like Dungeons and Dragons, a logical puzzle like Sudoku, or a chance-filled board-game like Monopoly. 
The fact that each of these activities has been adapted on several occasions into video games—
including in the Madden NFL series (EA, 1988-), Battle Chess to (Interplay, 1988), Baldur’s Gate (1998, 
Bioware)—simply serves as evidence supporting the primary assumption that video games belong to 
this “family” of games we associate with gameplay.  
However, there are also consequences and questions raised by this formulation. Are we to 
understand that the computational machine used to process and render a video game is effectively 
an extension of the activity’s apparatus? That is, is the computer or Xbox akin to a deck of cards 
because, like the deck of cards, various games can be played using the same material components?  
Another point is that, in contrast to those video games just mentioned which adapt pre-
existing games, many video games have a less concrete association with recognizable gaming 
conventions and the mode of experience we think of as gameplay. For example, the fairly popular 
video game Euro-Truck Simulator 2 (2012, SCS Software) promises to give “you,” the player, “the 
chance to become a real truck driver from the comfort of your home…making you feel as if you 
were driving the trucks in real life!”9 To most people, the idea of driving an 18-wheeler across 
                                                 
9 This language is taken from the video game’s website. http://eurotrucksimulator.com retrieved from the internet 
8/3/2017 
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Europe to deliver cargo on a deadline—and potentially sitting in hours of virtual traffic, 
accompanied only by the program’s piped-in live radio—is quite literally the opposite of what one 
might associate with the way we play most of the family of games. What is easier to recognize is that 
Euro-Truck Simulator 2 delivers something of a guided imagining of an experience through a mostly 
visual interface. Similarly, other examples within the “simulator” genre allow players to virtually 
access non-game-related experiences like being a crane operator, a pastry chef, a car mechanic, a train 
passenger, or a gay dad looking for love.10  
Yet another reason to question the privileged relationship between video games and gameplay 
comes from the recognition that narrative video games will include experiences more commonly 
associated with other expressive aesthetic forms. For instance, during the over eight hours of 
cinematic sequences interspersed through Metal Gear Solid 4 (Konami, 2008), the “player” merely 
watches a convoluted melodrama about a terminally-ill spy trying to avert global catastrophe by 
destroying major arm manufacturers before he dies. Should this activity, and the spectatorial 
experience of watching 40-minute cut-scenes, be understood only in terms of gameplay?  
The very existence of these questions suggests the need for a more nuanced conception of 
what occurs when we “play a video game.” Instead of assuming that all video games are traditional 
games, and that we simply play them in the same way we play ring-around-the-rosy, tennis, chess or 
solitaire, looking closely at individual encounters with video games tends to provide a vastly more 
complex conception of the ranges of experience included by the encounter. What is more 
remarkable, though, is that a crucially overlooked aspects of video games’ lineage—aspects which 
more readily correspond with other expressive media like film—may also be found within the term 
                                                 
10 These are all experiences that are sought in simulation games. Specifically, Construction Simulator: 2015 (Software 
Entwicklung GmbH, 2014), Car Mechanic Simulator (PlayWay S.A, 2014), Train Simulator (Dovetail Games, 2009) 
Dream Daddy: A Dad Dating Simulator (Game Grumps, 2017)  
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play itself. However, to make this observation, we must recognize additional valences for the term 
play.  
0.1.2 Video Games and Playing a Record 
In the English language, not everything we play is a game.11 For one thing, musical instruments are 
played, and this act is not considered a type of gameplay. Neither, for that matter, is the act of 
screening a film. Yet, films are played in theaters or we might inquire, “what time is that film playing?” 
We also play certain media when we press a button marked “play” or the graphical symbol ► (a 
rightward-pointing triangle) on a remote, on a VCR, or on graphical user-interfaces (GUI). Similarly, 
when we sit at home and choose to watch a film—via a streaming service, laserdisc, DVD, Blu-ray, 
Betamax, video tape 16mm—we play the film. Records, tapes, films, and .mp3 (sound) files are all 
played. We also play books on tape, we play last night’s recorded surveillance footage, and we play our 
favorite podcasts. This type of play is that which prompts the expression of some recorded 
durational content through some technological medium. Yet this connotation seems to have some 
delimiting parameters: unless a television show is recorded ahead of time on our DVR, we are not 
the ones who play a television show. When a television show is broadcast live and our TV is on—it is 
airing—not usually playing. At the same time, a movie on television might be playing on a channel, just 
as a song might be playing on the radio, but we, the home audience, are not the ones playing that 
movie (even if we might be admonished for playing the radio too loud). The radio plays as we listen, 
but it is the broadcasting channel or the DJ that decides what to play over the airwaves.  
                                                 
11 Nor does something have to be thought of like a game for it to be played. I am not just referring to “gamification” or 
transforming non-game activities to have more qualities associated with game as talked about by Ian Bogost recently. Ian 
Bogost, Play Anything: The Pleasure of Limits, the Uses of Boredom, and the Secret of Games (New York: Basic Books, 2016). 
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In the Oxford English Dictionary’s entry for play (as a verb), it mentions that the use  
corresponding to “playing a record”—and soon afterward “playing a movie”—dates back to the 
turn of the 20th century, right around the time that phonographs and films came into mass 
production. One plausible explanation for how this lexical pattern emerged relates to the more 
performative connotations of play, those associated with music recitals and operating a musical 
instrument, as when one “plays a violin,” a phrase that has been around for centuries. 12 If what 
people were listening to on those early gramophones was indeed recorded music, it seems likely that 
language shifted from “listen to a recording of a piano playing” to “listen to a record playing” to 
“playing a record.” This syntactic progression appears inevitable in retrospect, but we should be 
careful not to overlook the significance of the foreshortening rooted into the word “play” itself. We 
may hear a violin being played through speakers connected to a record-player as the record plays a 
recording session of a violinist playing. We are listening to the violinist playing—yet there is no 
violinist; there is only the mediating apparatus and the material facsimile of that original 
performance. The act of playing has been transcribed, and the play is transplanted from the violinist 
first to the recording, then to the media apparatus, and perhaps finally to the listener who can decide 
when and how to play the record. The musician at once plays a song, a concert—the musician plays 
Mozart—but with the recording, it is now the consumer who plays the record on the gramophone, 
we play the song, we play the concert, and we play Mozart.13 Consider how a record’s grooves are 
deciphered, converted, and expressed as soundwaves through some mediating apparatus, and 
through this process, the performative mode of play is transferred, transported, and transmuted.  
                                                 
12 Oxford English Dictionary, "Play, V." (Oxford University Press), IIIa, IIIc. 
13 There is a connection to being a DJ and sampling in hip hop music that is worth considering more. One resource for 
this would be Russel Potter’s work talking about hip hop and “play.” Russell A Potter, Spectacular Vernaculars: Hip-Hop 
and the Politics of Postmodernism (Suny Press, 1995). 
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When video games are placed in a lineage of expressive media, “playing a video game” 
provides a vastly different understanding compared to that implied by gameplay. As an expressive 
form, the video game is not so much an activity as it is a recorded schema, one that has been 
transcribed perhaps into the readable surface of an optical disc, within the memory of a cartridge, or 
as the source code in a downloadable program. The video game itself is raw data, a schema of 
information, that has been encoded and distributed. It will be decoded as it is processed by a 
computational apparatus—rendered into expressive images and sounds—before it is experienced.  
In this way, it is comparable to visual data imprinted onto celluloid that is eventually 
experienced as a film. The video game’s data must be processed both by a computer and then by a 
player to be experienced, perhaps not unlike how the film must be rendered by the bright light of 
the projector and processed by the spectator in order to be experienced. For both film and video 
games, the recorded data is calibrated to engender a range of receptive experiences. As we will 
explore elsewhere in this dissertation, connecting video games with film is about recognizing video 
games within a lineage of media encoded with durational recordings of expressions, expressions that 
should be understood as authored aesthetic experiences.  
The point here is that “playing a film” may have more in common with “playing a video 
game” than one might expect if playing a video game can reclaim the lineage of recorded durational 
media. At the same time, though, it also important to recognize that gameplay and 
media/performative valences of play are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and video games can still 
forge resonances to film through gameplay. This is because film itself may have more of a relationship 
with gameplay than commonly acknowledged. 
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0.1.3 (Inter)activity, Gameplay, and Film 
As we will see through this dissertation, the justification for separating video games from film often 
hinges on some argument related to the term “interactive.” While it usually remains unclear if the 
interactivity being compared is found in the materiality of the respective forms or in the receptive 
experiences of those forms, the assumption is that video games provide interactivity which is absent 
in film and other “old” or “traditional” media.  
One way to articulate the approximate logic behind this supposition is to again note the 
subtle differences in the connotation of “playing a film” compared to “playing a video game” that 
suggest agentic activity during the act of playing. Imagine that after setting up a movie to watch on a 
DVD, I then play the film by pressing a button on a remote control corresponding to the command. 
At that moment, I am playing the film. However, once it has begun playing, it is the movie itself, the 
DVD, the DVD player, and/or the television that is playing the film. I may be watching the movie 
play, but I am no longer the one playing the movie.14 Once my input is completed, it is the recorded 
durational expression and the mediating apparatus that are playing.  
Now consider what happens during a comparable occasion when I sit down to play a video 
game—an event that may very well rely on the same processing console and television used to watch 
a movie on a DVD. Instead of merely pressing play 15 and beholding the expression as it and the 
apparatus plays, as the video game player, I am called upon to provide regular input and perform 
certain actions to both play the video game and allow it to be played.16 I am responding to the aural 
and visual information conveyed through a screen and speakers as I press buttons on my controller 
                                                 
14 The exception to this may be when we are playing a movie for others to see because, in such an instance, we seem to 
express agency in playing the film. This allows the act of screening to function more as a performative act where the 
film’s continued expression becomes a reflection of our agency and our continued cooperation.  
15 Depending on the video game, the command to start the game within the menu interface might read as some variation 
of “Begin the Game” or “Press Start,” but it may also be “Press Play.” 
16 In chapter 2 we will acknowledge why this is different from old media apparatuses which require constant physical 
action like hand-cranked gramophones, or paper books.  
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and input the commands that continue the expression of the video game over some duration. When 
I play a video game, I could be said to play it in the same way the DVD player plays the information 
encoded on a disc. The video game’s code is processed by hardware and rendered onto a screen, but 
the video game’s expression is only sustained by players’ continued cooperation and action. The 
video game plays only as players play it. In this way, players are materially a part of the mediating 
apparatus; they are that which renders the encoded data in the service of the expression. One could 
even make the case that the human agency expressed while playing a video game is a return to the 
agentic human performance displaced by the automated gramophone player. It may be true that 
playing music, whether on a violin or on a home stereo, is a performative act, but, as such, it only 
remains playing through a sustained expression of agency by the player. The violinist plays 
throughout the whole song, while those of us playing a gramophone record only press that button 
marked “play” to allow the record to play. The video game players play the video game to enable its 
expression not unlike how musicians play the notes written in their sheet music.17  
The assumption is, then, that video games are interactive (or provide interactive experiences) 
because they rely on the continued agentic activity on the reception end simply to be expressed. The 
problem with this idea is, however, that determining what counts as the receiver’s agentic activity 
during reception is significantly more difficult when it comes to forms of cultural expression and the 
aesthetic experience. Since we will return this point on more than one occasion in this dissertation, it 
                                                 
17 Indeed, we find versions of this argument in Jay Bolter’s argument about navigating hypertext as being akin to playing 
music. See J. David Bolter, Writing Space: Computers, Hypertext, and the Remediation of Print, vol. 2nd (Mahwah, N.J: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2001), 99-110. Also, this is an argument made by the attorneys representing the video 
game industry in their effort to defend video game playing (in addition to video game production) as an expression free 
speech in the Supreme Court case concerning video game censorship which we will discuss extensively in Chapter 1. In 
their brief, they argue that “playing a video game is like improvising a performance of a musical score, because the player 
engages in and contributes to the expressive activity rather than passively consuming it. Video game play is also like a 
musical performance in that it requires an element of physical skill and virtuosity, such that accomplished players have 
more expressive options than novices.” Brown V. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 3 (2011). 
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is worth foregrounding the reasons why some question the efficacy of interactivity as a 
distinguishing quality for distinguishing video games from film.  
Lev Manovich, for one, describes the “myth” of interactivity in the The Language of New Media 
as follows: 
In contrast to traditional media where the order of presentation was fixed, the user can now 
interact with a media object. In the process of interaction the user can choose which elements 
to display or which paths to follow, thus generating a unique work. Thus the user becomes 
the co-author of the work.18 
For Manovitch, the entire premise that new media is uniquely interactive fails to account for how all 
aesthetic forms are experienced regardless of media. Relying principally on the ideas of E.H. 
Gombrich—a figure we return to in Chapter 3—Manovich points out that “all classical, and even 
more so modern art, was already ‘interactive’ in a number of ways [including] ellipses in literary 
narration, missing details of objects in visual art and other representational ‘shortcuts’ that required 
the user to fill-in the missing information.”19 Simply put, for Manovich, interactivity in relation to 
aesthetic objects can be “psychological,” and it should be understood as a function of the receptive 
experience, as opposed to a “literal” condition of the material medium. It is for this reason we find 
strains of reception studies across forms that have long argued that all kinds of media reception 
engender interactivity. 
As we will discuss more in Chapters 2 and 3, this psychological and aesthetic conception of 
interactivity is consistently linked less with performativity, and more with ludic categories and 
gameplay. The beholder’s activity is consistently a form of playful (inter)activity. This helps explain 
why several film scholars identify aspects of interactivity within films that are particularly associated 
                                                 
18 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media, Leonardo (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 66. For Manovich this 
myth is used primarily to serves a teleological narrative about technological progress in the computer age. Within this 
narrative new media is cast as more democratic because it allows for two-way participation in the production and 
consumption of knowledge, compared to the indoctrinating qualities of the one-way stream of “old” media. 
19 Ibid., 71. 
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with gameplay and other ludic categories.20 For instance, certain directors like Michael Haneke, 
Christopher Nolan, Lars Von Trier and Quentin Tarantino have each been associated with ludic 
categories based on films that upend conventions, provide byzantine twists, and mislead their 
audiences.21 The basic premise behind these arguments is that, even as film, as a material medium, 
may lack the literal agentic activity found in a computational form like video games, films are 
interactive when they “play games” with us as an audience. In this way, gameplay and interactivity are 
not impediments to connecting video games and film, but outlets for demonstrating convergences 
among certain kinds of films.  
Thomas Elsaesser, for one, relates a certain trend of cinematic experiences directly to 
“games” as he identifies a fairly broad slate of filmmakers who use narrative blocks and reveal to 
“disorient or mislead spectators” in what he terms “mind-game films.” To Elsaesser, the films are 
themselves types of games and spectators are active in playing along: “spectators on the whole do not 
mind being ‘played with’; on the contrary, they rise to the challenge.” The mind-game films often 
require repeat viewings to untangle the narrative twists that change the spectator’s experience on 
subsequent viewings. This narrative complexity engenders a particular mode of engagement as 
spectators pay fastidious attention to themes and motifs as clues foreshadowing the “real” story that 
remains hidden in plain sight. It is mode of viewership that “provokes a different, more direct form 
                                                 
20. See especially, Adam Lowenstein, Dreaming of Cinema: Spectatorship, Surrealism, & the Age of Digital Media (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2015). Marsha Kinder, "Narrative Equivocations between Movies and Games," The new media 
book  (2002). Nitzan S. Ben-Shaul, "Hyper-Narrative Interactive Cinema Problems and Solutions," Rodopi; Nitzan S. 
Ben-Shaul, Cinema of Choice : Optional Thinking and Narrative Movies (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012). Several critics and 
film scholars have made the case that the recurrence of these characteristics within the last couple of decades is 
specifically related to new media and video games also seems that we have ended up with a number of different names 
for similar phenomenon of complex narratives in film. David Denby calls these films “narrative disorder,” Patricia 
Pisters calls them “the mosaic film,” and Angela Ndalianis talks about them in terms of “neo-Baroque aesthetics.” David 
Denby, "The New Disorder: Adventures in Film Narrative," The New Yorker 5 (2007); Patricia Pisters, "The Mosaic Film: 
Nomadic Style and Politics in Transnational Media Culture," Thamyris/Intersecting: Place, Sex and Race 23, no. 1 (2011). 
Angela Ndalianis, Neo-Baroque Aesthetics and Contemporary Entertainment (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2004). 
21 Warren Buckland, ed. Puzzle Films: Complex Storytelling Contemporary Cinema (2009); Brigitte Peucker, "Games Haneke 
Plays: Reality and Performance," in A Companion to Michael Haneke (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Berg Charles Ramírez, "A 
Taxonomy of Alternative Plots in Recent Films: Classifying the "Tarantino Effect"," Film Criticism 31, no. 1/2 (2006). 
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of participation from the spectator” than the classical Hollywood narrative or a more standard 
movie. Even as Elsaesser identifies this as a “new” type of experience, he also concedes that “the 
genealogy of the mind-game film includes such venerable master-magicians of surprise, suspense, 
and the double-take as Fritz Lang, Luis Buñuel, Alfred Hitchcock, and Orson Welles, as well as 
1950s/1960s ‘art cinema’ films by Akira Kurosawa, Alain Resnais, and Ingmar Bergman.”22 What is 
“new” about these mind game films is really only the ostensible mainstreaming of this mode which 
plays with filmic conventions to surprise and frustrate the audience’s expectations. While 
Michelangelo Antonioni’s and Buñuel’s films were shown in art-house theaters, Cristopher Nolan’s 
and Quinten Tarantino’s films are tent-pole blockbusters distributed in wide release.  
In fact, several film scholars have noted a nearly identical lineage to the one that Elsaesser 
associates with mind-game films. Marsha Kinder, for one, dubs a similar group of films “database 
narratives,” which she explains as “narratives whose structure exposes the dual processes of 
selection and combination that lie at the heart of all stories and are crucial to language: Certain 
characters, images, sounds, events and settings are selected from series of categories and combined 
to generate specific tales.”23 Another name for these films comes from Nitzan Ben-Shaul who 
describes “hyper-narrative interactive cinema” which is “based on a cognitive-constructivist 
approach to narrative and the viewer’s activity,” are films “designed…[to play] with the viewer’s 
strive to construct a cohering, intelligible, goal oriented trajectory out of the film’s audiovisual flow 
by introducing surprises distractions, diversions and postponements along the way.”24 Others who 
have identified an uptick in films with similar descriptions include David Denby who describes a 
trend of films of “narrative disorder,” Patricia Pisters who identifies the “mosaic film,” and Angela 
                                                 
22 Thomas Elsaesser, "The Mind-Game Film," in Puzzle Films: Complex Storytelling Contemporary Cinema, ed. Warren 
Buckland (2009), 15-16. 
23 SeeMarsha Kinder, "Designing a Database Cinema," in The New Media Book, ed. Dan Harries (London: BFI Pub., 
2002), 6.  
24 Ben-Shaul, "Hyper-Narrative" 83. 
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Ndalianis talks about similar films in terms of “neo-Baroque aesthetics.”25 In each of these various 
approaches, a complex narrative form engenders a more active mode of spectatorship. 
While recognizing this tendency is helpful to some degree, it also perpetuates a misguided 
notion that interactivity and playful modes of cinema spectatorship are merely correlate functions of 
complex storytelling. More likely it is the case, as Kinder implicitly acknowledges, that these “mind-
game” films merely exhibit specific modes of play more conspicuously than other films because 
these complex narratives more reflexively “[reveal] the arbitrariness of the choices made, and the 
possibility of making other combinations which would create alternative stories.”26 What this 
dissertation will explore more in Chapter 3 is that narrative complexity is not the only aspect of 
gameplay relevant to film spectatorship. Further, if too much attention is paid to the use of complex 
narratives, other ludic qualities pertinent to understanding the resonance between films and video 
games remain overlooked.27  
At the same time, it is crucial to acknowledge several facets and types of gameplay found in 
both film and video games. More importantly, only particular modes of gameplay in some video 
games should be understood as relevant to film. This is why one of the consistent points this 
dissertation will return to concerns the limitations wrought by grouping all video games together in 
the first place.  
                                                 
25 Denby, "The New Disorder: Adventures in Film Narrative."; Pisters, "The Mosaic Film: Nomadic Style and Politics in 
Transnational Media Culture." Ndalianis, Neo-Baroque Aesthetics and Contemporary Entertainment. 
26 Marsha Kinder, "Hot Spots, Avatars, and Narrative Fields Forever: Buñuel's Legacy for New Digital Media and 
Interactive Database Narrative," FILM QUART 55, no. 4 (2002): 6. 
27 As we will talk about more in the Chapters 1 and 3, Roger Caillois’ work is particularly helpful for recognizing the 
different playful modes of experience engendered by filmic form. 
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0.1.4 Divisions among Video Games: (De)limiting Frameworks 
For a moment in the 2000s, the meta-discourse concerning the scholarly approach to video games 
was effectively cast as a binary debate between two frameworks: ludology and narratology.28 Scholars 
like Epsen Aarseth and Gonzalo Frasca used a ludic-based approach to video games which focused 
on gameplay and apparently took care in recognizing the player as an agent in an interactive 
system.29  Alternatively, scholars including Henry Jenkins and Marie-Laure Ryan were positioned as 
thinkers contextualizing video games within a tradition of storytelling forms, media convergence, 
and complex narrative structures.30 If nothing else, the ludology and narratology debates were used 
to articulate ostensibly divergent institutional avenues for video games in the academy—the 
narratologists advocated for video games to join an ongoing scholarly discourse found in literature 
and media studies, while the ludologists sought to define a more autonomous space centered around 
gameplay and computation.31  
To the extent that the ludology versus narratology dichotomy ever really existed—a point 
later disputed even by those heavily identified with the debate32—it reflected the reasonable 
                                                 
28 The debate has itself been documented from both the narratological and ludic-centric sides. Marie-Laure Ryan, 
"Computer Games as Narrative: The Ludology Versus Narrativism Controversy," in Avatars of Story (U of Minnesota 
Press, 2006). Gonzalo Frasca, "Ludologists Love Stories, Too: Notes from a Debate That Never Took Place" (paper 
presented at the DiGRA conference, 2003). Here we will discuss this debate mostly as historical matter without getting 
into all of the nuances of each argument. 
29 The works that typify this perspective are Gonzalo Frasca, "Simulation Versus Narrative," The video game theory reader  
(2003); Espen Aarseth, "Computer Game Studies, Year One," Game studies 1, no. 1 (2001). At least this is how it is 
characterized in Matthew Kapell’s more retrospective on the debate. Matthew Wilhelm Kapell, "Introduction: The Ludic 
and Narrative as Sialective About 'What Games Do"," in The Play Versus Story Divide in Game Studies: Critical Essays 
(McFarland, 2015). 
30 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture Where Old and New Media Collide (2006); Marie-Laure Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality 
Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media, Parallax Re-Visions of Culture and Society Ser (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003); Marie-Laure Ryan, Narrative across Media : The Languages of Storytelling, Frontiers of 
Narrative (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004). 
31 Since the digital humanities (or humanities computing) was still a relatively marginal presence within humanities 
departments, the thought may have been that narratologists would ignore the technological aspects of video games while 
the ludic perspective would be far more receptive to those working on the production end of video games including 
engineers, programmers, and designers.  
32 See for instance Espen Aarseth, "Ludology," in The Routledge Companion to Video Game Studies, ed. Mark JP Wolf and 
Bernard Perron (Routledge, 2014). 
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apprehension of video game scholars trying both to justify an interest in a rather stigmatized cultural 
form and to protect this object from being engulfed by more established discourses. The concern 
among the ludic faction of video game scholars seems to have been that interloping literature and 
film scholars would carelessly apply prefabricated cultural readings to the representational signifiers 
in video games without truly understanding the form.33 This view, however, relied on a myopic 
conception of literature and film scholarship, a point evidenced by the shallow reduction of 
literature and film to narratology. After all, film studies scholars are by no means principally 
concerned with narrative, nor do all films (or works of literature) have identifiable narratives.  
More than a decade since the height of the debate, video games have become more 
entrenched as a cultural form, one considered worthy of recognition and study, without finding a 
dependable discursive home in the academy. One reason for this is the consequences of positioning 
video games as a “medium” have never really been well articulated. Consequently, those scholarly 
approaches that effectively cordon off video games within academic journals, book series, or 
individual articles, continue to take for granted that what unites these objects is apparent. Partly this 
is motivated by the rhetorical convenience for scholars within an emerging discourse to operate 
under the assumption that a coherent medium called “video games” actually exists. Meanwhile this 
stance ignores difficult questions about what makes the video game distinct and distinguishable 
enough as a medium to justify grouping together all these disparate objects engendering diverse and 
manifold experiences. Without realizing it, scholars may have conceded basic taxonomical 
discussions and doubts about medium specificity by relying on the conventional wisdom of the 
cultural hive-mind. In truth, the public’s notion of media is effectively provided by whoever 
moderates Wikipedia, names Amazon’s departments, designs the App Store’s menu, or decides how 
to stock the aisles in Wal-Mart. This way, scholarly reference to “video games” is merely descriptive 
                                                 
33 Kapell, "Introduction: The Ludic and Narrative as Sialective About 'What Games Do'." 
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of a cultural phenomenon, and it thus avoids having to prescribe a system of classification based on 
coherent theories of media, aesthetics, representation, or games.34  
As we will discuss in the coming chapters, even as video games have been given implicit 
stamps of approval by various cultural gatekeepers—the US Supreme Court and The Museum of 
Modern Art, for example—what fundamentally unites these objects remains an open question. Does 
the category of video game really have such defining qualities that it justifies tethering together a 
puzzle/skill title like Tetris (1984), and a long-running, expansive, networked-multi-player, role-
playing, virtual universe like Eve Online (2003); the arcade classic Pac-Man (1980) and the sprawling, 
procedurally generated customizable worlds of Minecraft (2011); the competitive arcade fighting game 
Street Fighter II (1991) and the point-and-click, solo adventure narrative Another World (1991)? Maybe 
not, but, to cite one example, these titles are classified together as “video game software” in 
MoMA’s permanent collection effectively binding these objects together with a singular identity 
within the eyes of both the institution and the public. One consequence of an overly rigid 
attachment to medium specificity is, then, that it suppresses important distinction amongst objects 
based on their shared descriptive term.  
To some extent, video game fans and critics have relied on genres and endless sub-
categorization to deal with the tremendous diversity of forms that get culturally bound together as 
“video games.” We find popular notions of genre relied upon to encompass a host of incomparable 
characteristics including narrative patterns, level design, production process, platform, gameplay 
mechanics, visual style, or the player’s primary perspective. Really this creates inchoate video game 
genres based on an assortment of characteristics with descriptions like “first-person,” “rogue-like,” 
                                                 
34 As it stands now, scholars focusing on video games will often justify their object of interest by citing industry statistics 
about video games sales and the colossal figures of people who play video games. But these statistics strategically neglect 
to differentiate between a teenage boy who spends 4 hours each night playing Call of Duty with a group of online friends 
from the boy’s mom who spends her subway commute playing angry birds on her phone. However, if we do not 
acknowledge how different these experiences are from one another, we are perpetuating the video game industry’s 
capital interests in claims of diversity among video game players. 
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“casual,” “simulator,” “text-based,” “open-world,” “multiplayer,” “sand-box,” “retro,” “arcade,” 
“puzzle,” and “indie.” Each of these descriptors provides some detail about some aspect of the 
game, but none provides a level of insight about what the player can expect in the way that the 
moniker “Western” might for a film audience. This leads to situation in which a video game like 
Minecraft (Mojang, 2011) might be described as a third/first-person, survival, sand-box, crafting game 
with optional multiplayer features that takes place in a procedurally-generated, open-world with a 
faux-retro style.  
Deciding how to categorize video games is certainly not an easy task, but there have already 
been some valuable scholarly contributions making key distinctions among video games.35 Jesper 
Juul’s A Casual Revolution, for instance, does a lot of work providing a distinct history and analysis of 
the industry term “casual games,” which are those more mainstream games ubiquitous on mobile 
devices that are “that are easy to learn to play, fit well with a large number of players and work in 
many different situations.” 36 Juul’s distinction between casual games and those 
“mimetic”/”hardcore” games—those known for creating more intricate worlds requiring a 
significant time investment—is important precisely because it does not rely on traditional genre 
distinctions, but rather on modes of engagement. Still, like most other critics writing about video 
games, Juul assumes that even casual games are necessarily part of a larger project, which is why he 
articulates his study of casual games as one “meant to capture what is happening with video games.” 
In this way Juul still organizes all video games in relation only to each other, and neglects to consider 
whether there is an experiential justification for connecting all video games.  
                                                 
35 Nils Skare, "How to Define a Genre: A Lacanian-Marxist Case Study of the Nes Platform Game," 5, no. 1 (2011); 
Damien Djaouti, Julian Alvarez, and Jean-Pierre Jessel, "Classifying Serious Games: The G/P/S Model." 
36 Jesper Juul, A Casual Revolution : Reinventing Video Games and Their Players (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010), 5. 
Usually they are identified by minimal narrative, short learning curve, direct and continuing interface with the player, 
point systems, combination of skill and chance. They can be played for short or long periods without much variation in 
the game mechanics. While it is possible to “beat” some of them, they foster a sense of the need for endless mastery and 
are arguably designed to be addictive. 
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As we will see in the Chapter 1, in the last few years the logic for cloistering video games 
from other forms of expression has been founded largely in argument about materiality and 
computation. We even see this strain of thought in those who are not as invested in medium-
specificity like Alexander Galloway, who at one point argues that “video games are games, yes, but 
more importantly they are software systems…[and] the video game Dope Wars has more in common 
with the finance software Quicken than it does with traditional games like chess, roulette, or 
billiards.”37 Galloway’s argument here is that video games have a stronger “family resemblance” to 
all other user-facing digital software than they do to either those cultural forms we think of as games 
or to other expressive forms of media like film.38 The idea is that the underlying “algorithmic” form 
of video games—the seemingly complex logic of computer software—justifies an alternative critical 
framework for the analysis of this entire form. This logic is appealing, but, as we will continue to see 
in this dissertation, it also reduces video games to their underlying data and material composition in 
a manner that can be quite reductive because it suppresses any consideration of the way these forms 
are experienced. 
In fact, it is quite telling that Galloway’s illustration relies on a comparison between Quicken, 
a budget software, and Dope Wars, a text-based game concerning the economics of the drug trade.39 
It seems that these two examples of software were picked in part because of several resemblances 
pertaining to a shared interest in economic planning, financial calculations, and budgeting. A 
significantly more demanding comparison would be to ask whether a software version of chess has 
more in common with Quicken than it does with chess played on a marble chessboard. Or, for that 
                                                 
37 Alexander R. Galloway, Gaming Essays on Algorithmic Culture, Electronic Mediations 18 (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006), 6. 
38 Galloway at least contemplates a medium-specific approach to video games; he begins his work by explaining that, “if 
photographs are images, and films are moving images, then video games are actions. Let this be word one for video 
game theory.” Ibid., 2. 
39 Dope Wars is an adaptation of Drug Wars (John E Dell, 1984). An additional point to note is that Dope Wars became 
popular in part because it was ported (adapted from one platform to another) to be played on graphing calculators. 
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matter, we might ask whether Galloway would go as far as to argue that the “interactive fiction” 
software version of The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (Infocom, 1984), written by Douglas Adams, 
has more in common with Quicken than it does with Adams’ novel or radio play versions of The 
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy? Again, as we will discuss in Chapters 1 and 2, this tendency to 
overemphasize video games as computational software for the sake of media specificity, has a 
tendency to overlook how video games are engaged in practice. This is not to say that video games’ 
materiality is irrelevant to how they are experienced; only that materiality is not always the principle 
driver of that experience. 
Because this dissertation aims to demonstrate the importance of recognizing experiential 
resonances across media, it is worth making clear at the outset that some video games have far more 
in common with works found in other traditional divisions of media than they do with other video 
games. Take for example, The Walking Dead (Telltale, 2012-), a tightly scripted series of narrative 
video games in which the player makes difficult ethical choices for an escaped convict named Lee 
during a zombie apocalypse. This video game series has far more in common with its sources—the 
popular television show The Walking Dead (AMC, 2010-), and the graphic novel series The Walking 
Dead (Robert Kirkman, 2003-)—than it has with an arcade video game Pac-Man, a casual puzzle 
video game like Candy Crush Saga (King, 2012), or a sports video game like FIFA 2012 (EA, 2011). 
More importantly, this claim will not rely solely on narrative analysis; it simply acknowledges the 
host of formal qualities that should be considered in a close, critical analysis of video games when 
thinking about them in terms of players’ experiences. Accordingly, a close reading of a given episode 
from Season 1 of The Walking Dead video game would entail looking at such qualities as camera 
angle, editing, voice acting, lighting, tone, style, and mise-en-scène—all elements consonant with a 
comprehensive scene analysis within a film studies discourse. Simply put, The Walking Dead video 
games have more to gain from scholarship relating to animation, television, film, and graphic novels, 
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than they do from any video game or ludic scholarship that ignores prior forms of expressive media. 
Acknowledging this point does not mean that scholars should ignore the aspects of The Walking 
Dead video game that are distinct to the video game’s form; only that we need to avoid overvaluing 
those distinctions merely because they bolster an argument for medium specificity.  
As much as it may work against the interests of scholars focused on studying video games to 
do so, we cannot always rely on medium specific frameworks that neglect crucial distinctions. 
Instead of insisting that all video games should be understood simply as games, stories, or software, it 
makes more sense understand video games through the modes of experience they engender—some 
of which are also plainly modes of experience engendered by film.  
0.2 CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
This project began not long after a confluence of fundamental cultural institutions in the United 
States publicly signaled for the first time their approval of video games as objects worthy of serious 
critical attention. Specifically, prior to 2012, several major universities began collections of video 
games within their library systems. Among these were several institutions with established film 
studies programs including the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, and University of 
California at Santa Cruz.40 Another historic occurrence from around the same moment—one we will 
discuss in detail in Chapter 1—was when the United States Supreme Court ruled that video games 
are a protected form of expression under the first amendment alongside film, paintings, and novels. 
Shortly afterward, but seemingly with no connection, the Museum of Modern Art in New York 
began adding video games to their permanent collection. 
                                                 
40 Other university libraries to begin collecting video games between 2008-2012 include those at the University of 
Illinois, the University of North Texas, the University of Delaware, and the University of Washington. 
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As already mentioned, however, it is hard to generalize about video games, which is why this 
dissertation critiques some the of the legal, industrial, and scholarly rhetoric that circumscribes video 
games as a medium. As a scholar with a background in film studies, I will be particularly attuned to 
the dominant assumptions within these discourses that continue to obscure the relevance of video 
games to film studies, and vice versa. These assumptions include video games’ unmitigated 
relationship to gameplay compared to films’ lack thereof, video games’ interactive design and the 
presumption of the player’s agency compared to the experience of the film spectator, and video 
games’ lack of primary, indexical connection to the historical world compared to that which is 
assumedly maintained by film. By critiquing these assumptions, I demonstrate how better 
articulating the relationship between video games and film provides crucial insights into how both 
forms are experienced as aesthetic expressions.  
Chapter 1 looks closely at the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court case, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association, which considered California’s attempt to regulate the sale of “violent” video games as a 
way of evaluating two how to legally apprehend video games as a specific medium. While the 
Court’s decision relied on the history of film censorship to protect video games under the First 
Amendment, some media scholars subsequently criticized the ruling for equating video games with 
film. To media scholar Jennifer Petersen, for instance, the court crucially failed to recognize that, 
“unlike…film, [video] games are built of code and computer files, complexes of software and 
hardware.” Petersen’s accusation that the Court’s principle error was the Justice’s “exclusive focus 
on the screen,” is characteristic of a recent a resurgence among scholars focusing on the materiality 
of media objects. 
Specifically, German media scholars like Freidrich Kittler, Wolfgang Ernst have supplied the 
critical theory for a neo-materialist movement that brings with it a vociferous return of distinctions 
between media—especially between a digital, computational forms like video games and an 
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expressive photographic medium like film. However, a close reading of the case demonstrates how 
the Justices’ opinions—and the circumstances that led them to those opinions—provide a 
crucial critique to materialist conceptions of video games and media specificity for failing to 
recognize the relationship between materiality and experience.  
In Chapter 2, I turn my attention to a shift that began the following year with the Museum 
of Modern Art’s foray into video game collection in 2012. While MoMA’s collection in some ways 
echoes founding of MoMA’s Film Library and its subsequent Department of Film in 1935—a 
momentous turn for the role of film in museum practice and academia—the video games it acquired 
were specifically labeled “design objects” and categorized as “interactive design,” connoting an 
institutional and theoretical divide from the seemingly less functional “art” objects in other 
departments. Part of what this decision forces us to reckon with is the fact that Manovich’s 
argument about the myth of interactivity has clearly not been applied here. Consequently, it is 
essential to reckon with the fact that interactivity remains a pervasive and critical term for 
articulating something both novel and noteworthy characteristics of the encounter between humans 
and video games. This chapter proposes that the entire debate over interactivity as a unique 
characteristic of video games is missing a critical distinction between aesthetic objects and design 
objects—the former of which is engaged textually, and the latter of which is engaged functionally. 
To make this case, the chapter transitions into a close reading of the computer game The Stanley 
Parable (Davey Wreden, 2013), which reveals how video games present a privileged site for 
examining the relationship between aesthetics and design because they can explicitly invite textual 
and functional experiences simultaneously. Using this reading I make the case that interactivity is not 
just a description of the material construction of the artifact in question or its media; it is a critical 
position one takes in apprehending a cultural object. 
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Chapter 3 turns its attention to the lessons we can derive from the correspondence between 
ludic and aesthetic experiences when it comes to film and video games. I make the case that video 
games can help us understand cinematic reception in terms of entering a play-space which, in 
narrative films, involves encountering a built world. The reverberation between gameplay and 
narrative film spectatorship provides outlets for thinking about film reception in terms of how video 
game worlds are explored and apprehended. To investigate and illustrate this idea, this chapter looks 
closely at Peter Weir’s The Truman Show (1998), which is a remarkable film for demonstrating how 
video game play can relate to film reception because the film has a rather unusual way of positioning 
its spectator in relation to the fictional world it creates. Specifically, the film’s multiple diegetic layers 
allow the spectator to remain both in a reflexive position outside one layer of the film, while 
remaining effectively absorbed inside another layer of the film. This produces a mode of 
engagement that feels particularly resonant with the way video game players can both play in and play 
with video game worlds. 
Chapter 4 continues the theme of world-building to examine one of the principal challenges 
in creating critical parity between video games and film—their differing ontological (or “indexical”) 
relation to the historical world. The assumption is that while films have the capacity to document the 
historical world, video games always construct a world (akin to animation or other non-indexical 
forms). Specifically, I look at the video game LA Noire in relation to a peculiar cycle of mid-century 
American films (sometimes referred to as “semi-documentary noirs”) as an occasion to interrogate 
the relationship between “real-world” historic cities and their counterpart versions experienced 
through video games and films. Through an analysis of these texts, I demonstrate that the notion of 
authenticity that we associate with the documentary can be manufactured in video games through 
the experience of complex, contingent systems. This leads me to make the case that video games can 
have documentary functions akin to those produced by films. 
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Taken together, these chapters reconsider and recalibrate some of the central notions 
undergirding the way both scholars and enthusiasts apprehend video games. My methodological 
approach, which adapts a film studies discourse to better understand and incorporate video games, 
not only reveals overlooked parallels between the receptive experiences of film and video games, but 
also complicates some of the basic distinctions we make in characterizing these forms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Video Game Materiality: 
The Supreme Court and the Case Against 
Medium Specificity 
1.1 DIFFERING OPINIONS 
In the introduction, we discussed a few of the ways to situate video games as a medium in relation to 
other media. Specifically, in the word play we found that video games might be contextualized in 
relation to a ludic context of games and gameplay, but we also recognized that another valence of play 
suggesting a connection forged in the articulation of media objects encoded with recorded 
expressions. Underlying either lineage, however, is a question about whether video games are 
distinct in way that justifies treating them as categorically different or new. That is to say, are video 
games distinguishable enough as a medium to justify apprehending them through an altogether 
different framework from either expressive media or games?  
As it happened, in a legal sense this question was implied during the 2011 US Supreme Court 
case Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association judging the constitutionality of California’s attempt to 
regulate the sale of “violent” video games to minors, in which the Justices confronted the difficult 
task of situating video games as a medium. In the oral arguments, the Justices openly considered 
several preexisting frameworks based on video games’ presumed relationship to more established 
media. During oral arguments Justice Kagan, for one, entertained the idea that video games should 
be understood as the “modern-day equivalent[s] of Monopoly sets.” Video games, Kagan explained, 
“are things that people use to compete… [just as Pong is] playing tennis on your TV.” Yet, Kagan 
also wondered aloud if the Court had an interest in “separat[ing] video games into narrative video 
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games and non-narrative video games.” Meanwhile, Justice Ginsburg challenged the law’s proponents 
to articulate the characteristics of video games that justify regulating them differently from other 
expressive media including films, comic books, and fairy tales, with a simple question, “why are 
video games so special?”1  
As it turned out, a divided court, with some atypical ideological configurations, ended up 
striking down California’s attempt to regulate video games largely on the grounds that video games 
are not “special” enough to warrant being treated differently from those forms of expression already 
protected under the law including film, literature, and comic books. On the contrary, writing for the 
Court the late Justice Scalia’s majority opinion downright rejected California’s argument that video 
games present “special problems” because they are uniquely “interactive.” Instead Scalia argued that 
“the California Act [was] the latest in a long series of failed attempts to censor violent 
entertainment…[and b]efore videogames came cheap novels depicting crime, …, motion pictures, 
comic books, television and music lyrics…”2  
Still, the Court’s decision was far from unanimous, and, frankly, the 7 to 2 decision on 
record obscures the significant disagreements among the Justices over central questions about how 
to understand video games. For one thing, only the minimum five Justices signed on to Scalia’s 
majority opinion; Justices Alito and Roberts, explicitly did not join Scalia’s opinion and instead 
struck down California’s regulation on narrower grounds concerning the law’s vagueness.3 
Meanwhile, Justices Breyer and Thomas dissented in separate opinions. Perhaps more telling is that 
Kagan, one of the five Justices that provided Scalia with enough votes to maintain the majority 
opinion, has since described this case as the “toughest” decision she has had to make since joining 
                                                 
1 The official transcript for the oral arguments from Brown V. Ema, 39,5. Case# 08-1448 The case was originally known 
as Schwarzenegger V. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n. 
2 Scalia Opinion Announcement - June 27, 2011, ibid., 2737. 
3 Alito and Roberts do not exclude the possibility that video games are a form of an expression that can be regulated. 
However, in their judgments, the statute at issue in Brown lacked the specificity to distinguish between acceptable and 
non-acceptable video games. 
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the Court, explaining that it is “the one case where...I just don't know if [my decision was] right.”4 
Even the majority opinion, which is delivered in Scalia’s typically assured rhetorical bravado, relies 
on rather slippery logic; it at once argues that a video game player’s “interaction with the virtual 
world” is a “distinctive feature to the medium [of video games],” while also making the case that 
“interaction” is found in other expressive media and should then only be understood as different as 
a “matter of degree [rather] than of kind.”5 In other words, it would seem that Scalia at once 
acknowledges the quality of “interaction” as a meaningful and distinguishing feature of video games, 
and yet he also argues that video games provide only an amplified gradient of what occurs when, say, 
a novel “draws the reader into the story.”6 
Among those Justices who did not sign on to Scalia’s opinion, we find arguments outlining 
why video games are “special” enough as a medium to be treated differently under the law. Breyer 
proposes the idea that, unlike books or movies, “video games combine physical action with 
expression.” As an “active” medium, Breyer argues, video games are instructive (akin to “target 
practice”) and “can cause more harm…than can typically passive media, such as books or films or 
television programs.”7 Breyer’s logic is that, since the government can regulate physical action, the 
government may also be able to regulate video games. Taking it further, for Alito—and the co-
signing Chief Justice Roberts—video games “may be very different from anything that we have seen 
before.” Alito returns to the notion of “interactivity” and reasons that video games potentially 
provide an “unprecedented ability to participate” compared to other media. In this respect, Alito 
specifically questions Scalia’s fundamental assumption that video game interaction is only different 
in “degree” rather than “kind”:  
                                                 
4 Elana Kagan, interview by Christopher Eisgruber, November 20, 2014, 2014. 
5My Italics Brown V. Ema, 2733,38. 
6 Ibid., 2738. Scalia description is actually a quote from Judge Posner’s circuit decision in separate case regarding violent 
video games. American Amusement Machine Ass'n V. Kendrick, 244 F. 3d 572, 577 (2001). 
7 Brown V. Ema, 2765,68. 
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Spending hour upon hour controlling the actions of a character who guns down scores of 
innocent victims is not different in ‘kind’ from reading a description of violence in a work of 
literature…[Scalia’s majority opinion] is sure of this; I am not. There are reasons to suspect 
that the experience of playing violent video games just might be very different from reading a 
book, listening to the radio, or watching a movie or a television show.8 
Those “reasons to suspect” may have come in part from the dozens of social scientists cited within 
the case whose research links violent video games with aggressive behavior in adolescents.9 In fact, 
many of those same social scientists later felt that the Court’s decision firmly discounted the validity 
of their research.10  
Still, for the popular press and the video game industry, the Court’s decision was less of a 
rebuke of social science, than an affirmation of a constitutional declaration of the artistic legitimacy 
of video games, or as Seth Schiesel of the New York Times opened his article after the ruling “it is 
now the law of the United States that video games are art.”11 While an overstatement, at the very 
least the Court had placed video games alongside film and literature as a medium or definite form of 
expression that is assumed to maintain some “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, 
journalistic, historical, or artistic value.”12  
Part of what is so intriguing about the various opinions expressed in the case is how they 
reflect analogous ambivalence among media scholars about how—or maybe if—we should position 
video games as distinct medium.  
For a long time in media studies, it was easy to ignore questions about what defines video 
games because “media specificity” had been declared woefully misguided by scholars like Noël 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 2748,42. 
9  In fact, in Breyers written opinion, he includes an appendix listing over a hundred studies “supporting the hypothesis 
that violent video games are harmful” ibid., 2772-78. 
10 C. J. Ferguson, "Violent Video Games and the Supreme Court: Lessons for the Scientific Community in the Wake of 
Brown V. Entertainment Merchants Association," Am Psychol 68, no. 2 (2013). 
11 Seth Schiesel, "The Court Has Ruled; Now Games Have a Duty," New York Times, Jun 28 2011. See also Catherine J. 
Ross, "A Video Victory for Free Speech," The Washington Post, June 28 2011; Will Fulton, "The Day Justice Scalia Helped 
Save Video Games," Digital Trends, February 15 2016. 
12 This threshold was established in Miller V. California, 413 US 15 (1973). It has been reaffirmed many times since. 
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Carroll. In what may have been a backlash against Marshall McLuhan’s brand of media specificity, 
Carroll argued that overemphasizing media distinctions lead to overly determinist frameworks, and 
minimized the way these forms were practically experienced. In sum: it was “media essentialism”13 
But Ian Bogost and Alexander Galloway have made notable attempts to define video games through 
decisive characteristics like “procedural rhetoric” and “action,” respectively. Bogost calls video 
games an “expressive medium,” and defines them as “rule-based representations and interactions 
rather than the spoken word, writing, images, or moving pictures.” Video game expression, he 
continues, is “tied to the core affordances of the computer: computers run processes, they execute 
calculations and rule-based symbolic manipulations.”14 Galloway, meanwhile, begins his exploration 
of video games with the proposition that “if photographs are images, and films are moving images, 
then video games are actions.” Accordingly, Galloway makes a clear “distinction between those art 
forms that require the physical action of both the user and the work for the work to exist, and those 
that do not.” As pointed out in the introduction, Galloway’s other guiding principle for 
distinguishing video games from other expressive media is that “video games…are software systems 
[and] this must always remain in the forefront of one’s analysis.”15  
More recently, the case for media specificity has gone even farther by specifically working 
against a timeline that places video games alongside other expressive media. In addition to 
McLuhan, German media scholars like Freidrich Kittler and Wolfgang Ernst have supplied the 
                                                 
13 Noel Carroll, for one, persuasively made the case against media specificity by arguing it is a myth that provides a 
determinist framework and minimizes the qualities that operate across media. See Noël Carroll, "The Specificity of 
Media in the Arts," Journal of Aesthetic Education 19, no. 4 (1985); Noël Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
14 Ian Bogost, Persuasive Games : The Expressive Power of Videogames (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007). 
15Galloway, Gaming Essays on Algorithmic Culture, 128. Specifically, Galloway distinguishes the four moments of “gamic 
action” that are characterized by the “physical action of both the user and the work.”  These categories are drawn from 
two binaries that Galloway builds his ideas around, that of the operator/machine and that of the diegetic/nondiegetic. 
Ibid., 3,6. Bogost and Galloway both position video games within a cultural tradition of expressive media, before 
explaining how they are materially distinct. As in Scalia’s invocation of a history of censoring entertainment, both Bogost 
and Galloway situate video games within a cultural lineage that includes expressive media like film, implicitly recognizing 
how video games inherit the tradition of media that can express ideas and represent our world back to us. 
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critical theory for what Ian Verstegen has characterized as “the rise of studies of digital materiality 
and a philosophical turn to materialism.”16 This neo-materialist movement brings with it a 
vociferous return of distinctions between media—especially between digital, computational forms 
like video games and an expressive photographic form like film. This neo-materialist approach to 
media studies argues that digital media, including video games, is not simply a successive milestone 
on a continuous timeline of culturally expressive media. Rather, digital media, including video games, 
provides a categorical divergence from that timeline—or what Thomas Elsaesser characterized as a 
distinct techno-logic “made up of switches and relays, of circuits and grids, … made possible by 
harnessing electricity and mastering electromagnetic fields, rather than by mechanical devices 
arranged in a particular spatio-temporal order.” 17 The material gap between the optical image and 
the electronic image cannot simply be traversed through cultural narratives and, following the neo-
materialist critics’ reading of how to produce accounts of history, it is ideologically fraught to do so. 
Within this approach, the medium specificity of the digital is not simply a useful way of 
distinguishing some media; it denotes definite material distinctions, ones which are not easily glossed 
over with qualitative interpretive approaches utilizing concepts like “remediation” or “convergence.” 
Instead of worrying about being labeled “media essentialists,” these neo-materialists are now quick 
to accuse hermeneutic readings of video games as “screen essentialism.”18 
Before we allow the resurgence of materialist approaches to media to sever all ties between 
digital and non-digital media, it is helpful to return to Supreme Court’s consideration of video games 
to illustrate how the Justices’ opinions—and the circumstances that led them to those opinions—
                                                 
16 Ian Verstegen, "Dispositional Realism and the Specificity of Digital Media," Leonardo 47, no. 2 (2014): 159. 
17 Thomas Elsaesser, "Media Archaeology as Symptom," New Review of Film and Television Studies 14, no. 2 (2016): 195. 
18 The specific phrase “screen essentialism” seems to have been coined by Nick Montfort and popularized by Matthew 
Kirschenbaum. See Nick Montfort, "Continuous Paper: The Early Materiality and Workings of Electronic Literature," 
Modern Language Association, Philadelphia, PA. URL: http://nickm. com/writing/essays/continuous_paper_mla. html [25 August 
2015]  (2004).and Matthew G. Kirschenbaum, Mechanisms : New Media and the Forensic Imagination (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2008). 
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provide a helpful critique to overly materialist conceptions of video games. This allows us to 
carefully consider the practical and legal implications of the effort to define video games as a specific 
medium, and what happens when we distinguish video games from other expressive media on 
materialist terms.  
This chapter begins, then, by recounting the historical context the Court used to justify their 
cultural approach to video games, followed by an account of the materialist criticism of the Court’s 
approach. Looking closely at the materialist conception of video games, however, reveals that this 
approach can neglect the importance of utilizing cultural frameworks for understanding video 
games. The second part of this chapter examines some of the ways the Supreme Court assessed 
video games on a practical level. This analysis reveals the absence of crucial experiential components 
in discussions about medium-specificity and video games. Specifically, Brown’s details provide 
insights into why the term “interaction” remains a sorely misunderstood term in relation to video 
games. Additionally, details about how the Justices watched DVDs of gameplay recordings allow us 
to articulate the problem of theorizing video games without acknowledging the importance of 
theories of spectatorship. Together, this discussion will illustrate shortcomings of medium-specific 
conceptions of video games that are overly contingent on materiality. 
1.1.1 Cultural Precedents and Material Dissent 
When the issue of video game censorship came before the Supreme Court, the Court was well aware 
of the potential social, economic, and cultural consequences of delineating a new medium. Roughly a 
century earlier, 1915’s Mutual Film Corp v. Industrial Commission of Ohio found the Justices similarly 
tasked with defining a new mass-entertainment medium in a case involving state censorship of 
motion pictures. As in Brown, the pro-censorship argument—which prevailed in Mutual—hinged on 
the idea that this new visual medium should be categorically distinguished from those media 
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protected by the First Amendment as forms of free expression. As the Court explained in its 
decision, motion pictures were not to be considered equivalent to media of “expression, whether by 
speech, writing or printing.” Instead—lending additional credence to Tom Gunning’s notion of the 
“cinema of attractions”—motion pictures were classified alongside “theatre, the circus, and all other 
shows and spectacles,” which, while considered “mediums of thought,” did not enjoy the same 
protections under the first amendment as “expression.”19  
Even amongst these other spectacle-driven media, motion pictures were singled out for their 
exceptional “capability and power” to morally corrupt audiences. As the Court explained:  
[Motion pictures] are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and 
known, vivid, useful and entertaining no doubt, but, as we have said, capable of evil, 
having power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition.20 
This decision, outlining the cinema’s medium-specific “capacity for evil”—as it was subsequently 
referred to—justified the next five decades of state-sanctioned film censorship. According to the 
scholarship of Laura Wittern-Keller, the 1915 ruling reflected the popular sentiment of the early 20th 
century that “movies were an entirely new medium—far more graphic, more widespread, and more 
rapid in delivering realistic, riveting instruction in the ways of romance, seduction, and crime.”21 In 
2011’s Brown there is a clear echo of Mutual’s argument against film, as California tried to convince 
the Court that these were “offensively violent video games depicting brutal and sadistic acts” and 
that  “the level of graphic detail and realism contained in many modern violent video games is 
without historical parallel.”22 On both occasions, the moral threat is enabled by increasing realism 
and graphic detail.  
                                                 
19 Mutual Film Corp. V. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 US 230, 243 (1915). Also see Laura Wittern-Keller, Freedom of the 
Screen: Legal Challenges to State Film Censorship, 1915-1981 (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 43. 
20 My formatting. Mutual V. Ohio, 243-44. 
21 Wittern-Keller, Freedom, 18. 
22 Petitioners’ Brief Brown V. Ema, 43. Only Alito (and Roberts) seems swayed by this argument, however. See below. 
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By the mid-twentieth century, film’s exceptionality was no longer a convincing argument to 
the Supreme Court (perhaps because, by that point in time, the Justices had lived most of their lives 
in a world with moving pictures). It took until 1952 for the Supreme Court to “bring films under the 
umbrella of the First Amendment.” After a series of film censorship cases, in 1966 “the Supreme 
Court set down such rigid procedural requirements for governmental film censorship that all [but 
one] of the remaining states gave up. Beginning with the [1952] Burstyn decision and increasing with 
the [1966] Freedman decision, the mechanics of governmental film censorship grew to be such an 
onerous burden that, one by one, the states realized that it was no longer worth the effort.” 23  
By the time of Brown in 2012, any sense of film’s medium-specific exceptionality or legacy as 
spectacle was long gone, as movies were unceremoniously listed alongside protected forms of 
expression like literature, illustrations, and Grimm’s fairy tales. Mutual’s impact instead becomes one 
of a cautionary tale about medium-specificity, which is why Scalia’s majority opinion in Brown cites 
Mutual and its eventual reversal as a historical lesson about avoiding kneejerk reactions to emerging 
media.24 Indeed, during oral arguments, Scalia presented the legacy of film censorship to challenge 
California, describing how early film censors essentially used a parallel argument to California’s: 
“[Those early censors said,] ‘we've had violence in Grimm's fairy tales, but we've never had it live on 
the screen.’ Every time there's a new technology, you can make [the] argument [that its depiction of 
violence is categorically different.]”25 Video games, in this view, are simply the newest way to express 
ideas stemming from the latest technological innovation or cultural trend.  
Yet, it is this historical timeline of cultural media, which places video games on a 
technological continuum with other forms of expression like film and literature, that digital media 
                                                 
23 Wittern-Keller, Freedom, 276-77. This means that films, like other forms of speech, can only be restricted under 
exceptional circumstances, like for instance, when it is deemed to directly incite violence and if they lack “serious 
religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.” 
24 Brown V. Ema, 2737. 
25 Ibid., 2741. 
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scholars interested in materiality have begun adamantly contesting as of late. In media and legal 
scholar Jennifer Petersen’s view, the Court’s decision profoundly mischaracterizes video games 
through a bias of “mimetic visual representation and narration,” effectively placing video games in 
an erroneous historical timeline of expressive media. To Petersen, the Court “gloss[ed] over the 
actual social relations being protected” by failing to recognize that, “unlike books and film, [video] 
games are built of code and computer files, complexes of software and hardware.” If the Court had 
comprehended video games “in the same category as computer code,” Petersen reasons, then video 
games would be considered within a distinct media lineage, one that provides a more appropriate 
legal framework. Specifically, video games would be considered “speech plus,” a legal category 
connoting a medium’s crucial functional dimension—effectively action, in addition to expression. To 
justify this argument Petersen relies on the notion that video games “are, after all, the manifestation 
of machine and human action, the outcome of interactions between the code and the player.”26 In 
Petersen’s estimation, recognizing video games as “speech plus” might not have changed the 
outcome of Brown, but it would have proved crucial to understanding video games along a different 
axis from other visual and narrative media, which would have allowed the Court to protect the actual 
social and technical questions at issue.27 It is vital to recognize, however, that Petersen’s 
condemnation of the Court’s apparent “exclusive focus on the screen” is, at its core, premised on 
the principles of a particular materialist approach to digital media that should be contextualized.28 
In emphasizing video games’ underlying structure (i.e. its materiality) and downplaying the 
player’s experience, Petersen echoes the criticism of what Nick Montfort, Matthew Kirschenbaum, 
                                                 
26 Jennifer Petersen, "Behind the Screen: Visuality, Law, and New Media," Popular Communication 12, no. 3 (2014): 176, 
66-7. Petersen challenges the primary supposition that video games should be thought of as “pure speech, [and,] just like 
movies and books, [they] should receive the same free speech protections.” 
To make this argument Petersen cites both Bogost and Galloway. See also Jennifer Petersen, "Is Code Speech? Law and 
the Expressivity of Machine Language," New Media & Society  (2013). 
27 Petersen, "Behind the Screen," 176. 
28 Ibid., 173. 
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and Jussi Parrika all condemn as “screen essentialism” 29— a phrase that counters accusations of 
“media essentialism” with retaliatory accusations of the superficiality of hermeneutic approaches to 
video games (and other “new media”). Screen essentialism is cast as an approach focusing on 
narrative and visuals, while neglecting the underlying material components of both the video game 
as a physical object, and its respective platform. Put another way, the screen essentialist is said to 
privilege the interface, reading it alone as the video game’s text, without accounting for those 
hidden, yet quantifiable operations that allow the interface to manifest. Kirschenbaum, in particular, 
criticizes the “medial ideology” of the screen essentialist approaches that favors the user’s 
phenomenological experiences, while “many of the plain truths about the fundamental nature of 
electronic writing [remain] apparently unknown at a simple factual level, or else overlooked or their 
significance obscured.”30 We find a similar conviction in Petersen’s critique of the Court’s failure to 
note the “actual” social and technological conditions of video games.31 
In this way, Petersen’s reasonable argument only represents one side of a critical divergence 
amongst media scholars about how to conceive of digital artifacts and software in relation to media 
history, one which finds both sides accusing the other of “essentialism.” As Jussi Parikka explains, 
there are “two camps of media studies: the German variant of hardcore/hardware media 
archaeology and the cultural studies Anglo-American style of [media archaeology] focusing on 
content, users, and representations.”32 Petersen’s criticism of the Court relies on elements of the 
                                                 
29 See also Thomas Apperley and Jussi Parikka, "Platform Studies’ Epistemic Threshold," Games and Culture  (2015). 
30 Kirschenbaum, Mechanisms, 44-46. 
31 To be fair, Petersen’s argument relies on a more materialist approach to video games as a means to an end. Her point 
is effectively that the court’s conception of video games protected the corporate speech of video game producers while 
discounting “political and expressive freedoms of citizens.” Petersen, "Behind the Screen," 176. 
32 This divide media archeology broken down into the “media materialist” camp—characterized by the work of figures 
like Friedrich Kittler and Ernst—and the “contextual” camp—characterized by scholarship from scholars including 
Tom Gunning and Anne Friedberg. Jussi Parikka, "Archives in Media Theory: Material Media Archaeology and Digital 
Humanities," in Understanding Digital Humanities, ed. David M. Berry (New York;Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire;: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 87-88. Elsewhere Parikka refers to “a binary division…between the socially and culturally 
oriented Anglo-American studies and the techno-hardware approach of German scholars, who have taken their cue 
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“hardcore,” “media materialist” approach, which understands digital artifacts in terms of their literal, 
material operations, while the Court’s opinion apparently falls into a more contextual, “cultural” 
approach to digital artifacts. While it may not be immediately apparent why these camps are mutually 
exclusive, Thomas Elsaesser has recently pointed out that the debate’s “stakes are significant” 
because the two sides provide vastly different ideological conceptions of media history.33 As we shall 
soon see, these sides also have fundamentally distinct notions of the very constitution of the video 
game. 
1.1.2 The Material Video Game 
At the extreme ends of Parikka’s cultural and material divide, not only do we find different notions 
of how to study video games, but we find drastically different notions of what constitutes the object 
of study itself. For a humanist, we might say that scholars fundamentally disagree about what 
comprises the video games’ underlying textuality. For the culturalist, a text exists beyond the literal 
material object itself. This has been true, at least since the rise of postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, which moved cultural theory away from positivist conceptions of textuality or 
notions that a text can be delimited to, say, the intentionality of author, transhistorical signifiers, or 
its material composition. Instead, the text and textuality are understood, at least to some extent, as 
socially, historically, and politically constructed. The text of the video game, in a certain sense, has 
been apprehended through a notion of the video game as experienced. For the materialist, though, 
                                                                                                                                                             
from Friedrich Kittler’s synthesis of Foucault, information theory, media history, and McLuhan…” Erkki Huhtamo and 
Jussi Parikka, Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, and Implications (Univ of California Press, 2011), 8.  
33 Thomas Elsaesser’s recent work discusses the material/cultural divide in media archaeology in relation to film history. 
He asks “might it be possible if not to heal this rift, to nonetheless come to a better understanding of why and how it 
occurred? The stakes are significant: it would, on the one hand, help answer my question what is/was the cinema (good) 
for, and on the other, clarify how the cinema might clarify how the cinema might become, either despite, or because of 
its supposed obsolescence, the repository for that different kind of future that seems to lie at the heart of media 
archaeology’s utopian aspirations.” Elsaesser, "Media Archaeology as Symptom," 196. 
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the video game is an object that should be understood informatically, essentially as a code which 
provides a set of procedural protocols that produce a series of material operations in relation to a 
platform. This materialist approach advocates investigating video games principally in terms of their 
physical, mathematical, logical, technological, and functional structures, while a video game’s 
narrative content and the player’s experience is either beside the point or largely determined by the 
materiality. To the materialist, the video game’s textuality is what is produced when one 
comprehensively maps how all these interrelated operations function. According to Parikka, this 
approach counters unrestrained screen essentialism with “a nonconsumer, and nonuser, approach to 
media [which is] also beyond history and is deeply invested in develop[ing]…new critical humanities 
techniques to study technologies and technocultures on their own terms.”34 
 The materialist approach positions its conception of media as a significant departure from 
typical humanities approaches. Friedrich Kittler, who, along with Marshall McLuhan, provides the 
theoretical foundations for the materialist approach, articulated a conception of media and 
technological history apart from human and cultural history—a project that has been characterized 
as essentially excising the “human” from the humanities.35 In doing so, the materialist approach 
fundamentally rejects conceptions of media history like the one used by Scalia in Brown, which views 
media on an ostensibly evolutionary, cultural timeline. For materialists, anatomizing digital artifacts 
such as video games, provides occasions to counter the teleology of cultural narratives, by allowing 
scholars to uncover the obscured counter-histories lying dormant within the structural design of the 
material object. Wolfgang Ernst, who perhaps represents the extreme end of the materialist camp, 
explains the distinction between material and cultural approaches in the following manner:  
                                                 
34 Apperley and Parikka, "Platform Studies," 14,2. 
35 Friedrich Adolf Kittler, Austreibung Des Geistes Aus Den Geisteswissenschaften: Programe Des Poststrukturalismus, vol. 1054 
(Schöningh, 1980). 
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As opposed to multimedia aesthetics, digital archaeology tries to get beyond sight and sound 
because, behind the images and noises, we are confronted with practices in which visual 
images no longer have any reference to an observer in a ‘real; optically perceived world;’ but 
rather refer to electronic mathematical data in which abstract visual and linguistic elements 
coincide and are circulated.36 
For Ernst, aesthetic categories are wholly irrelevant. The sensorial descriptions of “sight” and 
“sound” already connote an adulterating context of human perception. Parikka explains that the 
materialist camp’s objective, typified by Ernst, seeks not to interpret an object’s meaning per se, but 
to understand the object through a process of diagramming its operations and structure. Objects are 
understood “in their material processuality—the logical and material infrastructure which are media 
technological only if they work…[T]he task of the media archaeologist becom[es] less a textual 
interpreter and a historian, and more an engineer and specialist in wiring and diagrammatics of 
circuits.”37 The archaeologist records and presents the materiality without explicating the materiality 
or the content in terms of representation or metaphor. 
The most influential version of this approach is probably Matthew Kirschenbaum’s 
materialist analysis of the early PC video game Mystery House (Roberta and Ken Williams, 1980) 
which models a way to critically engage software by focusing on the underlying traces passively 
recorded in the digital object’s engineering and code.38 Put another way, Kirschenbaum performs a 
reading of the “disk image,” instead of interpreting Mystery House by analyzing the game’s interactive 
storyline or the graphical output displayed on a screen which would be more familiar approaches 
within literature and film scholarship. It is this “disk image” in concert with the computer’s ability to 
process that image, that comprises the digital object itself to Kirshenbaum, who explains his 
approach to Mystery House as a new standard for critically reading digital objects: 
                                                 
36 Wolfgang Ernst, Electronic Mediations : Digital Memory and the Archive (Minneapolis, US: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2012), 
126. 
37 Parikka, "Archives," 95-96. 
38 Parikka makes the point a few times that Kirschenbaum’s work is an “‘exemplary’ illustration of a media 
archaeological approach to software. See Apperley and Parikka, "Platform Studies," 3. and Parikka, "Archives."(2012) 
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[T]o read through this one particular disk image, cultivating a thick textuality as a potential 
model of critical practice; a model encompassing both screen-level text and machine-level 
instructions, embracing both normal interaction with the game and activities closer to hacking 
or cracking…39 
Kirschenbaum is compiling what he calls the “forensic materiality” of Mystery House and his idea of 
the “textuality” is quite literal. It includes everything that can be gleaned from the record held within 
the “disk image,” which, he explains, “is not simply a copy of all of the files that were once on that 
original diskette; rather the disk image, like the facsimile or photograph suggested by the term, 
preserves all of the information that was recorded on the disk in its original storage geometry.”40 
Kirschenbaum’s forensic reading of the disk image produces a technologically determined “text,” 
one emanating from the material constraints and practicalities as various media function together to 
produce the very literal material artifact we know as the game Mystery House.  
Both the utility and the shortcomings of this approach seem most apparent when we try and 
apply an analogous approach to other, more traditional forms of expressive media. The equivalent of 
determining the forensic materiality for a novel would be to include everything from the books 
pagination, the clarity of the ink, the choice of font, the feeling of the paper stock, the sternness of 
the binding, and the idiosyncrasies and limitations of the actual printing press used to produce the 
novel. Because the disk image bares the mark left by the “hand” of their users, Kirschenbaum 
compares the disk image to the “palimpsest, or so called dirty books laced with marginalia and 
marks from the readers who have previously owned them, beloved by some collectors…and pored 
over by historians of reading and writing.” 41 The content of the book—what it means or 
expresses—becomes almost irrelevant. In contrast, this material approach takes one a more 
                                                 
39 Kirschenbaum, Mechanisms, 115. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 127.  
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teleological orientation in mapping out the entire historical record, an orientation perhaps already 
implied in the scientific association with “forensics.” 
However, one of the most baffling consequences of when this overly materiality approach is 
applied to video games, is that it neglects to explain how or why “video games” constitute a 
meaningful category of software to be interested in to begin with. The logic that renders video 
games into material objects, also flattens them ontologically, reducing them to the same bits, data 
operations, and informatic protocols as all other software. Mystery House is not all that different from 
a database software or an old copy of Microsoft Excel. The problem with this equation is that, as we 
will discuss more in the next chapter, video games may operate as computer programs, but they also 
lack the well-defined use-value of other software. Even if a video game’s code is read teleologically 
so that each part is identified as purposeful in the operation of the whole, the larger purpose of the 
whole—the ends of that teleology—remain indeterminate. It is, then, only when one considers video 
games’ social uses and meta-functions—their cultural, economic, developmental, and, as we will 
discuss in Chapter 2, aesthetic functions—that they are easily distinguishable from other software. 
This recognition, however, places video games within a framework akin to how most scholars 
approach film and literature as expressive media, understood to be cultural forms which exist to be 
experienced, beheld, consumed and interpreted.42 
While not every attempt to distinguish video games as medium requires a “hardcore 
materialist” approach, what we find is that every attempt to define video games as a specific medium 
relies on something of a material justification. In Brown, though, arguments about the video game 
experience being distinct from other expressive media are always implicitly about medium  
                                                 
42 When something materially identical to video game is provided a definitive social function other than as an expressive 
work, like a test-pilot simulators or video games to teach math, it is comprehended differently. We might compare these 
video games to film, art, and literature considered in terms of advertising, propaganda, or instruction. For more on video 
games used within pedagogy see Marina Papastergiou, "Exploring the Potential of Computer and Video Games for 
Health and Physical Education: A Literature Review," Computers & Education 53, no. 3 (2009). 
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specificity. The problem is that for those attempting to privilege materiality above all else, “screen 
essentialism” provides an emblematic straw-man—a reductionist portrayal of how textual analysis 
and media studies is conducted within traditional humanities discourses. Those digital materialists 
condemning screen essentialism might imagine literary and film scholars as naively transposing 
conceptual frameworks onto software with little regard to the unique characteristics and 
technological limitations imposed by computational material assemblages. While culturalist 
approaches to video games may be weary of a deterministic relationship between materiality and 
textuality, there are also a host of cultural frameworks operating under the supposition that the 
underlying material construction of a text is inseparable from understanding how it is experienced.43  
Any comprehensive interpretive reading of a video game has a more robust notion of form than the 
neo-materialists give them credit for. 
For the culturalist, though, the materiality needs to be understood primarily in terms of how 
it will be experienced. In relation to video games, then, one can still acknowledge Petersen’s 
argument without resorting to denying video games’ relationship to a history of culturally expressive 
visual forms. In fact, contrary to Petersen’s critique, the opinions expressed within Brown were by no 
means ignoring video games’ material properties. However, in the way the Justices approached the 
games, materiality was more implicitly recognized in how it potentially affected the experience video 
games provide.  
                                                 
43For instance, within film studies, theories of spectatorship and the apparatus, in particular, present the spectator’s 
experience as one constructed by the formal and material apparatus. For more on this see Michele Aaron, Spectatorship : 
The Power of Looking On (London; New York: Wallflower, 2007). 
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1.2 JUDGING INTERACTIVITY  
1.2.1 Affective and Material Dimensions of Interactivity  
California’s argument for supporting their right to censor video games included the difficult task of 
rationalizing why video game violence warranted government regulation, where presumably first-
amendment protected forms of expression like films, cartoons, and books, did not.44 During oral 
arguments, California was cornered on this precise issue. Ginsburg first asked why California was 
not trying to regulate “all deviant, violent material in whatever form.” Soon other Justices started in 
on this line of questioning. Roberts asked, “Why just video games? Why not movies, for example, as 
well?” Sotomayor inquired: “One of the studies..., says that the effect of violence is the same for a 
Bugs Bunny episode as it is for a violent video [game]. So, can the legislature now…outlaw Bugs 
Bunny?” 
California’s response was that video games’ distinctiveness lies in “the interactive nature of 
violent video games—where the minor or the young adult is the aggressor, is the individual acting 
out this obscene level of violence, if you will—is especially harmful to minors.” It is in California’s 
brief, however, where the state really attempts to illustrate this understanding through a description 
of Postal 2: 
The game involves shooting both armed opponents, such as police officers, and unarmed 
people, such as schoolgirls. Girls attacked with a shovel will beg for mercy; the player can be 
merciless and decapitate them. People shot in the leg will fall down and crawl; the player can 
then pour gasoline over them, set them on fire, and urinate on them. The player’s character 
makes sardonic comments during all this; for example, urinating on someone elicits the 
comment “Now the flowers will grow.”45 
                                                 
44 Transcript of Oral Argument Brown V. Ema, 5-7.  
45 California is actually quoting the district court’s description from a prior ruling. Petitioners’ Brief ibid., 3.  
The lurid description is perhaps intended to support the component of California’s argument for including violence 
within the unprotected category of “obscenity.” This seems to have at least swayed Justice Alito whose description 
echoed the one found in California’s Brief. “Victims are dismembered, decapitated, disemboweled, set on fire, and 
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This quote is particularly instructive in how it differs from a comparable description of, say, a film. 
In particular, there are several subjective positions being presented within this short description. It 
begins with the passive phrasing of what the “game involves,” implying a kind of preexisting 
situation, not unlike how a film’s plot could “involve” certain circumstances. Soon, however, it talks 
of “the player” performing the actions of “decapitating” and “urinating.” Later there is also the 
distinct notion of the “player’s character,” who is seemingly an autonomous agent, who is 
nonetheless possessed by the player. This possession, along with the notion that the “player can” 
choose to do certain actions, particularly signals what separates video games from a film or cartoon. 
Whereas the film’s protagonist belongs to the film, the player’s character belongs to the player; 
ostensibly video games are distinct precisely because the player can choose to directly affect certain 
actions in the diegetic world. The film’s spectator is assumed to have no comparable choice or 
power. The implication is, then, that video games are distinct because the receptive experiences they 
offer provide a kind of identification, complicity, or participation that is not found in the 
expressions of other media.  
In theory, the respondents had a legal interest in downplaying distinctions between video 
games and other media because video games’ protections relied on their commonality with protected 
forms like films or novels—a tactic some supportive amicus briefs took.46 However, somewhat 
surprisingly, the respondents’ brief—arguing that California’s law was unconstitutional because 
                                                                                                                                                             
chopped into little pieces. They cry out in agony and beg for mercy. Blood gushes, splatters, and pools. Severed body 
parts and gobs of human remains are graphically shown. In some games, points are awarded based, not only on the 
number of victims killed, but on the killing technique employed.” Ibid., 2749. 
46 For instance, amicus brief making this argument argues that “there is nothing exceptional about the interactivity of 
video games that distinguishes them from other forms of expressive media, or that justifies content-based regulation of 
speech. Being able to interact with media content is not novel, as theater audiences well know. As technology progresses, 
so do the interactive features of all forms of media, such as, for example, e-books and movies on DVDs.” Brief of Amici 
Curiae Entertainment Consumers Association, et al. Ibid., 6. 
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video games should be protected by the First Amendment—also emphasized what makes video 
games distinct:  
Video games are a modern form of artistic expression. A video game is an interactive 
software program that a player experiences on a screen, such as a television or computer 
monitor. Like films, video games incorporate dialogue, music, visual images, plot, and 
character development. […] Unlike the viewer of a film or the reader of a book, the player of 
a video game has some control over the story…the player exercises some control over the 
choices made by the protagonist and the subsequent story development when confronted with 
various challenges. […] In this respect, playing a video game is like improvising a 
performance of a musical score, because the player engages in and contributes to the expressive 
activity rather than passively consuming it.47 
In this quote, the respondents are trying to have it both ways. They emphasize what video games 
share with film, literature, and music, in what may be an attempt to borrow the artistic credibility 
(and the accompanying protections) of other expressive media, but for some reason they also take 
great pains to explain what makes video games different. For California, player agency justifies 
censoring video games by exposing the unique dangers the medium poses; however the respondents’ 
gambit argues that player agency actually affords video games additional First Amendment 
protections. Not only is the game protected as an expression, but the act of playing is protected as 
well: “the interactive aspect of video games heightens the First Amendment values at stake, because 
playing a game involves expressive activity not only by the game creators but by the player as well.”48 
In other words, video games’ unique materiality provides players with the agency to produce a 
secondary, posterior creative expression through the act of playing the game. 
In spite of being on opposing sides, then, the plaintiffs and the respondents achieved a 
rather unexpected consensus in their agreed assertion that “interactivity” is video games’ 
                                                 
47 Respondents’ Brief ibid., 2-3. This idea recalls the notion of the notion of play as performance discussed in the 
introduction. We will return to this point later in the chapter. 
48 Respondents’ Brief ibid., 18. Here the respondents’ argument critically suppresses any notion of video game playing as 
a form of gameplay and, instead—without acknowledging the provenance—they emphasize the valence of play that 
corresponds with performance and “playing a musical instrument.”  This could be understood as a dangerous argument 
if one recognizes that conduct can be regulated. It also assumes that video games are distinct and that a beholder’s 
interpretation of other art objects would not be considered a protected form of expression. 
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distinguishing quality. All the more remarkable, however, was that Scalia’s majority opinion largely 
rejected this idea regarding interactivity. As already stated, in Scalia’s view the level of interactivity 
found in video games is different in “a matter of degree rather than of kind” and, accordingly, 
Scalia’s appears to ally the Court with Lev Manovich, arguing that art and literature had already been 
“interactive” long before computational media and that new media’s exclusive claim over interaction 
is a “myth.”49 Even though we will take a deeper dive into the term “interactivity” in the next 
chapter, it is worth briefly explaining how Scalia’s opinion actually provides a more nuanced look at 
interactivity than even Manovich’s own. 
Scalia identifies two separate components of interactivity in California’s argument: the first is 
the player’s “control over the outcome,” or what essentially amounts to agency over the form itself; 
the second, is the player’s feeling of “participation.” First, Scalia addresses the player’s ability to 
“determine [a video game’s] outcome.” This component, what we might also call narrative agency, is 
something he argues is not distinctive to video games. As Scalia explains, “since at least the 
publication of The Adventures of You: Sugarcane Island in 1969, young readers of choose-your-own-
adventure stories have been able to make decisions that determine the plot by following instructions 
about which page to turn to.”50 The video game player, like the choose-your-own-adventure novel 
reader, seemingly collaborates in the production of the story. The other component of interactivity 
Scalia identifies is a more affective participation, in which “the player participates in the violent action.” 
Scalia rejects this quality as unique to video games because a book’s reader is already able to 
“identify with the characters, …judge them and quarrel with them, …experience their joys and 
sufferings as the reader’s own.”  
                                                 
49 Manovich, Language, 66-71.This point was discussed in the introduction. 
50 Brown V. Ema, 2738. As we will see in the next chapter, this point is reminiscent of figures like Epsen Aarseth and 
Nick Montfort among others who focus on video games’ association with “interactive fiction.”  See Espen J. Aarseth, 
Cybertext : Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 89. 
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From the perspective of the neo-materialists and Petersen, Scalia’s breakdown of interaction 
might invite accusations of screen-essentialism because it seems to primarily focus on the player’s 
experience. (For the neo-materialist, interaction would be something found in the computational and 
algorithmic logic of the video game itself.) What an accusation of screen-essentialism here would fail 
to recognize, however, is that Scalia’s breakdown of interactivity actually considers media materiality 
precisely by considering how that materiality is experienced. Specifically, Scalia’s notion of narrative 
agency stems from a consideration of the structure of the text itself. In the material approach to video 
games, however, interactivity is contingent on the notion that video game players go beyond what 
Manovich called “psychological participation” with their effective agency over the literal 
composition of the text. This notion of material interactivity hinges on a tangible quantifiable action 
that translates into agency; only a variable and responsive physical materiality can provide this form 
of interactivity. By linking video games to choose-your-own-adventure novels, Scalia is making the 
point that the materially variable structure that leads to a feeling of narrative agency is found in other 
aesthetic objects protected by free speech. As we will see in the next chapter, Scalia’s consideration 
and acknowledgement of both the affective and material connotations of interactivity is something 
that remains absent in the majority of scholarly conversations regarding video game interaction.  
It is also important to remember, however, that not all of the Justices found Scalia’s take on 
interactivity persuasive. Alito, in particular, found it highly problematic to “jump to the conclusion 
that a new technology is fundamentally the same as some older thing with which we are 
familiar.”51Alito later described the exceptionality of playing a video game as a receptive experience 
by contrasting it with the act of reading: “only an extraordinarily imaginative reader who reads a 
description of a killing in a literary work will experience that event as vividly as he might if he played 
                                                 
51 Brown V. Ema, 2742. 
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the role of the killer in a video game.”52 Alito’s assumption is that video games realize an affective 
experience that in prior media might only have taken place in the minds of particular beholders. In 
making his argument for video games’ exceptionality Alito seemingly agrees with California’s 
argument that “detail and realism” in video games “is without historical parallel”  when he explains 
how “today’s most advanced video games create realistic alternative worlds…[and] feature visual 
imagery and sounds that are strikingly realistic…”53  
In Alito’s vivid descriptions, the material and affective dimensions of interactivity are 
inextricable from one another:  
Compare [a reader of a violent novel] with a video-game player who creates an avatar that 
bears his own image…who is forced to decide whether or not to kill the victim and decides to 
do so; who then pretends to grasp an axe, to raise it above the head of the victim, and then to 
bring it down; who hears the thud of the axe hitting her head and her cry of pain; who sees 
her split skull and feels the sensation of blood on his face and hands. For most people, the 
two experiences will not be the same. 
Alito presents a notion that the additional agency afforded by the new technology is inseparable 
from the participatory experience. The physical perceptions Alito describes are seemingly afforded 
by the distinctive material qualities of video games. In this description, the sense of participation in 
the fictional world is not only imagined, but it is actualized to the degree that video games provide 
the ability to render these scenes. The experiential participation is a direct function of the new 
media’s new technological affordances. The distinct material structure underlying video games 
determines an experience that is categorically different “from anything we have ever seen before.”  
Perhaps the most telling detail of Alito’s description, however, is that it seems to be engaging 
with a hypothetical version of a video game. Hearing a “cry of pain” and seeing a “split skull” are 
things that a video game could provide, but Alito describes how the player “feels sensation of blood 
on his face and hands.” This feeling is, then, Alito’s own projection onto the video game, since no 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 2750. 
53 Ibid., 2748. Quote from California can be found here Petitioners’ Brief ibid., 43. 
Hakimi/51 
 
video game-related technology provides this sensation (as of yet). Consequently, Alito’s affective 
experience is less concretely rooted in the literal material affordances of video game form, and more 
reflective of his imaginative perception of what the experience entails. By no means is this latter 
characterization irrelevant to what video games are, but the fact is that Alito’s imagined experience 
inadvertently supports Scalia’s points that every new technology is initially conceived as overinflated 
with corruptive power and that interaction has always been an imaginary condition.  
More importantly, though, the fact that Alito confused his imaginary experience of a video 
game with an empirical account illustrates the crucial point that the Justices may have had very little 
to no first-hand experience with video games to begin with, and this allows us to consider further 
how the Justices, on a practical level, familiarized themselves with video games. 
1.2.2 Video Game Trials 
In 1952, when the Supreme Court was deciding whether New York State could ban Roberto 
Rossellini’s Il Miracolo (1951) for being “sacrilegious,” for the first time ever the Justices actually 
viewed the film as part of their adjudicating process.54 Since so much of the argument in the case 
revolved around the artistic merit of the film, the court found it necessary to experience the film 
first-hand. Wittern-Keller points out the prescience of Justice Reed’s opinion in the case, when he 
made the point that the Court would now be obliged to determine the first amendment merits of 
films on a case-by-case basis, essentially “becom[ing] a board of supercensors.”55 And, indeed, after 
unanimously, but narrowly ruling that Il Miracolo could not be censored as “sacrilege,” through the 
1950s and early 60s, the Court soon faced several other film censorship cases that found them 
                                                 
54 See Wittern-Keller, Freedom, 138. The case regarding Il Miracolo is Joseph Burstyn, Inc. V. Wilson, 343 US 495 (1952).  
55 Wittern-Keller, Freedom, 141. 
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watching films such as Max Ophul’s La Ronde (1950) and Marc Allégret’s adaptation of Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover (1955).56  
The logic behind these screenings was ostensibly that the Justices needed to experience for 
themselves whether these films should be protected by the first amendment by watching them. 
However, by the late 1950s, there was a division amongst the Justices regarding their role as the 
“supreme critics”—some wanted to “articulate a clear statement of principle” and avoid having to 
judge each film individually, while others seemed content to continue judging the “cases on an 
individual basis.”57 Consequently, it was not until 1965 that the Court effectively shifted the burden 
of proof to the censors, by declaring films to be covered by first amendment by default. This point 
was essentially clarified (and scaled back) in a 1973 ruling argued that, for a film to be censored, it 
must be shown to lack a “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or 
artistic value.”58  
When it came to video games in the Brown case, the Court presumably wanted to avoid a 
similar protracted process of judgment compared to the one that the cinema went through 
beginning some sixty years prior. After all, such a process would have essentially required the 
Justices to once again assume the role of “supreme critics,” determining the artistic merits of 
individual video games. Before getting into the legal justification, it is worth recognizing practical 
complications that prevented the Justices from assuming such a role. The presumption is that 
playing video games requires a level of technical literacy and a basic skillset that the judges do not 
have. As Mark JP Wolf explains this point: “film viewers can watch a film from beginning to end 
                                                 
56 The case regarding La Ronde is Superior Films, Inc. V. Department of Ed. Of Ohio, 346 US 587 (1954).; the case regarding 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover is Kingley International Pictures V. Regents of the University of the State of New York, US (1958). 
57 Wittern-Keller, Freedom, 212-13. 
58 Freedman V. Maryland, 380 US 51 (1965); Miller V. California. 
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and be satisfied that they have seen the film in its entirety, but a video game player must often have 
some amount of skill” merely to access the bulk of what could be called the content.59  
Another relevant point to recognize is that Brown did not technically have a specific video 
game at its center. However, within the court briefs, California regularly referred to Postal 2 (2003) as 
the prototypical example of a game that would be censored by their law, effectively allowing this 
game to serve as the litmus test for their argument. This appears to be the video game that Alito is 
describing, however, the only recorded account of any of the Justices having actually played the 
video game—or any game related to the case—comes from an anecdote relayed by Kagan: Breyer 
“had his clerk set up [Postal 2] in his office, […] I went over to his office, and there we were, killing 
everybody left and right.”60 Amusing as it may be to picture the then 73-year-old Breyer trying his 
hand at Postal 2—maybe even struggling to get his avatar to urinate on a corpse—it seems that 
playing at least one video game would be the minimum requirement for making an informed 
decision regarding video games and their relation to other media. In fact, what can be ascertained 
through the case’s records is that the Justices’ familiarity with video games in Brown came largely 
through second-hand modes of reception.  
Aside from written descriptions of some video games contained within the plethora of briefs 
filed to the Court in an attempt to sway the Justices’ opinions,61 it seems that the Justices’ exposure 
to video games was largely through DVDs and video tapes containing recorded footage from 
                                                 
59 Furthermore, “there are often courses of action and area of the game which are still left unexplored even after several 
times through.” Wolf, The Medium of the Video Game, 13. Arguably a novel with an esoteric vocabulary could be described 
as requiring a comparable “skillset” to access its content. Although, in video games even a honed skillset may not 
guarantee access to content subject to some algorithmic probability. 
60 See Fred Barbash, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/18/how-and-why-
justices-kagan-and-breyer-faced-off-in-a-violent-video-game-to-help-decide-a-major-case/?utm_term=.428937dd6d8c. 
The original interview is here Elana Kagan, interview by Martha Minow, Sept 14, 2015. 
61 Notably, amongst the amicus briefs supporting Brown’s respondents were some well-established video game industry 
publishers and developers of blockbuster games which were also infamously scrutinized to one degree or another for 
their carnage: Blizzard Entertainment developed Diablo (1996) and World of Warcraft [2004],); Id Software developed 
Wolfenstein 3D (1992) and Doom (1993); Microsoft produced Halo: Combat Evolved (Bungie, 2001) and Gears of War (Epic 
Games, 2006). 
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various video games voluntarily submitted as evidence by the opposing sides in the case. We may 
never know if Kennedy or Thomas actually sat down and watched either the five-minute “Video 
Game Violence Samplers” submitted by California or the “two-and-a half hours of excerpted game 
play” on video tapes submitted by the respondents, but the more instructive point arises simply 
when considering the significance of these videos’ very existence.62  
We can assume the DVDs and tapes were meant to provide the Justices with a sampling of 
recorded footage of the audio and visual content that a player could potentially encounter when 
playing certain video games. California’s five-minute montage of gory and violent imagery was aimed 
to support their claim that video games provide an unprecedented experience, one that can be 
harmful to children. The respondents, by contrast, submitted longer segments specifically to supply 
more context in “contrast to the five minutes” of non-sequential footage in California’s DVD.63 If 
the experience that video games’ provide is at issue, to what extent can watching a recording of 
video gameplay footage provide that experience? Is watching a video game being played a 
categorically different experience from playing that same video game oneself? The answer to these 
questions are somewhat complicated and they return us to thinking about issues of cultural and 
material notions of medium-specificity.  
One thing to realize is that, there are both legal and theoretical issues involved with defining 
the video game in terms of the experience it provides. If one can experience a video game without 
playing a game first-hand, California is confronted by a cascading set of questions about censoring 
video games. Should a ban on violent video games include a ban on videos of recorded game 
                                                 
62 Respondents’ Brief Brown V. Ema, 3. Only California’s DVD is listed in the “Proceedings and Order” which lists 
“copies of trial exhibit ‘Video Game Violence Sampler’ received from counsel for the petitioners.” However, elsewhere 
there were references to the video recording of video game footage.  
63 Respondents’ Brief ibid. The respondents’ excerpts came from the six games also apparently submitted into the 
record: Medal of Honor: Frontline (Electronic Arts, 2002), God of War (SCE Santa Monica Studio, 2005). Tom Clancy’s 
Rainbow Six 3 (Ubisoft, 2003), Jade Empire (Bioware, 2005), Resident Evil IV (Capcom, 2005), and Full Spectrum Warrior 
(Pandemic Studios, 2004). 
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footage? Does this imply that the unique harm of video games transcends the player and includes 
bystanders watching the game being played—whether in person, over a streaming service, or 
through a DVD? California never ended up having to address these questions because the case 
never got that far, but the premise of their argument might have fallen through on the basis of these 
questions alone.  
Thinking about the recorded video gameplay in relation to materiality, meanwhile, provides 
its own terms of analysis. From a “hardcore materialist” approach, the Brown DVDs clearly cannot 
be equated with the video games themselves. The discs do not include remnants of the video games’ 
files, nor could they be “played” as games on any video game platforms.64 So even if one were to 
conduct a Kirschenbaum-esque “digital forensics” on the files found on these DVDs, the files 
stored therein would contain no traces of the original games’ code or underlying structure. (What the 
forensics might reveal instead would be information regarding when and how the video files were 
recorded, perhaps what software was used to edit the clips together or what was used to convert the 
video file type to one that could be played on DVD player.) Moreover, the DVD player, in its 
decoding of the disc’s information, remains indifferent to the data it processes into successive 
images appearing on a screen and audio data it relays through the speakers. Whether the images 
rendered come from the video game depicted in scenes from the feature film Elephant (Gus Van 
Sant, 2003), scenes from Elephant that are inspired by first person shooters, surveillance footage 
from the Columbine school shooting that inspired elephant, or from the video game Doom (1993) 
which was famously blamed for the shooting—the data on DVD is essentially ontologically 
indifferentiable until cognized. 
                                                 
64 Presuming they were formatted to be compatible with as many DVD players as possible, the DVDs would have been 
encoded with the standard “DVD-video” format—itself likely comprised of MPEG-2 code layer for the video, and 
PCM, MP2, or AC-3 code layer for the audio. Also, because most video game consoles in the last 15 years can decode 
and play DVD formats, the consoles might be able “play” the Brown DVDs as movies. 
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 Another view—one less materially deterministic about precise exhibition conditions, but 
still attentive to the material production and subsequent experience of materiality—might argue that 
the Brown DVDs should be likened to digital animation—or maybe machinima instead of all film.65 
It might matter, that, like Toy Story (1995), a video recording of God of War gameplay makes no 
claims toward indexically capturing images of the world, even as it may rely on representations of 
visual signifiers or that refer back to the world. The Brown DVDs, in this view, merely remediate 
video games, converting them into digital animations or machinima. In this understanding, 
Petersen’s criticism that the Court focused on the “relation between the screen and the user rather 
than on the engineering and social construction of code behind the screen” seems more justifiable if 
only because the Justices may never have been exposed to actual video games—only to remediated 
animations.  
Petersen’s argument, and the hardcore materialist perspective, effectively fosters a 
dichotomy between the interface and the code. The fundamental problem with such a view, 
however, is that it woefully discounts how the interface itself can express aspects of the underlying 
materiality of a form. Any thoughtful approach to “the screen and the user” would recognize how 
key elements of “the engineering and social construction of the code” are perceptible in the 
experience not only in the interface but perhaps even the representations of the image. The judges 
do not need to read the game’s code to recognize how that code will be experienced. In this way, 
reading the Brown DVDs as digital animation feels inadequate because it neglects to recognize the 
context—how these moving images of gameplay are experienced, interpreted, and/or cognized by 
their audience.  
                                                 
65 This perhaps also relates to the lines between digital animation and Machinima, cinematic productions made using 
video game engines and software. For more on these discussions see Henry Lowood and Michael Nitsche, The Machinima 
Reader (MIT Press, 2011).  
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When Alito and Breyer describe video game play in terms of an unprecedented level of 
action, agency, and participation, they are not only describing what is depicted, but what is 
engineered into the game’s variable possibilities. The Justices’ knowledge of what video games are, in 
addition to what they show, is crucial to the ways they experience the Brown DVDs. What the Justices 
experience when they watch a gameplay video is something of a narrated recording of a contingent 
series of occurrences, not the plotting of a prescribed expression as in a CGI film like Toy Story. The 
knowledge that the video game’s player makes choices that represent divergent (even if only 
momentarily divergent) compositional configurations is crucial to recognizing what makes watching 
a video game different from watching an animated feature. The images presented on screen as 
gameplay are part of a responsive and alterable composition, one that varies in part because of the 
actions of a subsequent player.  
Whether or not it was intentional, the Brown DVDs participate in a much broader, more 
inclusive understanding of video games, one that provides reason to be skeptical of any overly 
materialist characterizations of video games. Bundled into the act of spectatorship of the video game 
recording is the knowledge that the event visualized is being performed by a player in relation to a 
scripted, procedural text. Even in the video on the recorded gameplay DVD, the viewer experiences 
not only what appears on the screen, but also the accompanying possibilities concerning what did 
not happen, or what could have happened. One observation to make here then, is that describing 
the video game in terms of active “playing,” in a manner that implies something wholly distinct from 
watching—setting up a dichotomy between the operator and spectator—obfuscates the video game 
player’s experience by generalizing the encounter and veiling the critical lineage that connects video 
games to prior forms of expression.  
What we find in Brown, then, is that the Court’s relative video game illiteracy provided a 
surprisingly inclusive recognition that video games do not have to be played to be experienced. 
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Take, for instance, the increasingly widespread second-hand reception of video games as millions of 
people now watch others “play” through gameplay videos on YouTube and the popular streaming 
website and application Twitch and the massively popular “Let’s Play” videos on the internet, which 
often consist of edited gameplay accompanied by commentary and reaction shots.66 This second-
hand experience is clearly not about “playing” the game, but watching the game be “played.”  
As in popular sports, video games can be played by one and watched and enjoyed by those 
who do not have direct agency within the game. But perhaps this is only true for some video games. 
Watching someone play Pacman is perhaps akin to watching a golf game in that both games are 
categorized by competition, and spectating is about watching a demonstration of some sort of 
combination of skill, talent, and maybe chance. However, watching someone play a narrative driven 
game like Mass Effect (Bioware, 2007) might be about merely seeing what unfolds in the plot and 
thinking about the decisions being made. This seems very different from, say, watching sports.  
Part of understanding video games in terms of their textual experiences, then, entails 
embracing a critical lineage of “spectatorship.” Even as video game spectatorship cannot simply be 
equated with film spectatorship, it is also important not to entirely sever the video game experience 
from film spectatorship. Where media materialists might dismiss this entire approach as “screen 
essentialism,” material determinism can foreclose plenty of its own historical threads.67 In this view, 
not only are all video games bound and reduced to their platforms, hardware, and source code, but, 
                                                 
66 For the last several years, “Let’s Play” videos provide the bulk of the content on dozens of the most subscribed to 
YouTube channels. As of January 2017, the most subscribed to channel on all of YouTube is the Let’s Play video 
channel of PewDiePie http://www.youtube.com/user/PewDiePie. This channel, has over 52 million subscribers and his 
videos have acquired over 14 billion. He is reportedly compensated multiple millions of dollars a year for these videos. 
for more on this see Mike Rose, "Pay for Play: The Ethics of Paying for Youtuber Coverage," Gamasutra, 
http://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/219671/Pay_for_Play_The_ethics_of_paying_for_YouTuber_coverage.php; 
Patrick Klepek, "Who Invented Let's Play Videos?," Kotaku, http://kotaku.com/who-invented-lets-play-videos-
1702390484; Christopher Zoia, "This Guy Makes Millions Playing Video Games on Youtube," The Atlantic, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/03/this-guy-makes-millions-playing-video-games-on-
youtube/284402/; The Let's Play Archive, "The Let's Play Archive,"  http://lparchive.org/. 
67 Again, see Carroll, "The Specificity of Media in the Arts." 
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in the name of upholding medium specificity, critics can fail to recognize constructive experiential 
resonances with other media. Instead, video games’ texts need to be carefully parsed to better 
understand the varying modes of experience they foster and the cultural traditions of which they are 
a part.  
1.3 MEDIUM SPECIFICITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
In the short coda to Raising the Beam—a book that serves as a demonstrative model for “platform 
studies” using the Atari 2600—Bogost and Montfort make the case that there are “five levels of 
digital media, situated in [culture and] context”: 1) “platform,” the material hardware; 2) “code,” the 
program’s language system that instructs the hardware; 3) “form/function,” a program’s operations; 
4) “interface,” the program’s appearance; 5) “reception/operation,” the experience of the program.68 
Bogost and Montfort explain each through scholarly discourses and frameworks deemed applicable 
to each level—platform studies and systems architecture at the “platform” level; code studies and 
software engineering at the “code” level; narratology and ludology at the “form/function” level; 
“approaches from visual studies, film theory, and art history” at the “interface” level; reception 
studies at the “reception/operation” level; etc. What is essential to note in relation to the concerns 
of this chapter is, however, that these levels are consistent with a continuous spectrum ranging from 
material to cultural approaches to new media. Moreover, there is perhaps an implicit ideological 
hierarchy, one which links materialism with the authority of scientific empiricism, and undermines 
culture as part of a relativistic humanities discourse. The study of platforms, code, and material are 
charted out in substantive and demonstrable diagrams, while attention to interface and reception is 
relegated to relativistic and unverifiable interpretations. However, while Parrika positions the cultural 
                                                 
68 Nick Montfort and Ian Bogost, Racing the Beam: The Atari Video Computer System (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2009), 
146-48. 
Hakimi/60 
 
and material camps of media archeology in opposition to one another, understanding how ideas 
from each camp can inform one another a provide a more constructive approach to media history.69 
Bogost and Montfort’s divisions assume an air of empiricism because of their material 
underpinnings, so the consequences of their categorization scheme might be overlooked. Instead of 
dividing territory and establishing a hierarchy of standing, hopefully we can recognize that the 
extreme positions of both ends of the material and cultural divide have their limitations. A culturalist 
approach may neglect those aspects of the video game form that stem from its computational 
material base. An overly materialist approach, on the other hand, may fail to recognize the vastly 
different functions of objects with the same material bases. This way materiality can still be 
important to video games criticism without being determinant, because the notion of how 
materiality informs the video game experience would be interpreted through a careful analysis of the 
text. 
As stated earlier, when considering the medium specificity of video games, it is important to 
recognize that privileging the material conditions—and viewing the technological operations and 
source code as closer to empirical reality—has a tendency to obfuscate crucial experiential 
resonances that exist across media.70 Recognizing these common experiences not only allows us to 
approach emerging forms like interactive films viewed over VR that cannot easily be classified as 
video games or film, but it also helps us recognize categories of games and play that are important 
for understanding our encounter with certain films (amongst other aesthetic encounters). Medium 
specificity concerning video games also has a tendency to disregard lessons that come out of film 
studies, forgetting, for instance, that apparatus theory provides one model for thinking about how 
                                                 
69 Elsaesser expresses a similar sentiment regarding the different cultural and material approaches to media history when 
he says “Might it be possible if not to heal this rift, to nonetheless come to a better understanding of why and how it 
occurred? Elsaesser, "Media Archaeology as Symptom," 196.  
70 For example, a test pilot simulator used to train pilots, may be identical to a comparable video game, but they function 
very differently. As does a video file containing footage of Rodney King and a video file of gameplay from Grand Theft 
Auto V. 
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materiality shapes experience. At the same time, noting the materiality of video games allows us to 
recognize the new formal, ontological, and affective positions that are not easily found in ideas of 
film spectatorship.  
This is not to say that medium-specificity cannot be a useful concept for understanding 
video games. Like Jacques Derrida’s notion of genre, the concept of medium is “able to play the role 
of order’s principle: resemblance, analogy, identity and difference, taxonomic classification, 
organization and genealogical tree, order of reason, order of reasons, sense of sense, truth of truth, 
natural light and sense of history.” However, like Derrida’s notion of genre, any law that defines a 
specific medium would be “precisely a principle of contamination, a law of impurity, a parasitical 
economy.”71 Every schema of definite categorization is both edifying and obscuring. In the effort to 
define video games as a specific medium, we need to be wary of claims of technical precision, while 
making sure that they dos not come at the expense of recognizing media commonality. 
1.3.1 Modes of (Game)Play 
For theorists who study video games from a ludic perspective, it may be surprising to learn that 
aside from a stray remark or two during the oral arguments, the Brown case almost completely 
overlooks the conception that video games should be principally apprehended in terms of games 
and play. In fact, Brown gives almost no indication that “gaming” already has a robust legal 
framework as a broad category of activities that can be regulated under US and state law, and that it 
is regularly employed in legal statutes concerning gambling, competitive sports, contests, and 
outdoor recreation.72 Additionally, only one of the nearly two dozen amicus briefs filed in Brown 
                                                 
71 Jacques Derrida and Avital Ronell, "The Law of Genre," Critical inquiry 7, no. 1 (1980): 81,59. 
72 See for instance James H Frey, "Federal Involvement in Us Gaming Regulation," The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 556, no. 1 (1998). 
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makes a comparison between playing video games and gambling. Writing in support of California’s 
right to censor video games, it states that “playing video games no more constitutes free speech 
than…playing bingo and other forms of gambling.” This logic assumes that playing video games, 
like gambling, should be considered “conduct,” and should therefore legally be able to be 
regulated.73 
The absence of the legal concept of “gaming” seems like even more of an oversight if we 
recognize how video game culture is already inextricable from a number of cultural pastime activities 
that can be regulated as gaming. For one thing, there are now pretty established professional 
competitive video game leagues complete with sponsors and broadcast deals that are well on their 
way to being regulated like any other sport. 74Another point worth acknowledging is that for decades 
now casinos have been filled with “electronic gaming” slot-machines with digital touch-screen 
interfaces that increasingly resemble that interfaces of video games. Mobile video games, meanwhile, 
have likewise been coopting the “addictive design” qualities of constant reward found in casino 
machine.75 Another point worth recognizing is that, historically, the development of arcade video 
games have always been associated with pinball and the Japanese phenomenon of pachinko, two 
other arcade staples, which have been regulated as gambling in the past or are still regulated as 
gambling.76 All of this is to say that if video games were understood more in line with a legal lineage 
                                                 
73 Written in support of California’s right to regulate selling and playing games, the Eagle Forum Education & Legal 
Defense Fund argues that “conduct is not free speech, and selling or playing video games no more constitutes free 
speech than selling or playing bingo and other forms of gambling. Playing a video game is conduct rather than 
constitutionally protected free speech.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in 
Support of PetitionersBrown V. Ema, 4. 
74 TL Taylor, Raising the Stakes: E-Sports and the Professionalization of Computer Gaming (Mit Press, 2012). 
75 Natasha Dow Schüll, Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegas (Princeton University Press, 2012), 155.Mark 
Griffiths, who has been railing about the detrimental developmental effects video games for 20 years, has made a version 
of this point. Mark D Griffiths, Daniel L King, and Paul H Delfabbro, "The Technological Convergence of Gambling 
and Gaming Practices," The Wiley-Blackwell handbook of disordered gambling  (2014). 
76 While most modern Japanese Pachinko machines would still be considered gambling in the US, when it came to 
pinball, it was eventually demonstrated that because a certain amount of skill was involved in achieving free balls or free 
games, playing it was not simply a matter of luck. Steven Kent, "Ultimate History of Video Games : From Pong to 
Pokemon and Beyond ... The Story Behind the Craze That Touched Our Li Ves and Changed the World,"  (2010). 
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of “gaming,” the Court would have had a sound legal justification for regulating how video games 
are designed and played. What we find, instead, is that the Supreme Court, like so many other 
cultural institutions, neglects to make basic distinctions between distinctive modes of engagement 
and gameplay found within video games 
Although there have been several subsequent scholarly attempts to think through categories 
of games and (game)play, Roger Caillois theories developed in Man, Play, and Games (1958) remain 
particularly productive for understanding how the different lineages of video games can exist 
simultaneously. Caillois identifies and describes four central modes of playful engagement, or playful 
modes of experience, only some of which are also clearly relevant to aesthetic experiences across 
media. The first category, agôn or “competition,” is associated with contests between 
individuals/teams or games that are measured through quantitative scoring. The second category, 
alea or “chance,” relates more than anything else to gambling because it is about playing the odds 
and a definitive lack of skill. The third category mimicry or “simulation” is a more abstract mode of 
play that may be understood in terms of games of make-believe, storytelling, and the suspension of 
disbelief. The fourth, ilinx or “vertigo” concerns activities related to achieving affective thrills or 
bodily sensations. Further Caillois explains how each of these modes of experience can be engaged 
within a spectrum of activities ranging from uncontrolled and disorderly on one end, to more 
regulated and organized on the other.77 In Caillois’ conception, these modes of (game)play can 
operate simultaneously, but many times one mode is principally dominant.  
When thinking about video games’ and their relationship to film—among other expressive 
aesthetic media—Caillois helps articulate enormously productive distinction between, on the one 
                                                 
77 For a more in-depth discussion see the chapter “The Classification of Games” Roger Caillois and Meyer Barash, Man, 
Play, and Games (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 19-26. In regards to these categories usefulness to thinking 
about video games and media experiences see Andrew Darley, Visual Digital Culture: Surface Play and Spectacle in New Media 
Genres (Routledge, 2002), 168-73. 
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hand, games that operate primarily through competition and chance (agôn and alea), and, on the 
other hand, games of simulation and vertigo. Those games that operate primarily by engaging modes 
of agôn and alea are activities that the state has a precedent in regulating such as gambling, races, and 
other competitive sports. These are activities with quantitative scores, wins and losses, and potential 
stakes in relation to status. We could even note that, based on past precedent, the Court would be 
justified in regulating activities that primarily operate through these modes of experience in the same 
way they have regulated professional sports and gambling.  
As modes of (game)play, agôn and alea have very little to do with film and aesthetic reception, 
but the same cannot be said about mimicry and ilinx Meanwhile, the alternative modes to skill and 
chance have a significant overlap with prior aesthetic forms. For Caillois, simulation is directly 
related to notions of the mimetic faculty and the creative capacity to imagine scenarios or worlds 
without doing so for a larger practical purpose. For Caillois, simulation is not only both about the 
creation of that imagined space, but also about the receptive suspension of disbelief that allows the 
player to take on a “new personality,” first through “mimicry” in a pure imitative fashion and 
extends to “wearing a mask, or playing a part.”78 Adam Lowenstein specifically talks about Caillois’ 
mimicry to explain how the film “spectator is…engaged in acts of imaginative imitation, forgetting 
herself as she enters the film’s world.” For Lowenstein, mimicry is an expression of a “desire to get 
lost in the world of the game (or the film)” as well as “in the author’s imagination”—ideas we will 
return to in our third chapter.79 
 Of the dimensions of gameplay fostered by games, ilinx is the alternate mode of sensation 
that  “consist[s] of an attempt to momentarily destroy stability of perception and inflict a kind of 
                                                 
78 Caillois and Barash, Man, Play, and Games, 19-26. Lowenstein, Dreaming of Cinema: Spectatorship, Surrealism, & the Age of 
Digital Media, 41, 26-52.This argument is made through an understanding of the way Caillois uses the term mimicry in an 
earlier essay on insect camouflage. See Caillois, Roger. "Mimicry and legendary psychasthenia" October 31 (1984): 16-32. 
79 Lowenstein, Dreaming of Cinema: Spectatorship, Surrealism, & the Age of Digital Media, 41, 26-52. Lowenstein focuses on 
how ay Caillois uses the term mimicry in a different essay regarding on insect camouflage. Roger Caillois, "Mimicry and 
Legendary Psychasthenia." 
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voluptuous panic upon an otherwise lucid mind.”80  The most simple example of this, one which 
Caillois notably identifies in more species then just humans, is the act of spinning around until one is 
dizzy (hence “vertigo”). In some ways, this mode of play is more readily physiological than mimicry 
because of the fact that, for many of Caillois’ examples, the body itself needs to undergo some sort 
of physical stimulation to illicit vertigo. The examples are numerous (and may overlap with 
competitive aspects of agôn): dancing, horseback riding, skiing, carnival rides, mountain climbing etc. 
The commonality here is that all these examples a kinesthetic stimulation to the player’s body as the 
chief method for inducing this altered state of experience.  
Yet we can also recognize that much of the way ilinx is explained corresponds is through a 
recognition of an induced, altered state of consciousness, one we might directly connect to the mode 
of perception that we associate with spectacle in film spectatorship and movement like “cinema of 
attractions” and the formal avant garde.81 In regard to the cinema of attractions, Tom Gunning 
explains that these attractions “directly solicits spectator attention, inciting visual curiosity, and 
supplying pleasure through an exciting spectacle…” Like ilinx, the pleasure of an attraction’s 
spectacle does not need to be filtered through intense cognitive interpretation; the pleasure comes 
directly from experiencing the moving images as displayed. Gunning explains “confrontation rules 
the cinema of attractions both in the form of its films and their mode of exhibition. The directness 
of this act of display allows an emphasis on the thrill itself—the immediate reaction of the viewer.”  
It is an address that connects directly back to other forms of popular attractions of the 19th century, 
that are some of the exact examples Caillois uses to explain ilinx including the illusionist’s act, the 
carnival side show, the merry-go-round. Gunning explains, “many trick films are, in effect, plotless, a 
series of transformations strung together with little connection and certainly no 
                                                 
80 Caillois and Barash, Man, Play, and Games, 23. 
81 For more on this see Darley, Visual Digital Culture: Surface Play and Spectacle in New Media Genres. 
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characterization…the story simply provides a frame upon which to string a demonstration of the 
magical possibilities of the cinema.”82  Similarly ilinx requires no real context to be experienced; it is 
just a mode of perception open to affective titillation, a novel experience in the tradition of a thrill 
ride. 
While gambling and sports are hardly mentioned in Brown, a few strains of argumentation 
within Brown come close to a making a somewhat comparable argument that playing some video 
games might be considered conduct that could be regulated. Specifically, Justice Breyer, who sided 
with California in Brown, argues that if “physical activity [were] to predominate in a game, 
government could appropriately intervene…such as when restricting the sale of toys presenting 
physical dangers to children.” What is interesting about Breyer’s logic is that conduct is related to 
physical activity which connects video game playing to sports. Still Breyer also acknowledges that 
video games are somewhat different than physical activities because: “video games also embody 
important expressive and artistic elements, [so] the First Amendment significantly limits the State's 
power to regulate.”83 What we see here is that Caillois modes of play help define the aspects of  play 
within video games that seem correlated with this expressive elements, and encounters that comprise 
the video game experience in a way that breaks down barriers between media. 
Petersen criticizes the Court’s decision for failing to adequately articulate whose expression is 
being protected in regards to video games when she argues that the Court’s ruling  “conflates the 
freedom of creators to design with the freedom of users to play” by overvaluing the screen qualities 
and “confus[ing] the visible interface with the program itself.”84  What Petersen fails to recognize, 
however, is that this is exactly the point being made here in Breyer’s suggestion that it is the video 
                                                 
82 Tom Gunning, "An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (in) Credulous Spectator," Film Theory: Critical 
concepts in media and cultural studies 3 (2004): 85-86. 
83 Breyer’s Dissent Brown V. Ema, 2765. 
84 Petersen, "Behind the Screen," 173-74. 
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games themselves that “embody” the expressive and aesthetic qualities being protected. The 
conflation and “fetishization” is indeed part of the way these video games are experienced. To 
divorce the material form from the way they are experienced is to grossly misunderstand what makes 
expressive forms exceptional. The logic the Court ultimately relies upon to place video games into a 
cultural lineage with film, novels, and comic books provides a crucial response to Petersen’s critique 
because it accounts for her failure to recognize the immaterial qualities of the aesthetic object which 
must be factored into the experience. The Court recognizes that the protected expression is not 
located exclusively in the production or reception of the cultural object, but it is in the culturally 
constructed, imaginary relationship between the two that becomes embedded into the object as 
experienced.  
The Court’s logic is related to a crucially disregarded feature of video games that provides a 
profound reason to place them in a lineage of expressive media, before thinking about them in terms 
of games. It is something Eric Zimmerman comes close to articulating in his introduction to the 
Characteristics of Games when he says that “[video] games are different from other game [types] in one 
very important way: they are almost all deliberately designed.”85 While the term “design” implies an 
association with “functionality” that we will analyze more in the next chapter, what Zimmerman 
calls “deliberate design” provides a categorical departure that few game scholars acknowledge—all 
video games are intentionally created to be subsequently experienced. This is opposed to what 
Zimmerman calls “evolved” games, which emerge as experience without any sense of intentionality 
and can be played endlessly. Video games utilizing mimicry and ilinx, especially narrative or exploration 
based games, are much more productive to apprehend as authored expressions.86 
                                                 
85 My Italics. Elias, Garfield, and Gutschera, Characteristics of Games, 4-5. 
86 One caveat is that the difference between limited and limitless texts. In theory, procedurally generated worlds are both 
authored and unauthored. When a video game like Minecraft allow users to create sub-worlds, it is perhaps better 
understood as a platform. 
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The term “authored,” should not conjure the image of a singular author or ascribe authority 
over a video game’s meaning, but instead it should connote an “author function” in a more 
Foucauldian sense. In “What is an Author?” Michel Foucault describes the somewhat abstract 
relationship between the creator of an aesthetic object and the eventual beholder through the figure 
of the author. Authorship is not about creating a specific meaning, but providing a space where 
meaning can be made: “Writing unfolds like a game (jeu) that invariably goes beyond its own rules 
and transgresses its limits. In writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it 
to pin a subject within language; it is, rather, a question of creating a space into which the writing 
subject constantly disappears.”87 Thinking about video games as authored experiences provides a way 
for understanding how players are oriented to the game as creative work in which they are 
uncovering the purposeful expressions embedded into the object. While video games include 
variability, the player is also always operating within the parameters set forth by the video game 
designer. Just as a filmmaker or novelist creates a text that engenders a receptive experience, so too 
does the video game designer. What it means to think about the authored expression embedded into 
the video game an aesthetic experience, however, is something we will continue to examine in the 
coming chapters. 
                                                 
87 Michel Foucault and Paul Rabinow, The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 101. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Video Game Interactivity between Art and 
Design 
2.1 MOMA AND INTERACTION   
In 2012, under the guidance of curator Paula Antonelli, The Museum of Modern Art began 
acquiring video games into its permanent collection.88 While this was not the first occasion that 
video games had been publicly acknowledged by a major art institution,89 for many onlookers, 
MoMA’s decision to begin collecting and displaying games suggested this precise sentiment 
expressed by The New York Times: “If you have been disparaging video games…it’s time to think 
again. Video games are now high culture, with the imprimatur of the Museum of Modern Art…”90 
Whereas the Museum of the Moving Image or the Museum of Play had both previously collected 
video games alongside other pop-culture ephemera, MoMA’s venture ostensibly provided an 
indisputable signal that the gatekeepers of aesthetic taste and value had granted video games 
approval for critical admiration and recognition outside subcultural confines and alongside revered 
works of art.91  
                                                 
88 Paola Antonelli to Inside/Out: A MoMA/MoMA PS1 Blog, November 29, 2012, 
http://www.moma.org/explore/inside_out/2012/11/29/video-games-14-in-the-collection-for-starters/; Paola 
Antonelli, Kate Carmody, and Paul Galloway, "Applied Design to Feature Fourteen Recently Acquired Video Games on 
View for the First Time (Press Release)," news release, 2/14, 2013. 
89 The Smithsonian American Art Museum’s had almost concurrently put on its exhibition The Art of Video Games and 
the exhibition “Game On” had been touring continuously in various institutions, including art museums since 2002. See 
90Allan Kozinn, "Moma Acquires Video Games," The New York Times: Artsbeat 2012. Also see Chris Sueelletrop, "A 
Museum’s Games Are Not on Pedestals," The New York Times, March 3, 2013 2013. and Brian Crecente, "New Moma 
Exhibit Embraces the Art of Video Games as It Explores Their Design,"  (2013), 
http://www.polygon.com/2013/3/4/4054916/moma-video-game-applied-design. 
91 In his dissertation video game, scholar Felan Parker contextualizes MoMA’s decision to acquire video games within a 
broader “concerted effort to incorporate games into an increasingly influential art world assemblage and a particular 
conception of design and the aesthetic” See Felan Parker, "Playing Games with Art: The Cultural and Aesthetic 
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Without overstating MoMA’s cultural import, we should acknowledge that MoMA’s 
curatorial decisions historically have carried an outsized influence in defining the artistic merits of 
certain cultural forms during the last century—something made apparent when looking at MoMA’s 
extraordinary role in establishing a prior popular moving-image medium—film—as a distinct artistic 
form. In that capacity, MoMA was the first major art institution to take film seriously in the United 
States, and scholar Haidee Wasson explains that when MoMA founded what later became its Film 
department in its storied Film Library, the museum had publicly “declared film a modern art with an 
important history [by] provid[ing] cinema a prominent institutional home alongside other traditional 
and emergent aesthetic forms.”92 Effectively, MoMA changed the entire cultural discourse 
surrounding film as a medium. As Wasson explains, “film study programs and film societies at 
universities, museums, and libraries were, literally made possible by MoMA's circulating programs.”93 
Indeed, MoMA’s legacy in today’s academic film studies is still felt in the pivotal role it served in the 
establishment of the preeminent scholarly organization focusing on film, today known as the Society 
for Cinema and Media Studies, which, as the organization’s website explains, “grew out of a series of 
meetings held at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City starting in 1957.”94 In regards to 
film scholarship, then, MoMA was more than a slight contributor to a broader social phenomenon; 
its pioneering curatorial decisions profoundly impacted the academic discourse of film studies. 
Consequently, as the museum once again finds itself incorporating a popular moving-image medium 
into its permanent collection, MoMA’s potential influence over the cultural and critical reception of 
video games should not be underestimated.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Legitimation of Digital Games" (York & Ryerson Universities, 2014), 165. See also Felan Parker, "An Art World for 
Artgames," Loading… The Journal of the Canadian Game Studies Association 7, no. 11 (2013). 
92 Haidee Wasson, Museum Movies: The Museum of Modern Art and the Birth of Art Cinema (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005), 5; Antonelli, Carmody, and Galloway, "Applied Design." 
93 Wasson, Museum Movies: The Museum of Modern Art and the Birth of Art Cinema. 
94 "Organizational History," Society For Cinema and Media Studies, http://www.cmstudies.org/?page=org_history. 
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In fact, there are some striking historical resonances between MoMA’s approach to video 
games and its initial collection of film. When MoMA publicly made the curatorial decision to collect 
video games in 2012, it was precisely 40 years after the first video game console, the Magnavox 
Odyssey was released to the public in 1972; and, when MoMA established its Film Library in 1935, it 
was likewise 40 years after the Lumière Brothers’ first public moving picture exhibitions in 1895. 
Without assuming any intentionality behind these 40-year timeframes, the correspondence still 
reflects the analogous journeys of these media towards being considered culturally mature enough to 
be recognized by a preeminent artistic institution. On both occasions, MoMA was a pioneering force 
in making a public case about the merit of these media, and for both MoMA initially faced a popular 
backlash from those who felt that high-art was being diffused by its associations with a medium 
associated primarily with popular commercial entertainment. That is, Wasson recounts the early 
ridicule MoMA faced in the press when it began to take film seriously,95 and we once again have the 
highbrow reaction of art critic Jonathon Jones’s editorial for The Guardian responding to MoMA’s 
video game collection with the blunt headline, “Sorry MoMA, Video Games are not Art.”96 If 
nothing else, we see that in the roughly 80 years between the MoMA’s forays into both film and 
video game collection, the institution’s decisions are still regarded as a cultural indicator in perpetual 
debates about popular entertainment and “high art.”97  
In hindsight, there is little doubt that MoMA ended up on the right side of the cultural 
debate with its early consecration of film as an artistic medium worthy of thoughtful engagement. In 
the decades since MoMA’s Film Library was established, its assertion that film should be considered, 
                                                 
95 Wasson, Museum Movies: The Museum of Modern Art and the Birth of Art Cinema. 
96 Jonathon Jones to Jonathon Jones on Art, November 30, 2012. See also Brian Moriarty, "Comment Is Free: In Brief: 
Video Games Are Not Art, Regardless of Cultural Evolution," The Guardian (London, England) 2013. 
97 It is also worth noting MoMA’s relatively abandoned attempt of treating television as an art form. For more on this 
see: Lynn Spiegel Lynn Spigel, Tv by Design: Modern Art and the Rise of Network Television (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008). 
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in Wasson’s words, “a new modern art [to] be collected, saved, studied, and, most important, seen”98 
has since become conventional wisdom. What is much less certain is whether MoMA’s acquisition 
of video games carries any of the equivalent claims for video games. The fact is, that despite 
historical parallels, MoMA conceives of its video game collection quite differently than it initially 
considered film—the chief distinction being that the video game collection lacks an equivalent 
institutional space to MoMA’s foundational Film Library. Instead, the video game acquisitions were 
conspicuously made by MoMA’s Department of Architecture and Design and rhetorically couched 
within an ongoing effort to bring “interaction design objects” into the design collection.  
The pairing between video games and the Department of Architecture and Design at MoMA 
was by no means inevitable. When Antonelli made the press-grabbing headlines about the 
institution’s concerted effort to collect video games into its permanent collection, this was not 
actually the first time MoMA had acquired a video game. Four years prior, in 2008, MoMA’s 
Department of Media and Performance acquired artist Feng Menbo’s installation work Long March: 
Restart, which MoMA classified as a “Video Game” in the official catalogue.99 Further, Media and 
Performance, established in 2006, might seem like a more fitting institutional home for video games 
considering the department’s proclaimed interest in new media, a prior collection of “moving 
images, film installations, video, motion- and sound-based works,” and other “time-based art.”100 On 
the other hand, starting a collection of mainstream video games—most of which are unabashedly 
commercial products in a larger ecosystem of the entertainment industry—would clash with the 
Media and Performance department’s propensity for conceptual gallery installations and works 
associated immediately with high art, as epitomized by prominent exhibitions like Marina Abramović: 
                                                 
98Wasson, Museum Movies: The Museum of Modern Art and the Birth of Art Cinema, 3. 
99 This observation is also made by John Sharp, Works of Game: On the Aesthetics of Games and Art (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2015). 
100 http://press.moma.org/curatorial-departments/ 
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The Artist Is Present or its collection works by Nam June Paik. That is to say, the works collected by 
the Media and Performance department, including Long March: Restart, are often created for 
exhibition in museums, mostly by established artists, and so the works in this collection are 
essentially declared “high art” well before they are thought about in terms of their medium. 
Meanwhile, popular video games, like the-MoMA-acquired Street Fighter II, carry no such pretentions. 
(Although the same observation might be made about John Ford’s The Iron Horse [1924], one of the 
first films acquired by MoMA in 1935 within the institutional space of the Film Library).  
In this sense, mainstream video games are meant to reside within a class of cultural objects 
that ostensibly lack the artistic posturing found in the Media and Performance department. All the 
while, MoMA institutionally maintains plausible deniability in regards to making any definitive claims 
about video games as a “new modern art” as it once had for both film and photography, when 
MoMA respectively established those departments in 1935 and 1940. Like many major art 
institutions, it seems MoMA still maintains significant organizational distinctions around the 
“applied art” found in the design collection. This point was effectively emphasized by Antonelli in a 
presentation she gave on MoMA’s video game collection when she diffidently denied accusations 
that she or her department had provided any role in proclaiming video games to be an art form: “did 
I ever say that [video games] were art? Pac-Man and Tetris are two floors away from Picasso and Van 
Gogh.”101 Her statement implies that the individual objects in the design collection might be 
                                                 
101 Paola Antonelli, "Why I Brought Pac-Man to Moma" (paper presented at the Ted: Ideas Worth Spreading, New York 
City, 2013). As a matter of fact, Antonelli has publicly sent mixed messages about whether or not she thinks that video 
games should be thought of as an art form. Previously Antonelli had quite clearly declared that she considers video 
games to be a unique art form. In the initial blog post announcing the video game collection, she called video games “a 
new category of artworks in MoMA’s collection” and rhetorically asked and answered, “Are video games art? They sure 
are, but they are also design, and a design approach is what we chose for this new foray into this universe.” Antonelli 
Video Game Collection. 
 Part of the confusion surrounding these statements may be that Antonelli has made the case that divisions between art 
and design should be abolished. Her logic might be that an object’s well-defined functionality does not preclude its form 
classification as an “art form,” or possibly that an aesthetic form can have easily definable design functions—either 
argument would be an even more radically counter-Kantian then merely arguing that design objects can be “aesthetically 
appealing.”  See again Antonelli, "Pac-Man to Moma." 
Hakimi/74 
 
declared worthy of appreciation, but MoMA is by no means equating them with the established 
“artworks” attributed to canonical “artists” and found in the “fine art” work within, say, the 
Department of Painting and Sculpture.  
In the curatorial statement that accompanied MoMA’s video games through multiple 
exhibitions, Antonelli’s careful phrasing explicitly incorporates video games into MoMA’s 
established posture toward design objects:  
as with all other design objects in MoMA's collection—from posters to chairs to cars to 
fonts— [the video games in MoMA’s collection] are historically and culturally significant, 
aesthetically appealing, functionally and structurally ingenious, and innovative in how they 
approach technology and behavioral design.102  
While it is clear is that video games, like other design objects, are not precluded from being 
appreciated on aesthetic terms, their “aesthetic appeal” is relegated to one of many qualifications 
justifying a worthiness within MoMA’s collection. In this context, the “aesthetic appeal” suggests 
something of a gratuitous layer of beauty superfluous to the object’s core purpose. If anything, a 
design object is more readily identified as such precisely because its “aesthetic appeal” is not 
primary; the design object must function chiefly outside of an aesthetic discourse. Only then will it 
be available for an intervention by MoMA’s design curators, who conscientiously uplift this object’s 
place into a museum, and enable it to be appreciated as something worthy of admiration.  
In this way, MoMA’s posture towards video games fits in with its established tradition of 
drawing attention to the formal qualities of functional objects, a mission that routinely delights in 
taking overlooked, quotidian objects—even mass-manufactured items— and imbuing them with the 
prestige of a high-art institution. For MoMA, this tradition of recontextualizing cultural artifacts has 
been going at least since its monumental 1934 Exhibition of Machine Art, which made the 
historically radical curatorial decision to display “springs, gears, cables, chemical capsules, carpet 
                                                 
102 Antonelli, Carmody, and Galloway, "Applied Design." 
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sweepers, and kitchen cabinets...among [other] useful objects...not on the basis of their usefulness 
but for their beauty of form, finish and material.”103 MoMA’s progressive suggestion, expressed first 
in the Exhibition of Machine Art, has never been about recontextualizing design objects as 
functionless work solely existing for the purpose of aesthetic expression à la found art; rather it has 
been about making an argument that even if an object is created for a wholly purposeful and 
functional role it can be re-contextualized and then be appreciated aesthetically.104 In this way, 
MoMA’s design team wields a particular cultural authority in its ability to lift functional objects out 
of inconspicuousness so that they may be re-encountered through a newfound appreciation of their 
form.  
However, instead of focusing on the interactive design as promised, the rhetoric surrounding 
the collection seemed to consider the video games as art objects. MoMA Antonelli’s initial blog post 
and press release declared video games as “a new category of artworks in MoMA’s collection”—a 
message that led to headlines like “The 14 Video Games MoMA just Classified as Art” and “Art 
Tested MoMA Approved.”105 Crucially, similar rhetoric about MoMA’s conception of its video game 
collections seeped into the exhibitions displays, where any effort to focus on individual video game’s 
design was lost to a broad celebration of the video games collected. The 14 initial games displayed 
                                                 
103 MoMA, "International Style for Architecture and Exhibition of Machine Art (Press Release)," news release, March 
5th, 1934, moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/press_archives/162/releases/MOMA_1933-34_0029_1934-03-
01.pdf?2010. 
104 This perspective has some resonance with video game scholar Graeme Kirkpatrick who focuses more than anything 
else on the experiences fostered by video games. To Kirkpatrick defining video games as “art” is irrelevant because, 
regardless, they foster aesthetic experiences. Following an understanding stemming from Kant and Jauques Ranciere, 
Kirkpatrick argues that “[v]ideo games inherit certain of their key properties, especially form, from an art world that has 
to some extent absented itself from important areas of experience.” Graeme Kirkpatrick, Aesthetic Theory and the Video 
Game (Manchester; New York; New York: Manchester University Press ; distributed in the United States exclusively by 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 15. 
105Moriarty, "Comment Is Free: In Brief: Video Games Are Not Art, Regardless of Cultural Evolution." “Art Tested 
MoMA Approved” in The Atlantic. Scott Meslow, "The 14 Video Games New York's Moma Just Classified as Art,"  
Mental Floss (2012), http://mentalfloss.com/article/31649/14-video-games-new-yorks-moma-just-classified-art. Esther 
Zuckerman, "Video Games: Art-Tested, Moma-Approved,"  The Atlantic (2017), 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/entertainment/2012/11/video-games-art-tested-moma-approved/59446/. Mental 
FlossCrecente, "New Moma Exhibit Embraces the Art of Video Games as It Explores Their Design".   
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were mostly done with conspicuously minimalist displays, the consoles were hidden behind a blank 
wall so that only a screen was visible, along with a shelf underneath that held a set of headphones, 
and, depending on the game, a controller. Only some of the games were playable while others 
merely had continuously running demos. In exhibiting these games, MoMA’s decision to avoid 
arcade cabinets and platforms in favor of the display was ostensibly supposed to enable the visitor to 
focus on the visual interface of the games, while avoiding the historical associations of the arcade 
cabinet and the nostalgic associations of video game culture. However, in exclusively highlighting 
these games in terms of their visual interface, MoMA was also obscuring the literal software and 
hardware behind the games, a decision that significantly undermines MoMA’s contention that they 
are interested in these objects as objects.  
My aim here is not to simply to chastise MoMA for neglecting to thoroughly articulate its 
interest in collecting, admiring, exhibiting, and preserving video games. If anything, MoMA’s mixed 
messages regarding video games merely suggests a broader cultural and scholarly ambivalence about 
how to contextualize video games in relation to other cultural traditions, and, relatedly, how scholars 
should apprehend them critically. More so than film or literature, video games are wedged between 
the discourses of design and aesthetics, and, while these discourses are not mutually exclusive, they 
do provide vastly disparate accounts of the basic constitution of video games as texts, and how we 
experience these games. Much of the difference, we shall see, hinges around the term interactivity, 
which seems to have a very different connotation when it is understood in terms of material design 
compared to aesthetic reception.  
2.1.1 Framing Aesthetic and Design Discourses 
The case can certainly be made that video games should be apprehended both in terms of design 
and aesthetics. After all, discourses of aesthetics and design can certainly overlap. When it comes to 
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fashion and architecture, to take two prominent examples, functional design and aesthetic beauty 
can be apprehended as inseparable qualities. A dress by Alexander McQueen or a building by Zaha 
Hadid, might be described in aesthetic terms—beautiful, excessive, and open-to-interpretation—
while also being understood through terms associated with design—useful, calculated, and 
functional. Certainly, merely having a practical use-value does not prevent a given object from being 
apprehended in aesthetic terms. Likewise, high-art objects hanging in museums have had functional 
applications in certain contexts—a Renaissance painting may have been used to absolve a patron’s 
sins, or a portrait, as John Berger points out functions as “an advertisement for the sitter’s good 
fortune, prestige and wealth.”106 In this sense, an object’s properties do not determine how it will be 
apprehended. As Raymond Williams noted, this is part of what led Jan Mukarovsky to the idea that 
“an active capacity for the aesthetic function is not a real property of an object…rather, the aesthetic 
function manifests itself only under certain conditions, i.e. in a certain social context.”107  Another 
way of putting it is Dabney Townsend’s observation that the “aesthetic objects are what artists 
produce, museum directors collect, critics criticize, and librarians put on their shelves in some 
classification.”108 In other words, aesthetic objects are those artifacts that we, as a society, principally 
consider through discourse of aesthetics. Any object can be an aesthetic object, as long it is 
apprehended as such. But what does it to apprehend an object through an aesthetic discourse?  
While it may be futile to define the essential properties of the aesthetic object, describing its 
relationship with design is still a tremendously productive way of understanding how cultural 
artefacts are apprehended critically. In a space like MoMA, for instance, we could say that the 
                                                 
106 John Berger, Ways of Seeing, vol. 1 (Penguin uK, 2008), 111. 
107  Jan Mukarovsky, "Aesthetic Function, Norm and Value as Social Facts, Trans," M. Suino  (1936): 3. as quoted 
inRaymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, vol. 1 (Oxford Paperbacks, 1977), 153. For more on this approach see 
Winfried Fluck, "Aesthetics and Cultural Studies," Aesthetics in a multicultural age  (2002). Elsewhere Fluck quotes 
Mukarovsky as follows: “The aesthetic is neither the property of an object, nor is it tied to particular qualities of the 
object.” Jan Mukarovsky, "The Problem of Functions in Architecture," Zeitschrift fur Semiotik 5, no. 3 (1983). in Winfried 
Fluck, "Imaginary Space; or, Space as Aesthetic Object," Space in America: Theory, History, Culture 1 (2005). 
108 Dabney Townsend, Aesthetic Objects and Works of Art (Wolfeboro, N.H: Longwood Academic, 1989), 86. 
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aesthetic object and the design object effectively exist on either ends of a rhetorical continuum 
centered on the perceived qualities related to “practicality,” “usability,” and “applicability.” The 
aesthetic function is an internal and conceptual function, but a design function is a concrete target in 
the social world. This discursive construction maintains a rift between the fine arts and the applied 
arts. The painter, writer, music composer, and filmmaker are artists producing objects perceived to 
exist to be experienced, but the music hall’s architect, the book cover’s graphic designer, and the 
film set’s constructor are designers producing objects perceived to exist in the service of something 
outside themselves. The artwork and the artist remain attached to purposeless aesthetics, while the 
designed object and the designer are associated with a discourse of functional utility.  
Product designer and scholar Anthony Dunne contemplates the dynamic between aesthetics 
and design by explaining that the design object “must be understood rather than interpreted.” 109 
Critically engaging with the design object’s form is about attaining comprehension. The design critic 
evaluates the design object’s mechanisms to understand better how the object “works” and the 
object can be assessed in terms of efficiency and user-friendliness. More importantly, we only stop to 
evaluate the design object when we are given reason to do so, when it is pulled out of its useful 
context. In this sense, a well-designed object—not unlike the Heideggerian hammer—functionally 
exists without us our notice.110 In this sense, we are more likely to recognize bad design and 
occasions when a design object frustrates us. When it comes to good design, however, we may only 
                                                 
109 In his rumination on digital objects, product designer and scholar Anthony Dunne contemplates the dynamic 
between aesthetics and design. “In the human factors world, objects, it seems, must be understood rather than interpreted. This raises the 
question: are conventional notions of user-friendliness compatible with aesthetic experience? Perhaps with aesthetics, a different path must be 
taken: an aesthetic approach might subsume and subvert the idea of user-friendliness and provide an alternative model of interactivity.” While 
Dunne wonders to what extent aesthetics and design are mutually exclusive, he understands these concepts indicate 
profoundly different, and somewhat oppositional, modes of engagement with a given object. Dunne’s initial assumption 
is that “interactivity” is synonymous with user-friendliness, and user-friendliness implies a framework of design. This is, 
after all, the same logic MoMA’s uses to classify video games as design objects. Anthony Dunne, Hertzian Tales: Electronic 
Products, Aesthetic Experience, and Critical Design, vol. 2005 (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 23-24. The “human factors 
world” that Dunne refers to is essentially the design world. 
110 G. Harman, "Technology, Objects and Things in Heidegger," Cambridge Journal of Economics 34, no. 1 (2009). 
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notice it when prompted to; perhaps when it is displayed in a museum or when tasked to build an 
object from scratch.  
If the design object’s operative function is unambiguous, the aesthetic object is identified in 
part because its operative function is difficult or impossible to discern. We must apprehend the 
aesthetic object as one imbued with intentionality, but the precise ends of that intention are 
indeterminate.111 When one contemplates an object through an aesthetic framework, we can reflect 
on what it means or how it makes us feel, and, in this sense, it can be interpreted without being 
understood. Still we can also reflect on our experience of the aesthetic object by considering what it 
represents, what it signifies, and why it exists.  
At least part of the logic in MoMA’s conception of video games seems to be that if a video 
game “works”—if it is “playable”— it should be understood as a design object. The term “design” is 
itself rarely, if ever, defined in practice and it remains a sorely under-theorized term for describing a 
kind of aesthetic authorship. When the term “design” is employed in disciplines ranging from 
mathematics and information theory to aesthetic theory and game development, it implies a certain 
practical functionality, a notion of a purposive plan being executed through an object, device, or 
machine.112 This idea is central to “game design.” As computer programs that can “run” on a 
platform, a video game must be built with some baseline amount of proficiency. Video games are 
applications quite literally comprised of mathematical and logical functions and the functions must be 
free from error enough to be able instruct a computational machine to render an image onto a 
screen. Moreover, the image must be intelligible enough that it will instruct users or players how to 
                                                 
111 In other words, Kant’s notion of “purposiveness without a purpose.” 
112 In Rules of Play - Game Design Fundamentals, Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman boil a few definitions and “offer the 
following general definition: ‘Design is the process by which a designer creates a context to be encountered by a 
participant, from which meaning emerges.’” This, I believe, is a hopelessly hazy characterization that only raises more 
questions. What is a “designer”? What is a “context”? What is “meaning”? How does meaning “emerge”? See Katie 
Salen and Eric Zimmerman, The Game Design Reader : A Rules of Play Anthology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 53-
59. 
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render additional images according to some schema. This, it seems, is the essence of video games in 
terms of interaction design. As Antonelli’s explains in her curatorial statement accompanying the 
collection: 
The video games featured here are landmarks in [the] highly innovative and increasingly 
ubiquitous field [of interaction design]…The quality of the interaction translates in the 
digital world what the synthesis of form and function represents in the physical one. The 
criteria by which each game was selected consider many aspects of interaction design, including 
visual quality, the architecture of the digital space, the types of behavior that the game elicits, 
and even the elegance of the code that makes it work. 113 
Whereas, in the “physical” world, the function of a chair is material and tangible, in the digital world, 
the function is only understood in terms of what allows the digital object to be experienced in the 
first place, its interactivity with a player or observer. Video games are, in this sense, designed because 
they are premeditated expressions, calculated procedures. The tantalizing equation made here is that 
“quality of interaction” is the digital equivalent of “the synthesis of form and function.” Interactive 
objects are intrinsically tied to the realm of functionality, and, assuring that that an object just 
“works.” The very existence of interaction in an object, enables the evaluative design terminology of 
efficiency and user-friendliness. Interactive design, provides the understanding that the object has a 
mutable form that is structured to vary responsively to user input. 
MoMA’s curatorial statement focuses on the constituent “aspects” of the form—the visuals, 
the level design as represented through the “architecture of the digital space,” the ability to foster 
affective responses, and the code itself. These individual components, it is effectively argued, are 
examples of interaction design that together allow the video game to be operable. A video game is a 
carefully plotted arrangement of encoded protocols, which, when subsequently executed, instruct 
computational hardware in the process of rendering a program. Through the framework of design, 
the video game is an object, one that should be understood informatically. It is a code providing a 
                                                 
113 Antonelli, Carmody, and Galloway, "Applied Design." According to sources in the department contacted by email 
correspondence with departmental staff, the content of this curatorial statement was written by Antonelli. 
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set of procedural protocols that produce a series of material operations in relation to a platform. 
This approach advocates investigating video games principally in terms of their material, 
mathematical, logical, technological, and functional structures, while the interpretations and 
explorations of a greater meaning are essentially ignored. 
The most fitting illustration of what it means to apprehend video games through a design 
framework is Ben Fry’s data visualization of Pac-Man, which was acquired by the Architecture and 
Design department four years prior to when it acquired Pac-Man as a video game. In Fry’s Distellamap 
(Pac-Man), he uses processing software to translate and visualize the basic binary and image data 
contained within the original Atari 2600 cartridge version of Pac-Man. Fry’s software draws lines 
illustrating the cross-references in the code, mapping out the complex web of logic that defines the 
rules of the game’s hidden operations (Figure 02.1-A).  
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Figure 2.1-A. Distellimap (Pac-Man) by Ben Fry. 
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When apprehended through a design framework, Pac-Man is anatomized into its component pieces 
networked in an elaborate logical schema. The larger video game is understood as one comprised of 
the relational functions of constituent fragments, each of which is read with a defined purpose in the 
service of the whole. Consequently, the critical approach to the video game is focused on 
comprehending how a game “works” and positivistically charting the logic behind its expression. 
Instead of interpreting its meaning as we might with a film, our orientation is one of admiration of 
the video game in terms of technical ingenuity and detailed craftsmanship. Like the techno-
materialist approach advocated by Kirschenbaum and Parrika discussed in chapter 1, MoMA 
fundamentally understands video games materially; they are operational protocols, written in code, 
that instruct computational hardware—and perhaps other software—in the service of generating a 
program that runs on a platform.114 All video games can, it fact, be described in this way, as perhaps 
can all software whether Microsoft Excel, Norton Antivirus, or a BIOS. This idea was echoed in an 
email exchange with MoMA Collection Specialist Paul Galloway, who explained that:  
In our minds we don't really separate video games from other forms of interactive design or 
software. We also have websites, digital fonts, and an app (Biophilia). Video games are, of 
course, very different from those, but we view them as part of a continuum of designers helping 
humans interact with machines. 
To MoMA, video games are simply illustrations of interactive design within computer software, and 
are not categorically different from any interfacing software requiring input from a human user in 
the course of operating. 115 The “machines” with whom the humans are interacting, would 
                                                 
114 Although to make this claim one should disagree with Kittler and take as a given that software exists. For more see 
Friedrich Kittler, "There Is No Software," ctheory  (1995). 
115 Interaction design focuses on the aspects of the material design that allow the video games to function, but in what 
sense can we say video games are functional? Video games, like the broader category of games, are meant to be played, 
but as will discussed in the Chapter 3, “play,” like aesthetics, is often identified through in its contrast to practicality 
social use. Other formal categories in the applied arts, such as fashion, architecture, industrial production, ceramics, and 
textiles, are all associated with an articulable easily definable in our social world. And certainly, for objects within the 
collection, such as Apple’s iPhone or an Eames’ chair, the relationship to their larger function is clear. Along these lines 
Antonelli at one point equates the design of “a stool or a helicopter” with that of “an interface or a video game” by 
explaining that “digital code takes the place of wood or plastic.” Antonelli, Carmody, and Galloway, "Applied Design.". 
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presumably be the platforms running the games or it may be the game itslef. Either way, interaction 
design connotes a relationship between the user and the program that is literally embedded into the 
material structure of the video game itself.  
And yet, one of the overlooked difficulties in debates involving the term “interactive”—or 
the related variants “interact,” “interactivity,” and “interaction”—is distinguishing to what the terms 
are being applied. When, for instance, the both sides arguing in the Brown Supreme Court case 
describe video games as “interactive,” are they talking about the game itself or the experience of 
playing that video game? Even Scalia argues that video games provide more interactivity than other 
media. Does this mean interactivity can be measured? MoMA, it seems, relies on the same rhetorical 
usage found in the field of Human-Computer Interaction, which certainly refers to interaction as if it 
can be measured. Still, would such a measurement be quantitative or qualitative? Can it be measured 
through material qualities in the design or through subjective, contextual assessments? It remains 
unclear if the material object is interactive, or only the experience fostered by those qualities of the 
object is interactive. The difference of where interactivity is located may be subtle, but it is an 
important part of understanding video games’ relation to forms such as film and literature. 
2.1.2 Locating Interactivity 
Considering how many scholars have attempted to define the term “interactivity,” it is no wonder 
many new media and video game scholars are weary of the term.116 Epsen Aarseth, for one, rejects 
                                                                                                                                                             
The problem with this analogy is that stools and helicopters have external uses in context; these are physical objects 
designed to be “used” in ways that require no interpretation. Video games are quite distinct from the common categories 
of applied arts in MoMA’s Architecture and Design collection precisely because, as a category, they do not have a clear 
function. Although they may be comprised of individually purposeful components, as a whole, video games are not tools 
calculated for practical ends.  
116 Within the humanities, see for example Erik P Bucy, "Interactivity in Society: Locating an Elusive Concept," The 
information society 20, no. 5 (2004); David Z. Saltz, "The Art of Interaction: Interactivity, Performativity, and Computers," 
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its use altogether, making the case that interactivity suggests “various vague ideas of computer 
screens, user freedom, and personalized media, while denoting nothing.” Even before Lev 
Manovich, Aarseth sees “interactivity” as ideologically problematic for implying a techno-teleology 
of the computer-age that starkly separates old and new media; the former becomes associated with a 
more democratic two-way participation involved with the production and consumption of 
knowledge, while the latter is associated with the indoctrinating qualities of top-down, one-way 
stream of information.117 However, while Aarseth abandons the term, Manovich uses “interaction” 
to describe a quality of aesthetic reception in media that existed prior to the digital. Therefore, for 
Manovich the “myth of interactivity,” is about those who mistake interactivity as a defining quality 
of “new media.” Galloway, meanwhile, expresses more ambivalence about using the term, at one 
point arguing that Manovich’s “claim about the ‘myth of interactivity’ [is] misguided: yes, the term 
‘interactive’ is practically meaningless due to overuse, but that does not mean the term should apply 
willy-nilly to static works of art.”118 Galloway’s suggestion here is that if interactivity connotes 
anything, it is a quality of the “non-static” object. 
Regardless of these varying opinions, “interactivity” remains a pervasive term in both 
academic and popular discourses alike as it seems to insinuate something both novel and noteworthy 
about the encounter between humans and digital objects. So, even if Manovich is right in arguing 
that interactivity in nothing new, it remains a ubiquitous descriptor in discourses of software design, 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55, no. 2 (1997); Dominic Lopes, A Philosophy of Computer Art (New 
York;London;: Routledge, 2010); Dominic Preston, "Some Ontology of Interactive Art," Philosophy & Technology 27, no. 2 
(2014); Aaron Smuts, "What Is Interactivity?," Journal of Aesthetic Education 43, no. 4 (2009). Marie-Laure Ryan, Narrative 
as Virtual Reality 2: Revisiting Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2015). 
117 Aarseth, Cybertext, 48-50. 
118 Alexander R. Galloway, The Interface Effect (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012), 4. To be fair, this is 
really an aside; interactivity is not Galloway’s main focus in this context. 
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web development, information sciences, human-computer interaction studies, and the video game 
industry. If its connection to the digital is a myth, why does this myth remain so pervasive? 
In trying to understand “interactivity,” the work of Spiro Kiousis provides an efficient 
starting point because his frequently cited definition synthesizes nearly two dozen prior notions of 
“interactivity” from the fields of “psychology, sociology, and computer science/design.” Kiousis 
ostensibly takes a literal, empirical approach to the notion of interactivity without being explicitly 
concerned with aesthetic experiences.119 While Kiousis never mentions video games, his definition is 
focused on interactivity occurring through a mediating object (as opposed to “face-to-face 
interaction”), and, as such, its provisions could apply to video games. The following excerpt 
provides Kiousis’ proposed definition, supplemented with clarifying examples from elsewhere in his 
article: 
Interactivity can be defined as the degree to which a communication technology [e.g. “anything 
from a telephone to a computer system”] can create a mediated environment [e.g. “anything 
from a telephone wire to virtual reality”] in which participants [i.e. “human” and/or 
“machine”] can communicate (one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many), both 
synchronously and asynchronously, and participate in reciprocal message exchanges (third-
order dependency). With regard to human users, it additionally refers to their ability to 
perceive the experience as a simulation of interpersonal communication and increase their 
awareness of telepresence.120  
Putting aside the second clause for the moment because it includes a rather significant qualification, 
there are number of observations to make here about Kiousis’ definition of interactivity. For one 
thing, Kiousis refrains from implying that an object itself, what he calls a “communication 
                                                 
119 The closest Kiousis gets to considering aesthetic objects is his inclusion of Janet Murray, whose work Hamlet on the 
Holodeck has been an important touchstone within conversations about video games and virtual reality. Spiro Kiousis, 
"Interactivity: A Concept Explication," New Media & Society 4, no. 3 (2002): 365. Also see Oliver Quiring and Wolfgang 
Schweiger, "Interactivity: A Review of the Concept and a Framework for Analysis," Communications 33, no. 2 (2008). 
Another reason it seems applicable to thinking about video games is because the definition is also only focused on 
interactivity occurring through a mediating object (as opposed to “face-to-face interaction”), and, as such, its provisions 
are capable to be applied to aesthetic objects. 
120 For the sake of clarity, I am supplementing the quote with illustrative examples taken from elsewhere in his article 
Kiousis, "Interactivty," 372. To clarify, “synchronously” or “asynchronously” means that interactivity can occur both in 
real-time and over indefinite durations. By example, people talking over a telephone would be synchronous, but people 
leaving each other notes on a bulletin board would asynchronous.  
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technology,” is being deemed interactive; instead interactivity is only considered as a measurable 
condition in the relationship that exists between participants through a specific communication 
technology. Still, it would perhaps be appropriate to describe a video game as being “interactive,” if 
that video game enables interactivity. Another point is that “interactivity” clearly exists on a 
continuum for Kiousis, so a given object can be assessed in terms of providing a range of 
“interactivity” correlated to the relative sophistication of the communication afforded. At the same 
time, Kiousis’ definition refrains from delineating a threshold where a particular object (or 
“communication technology”) enables interactivity.  
What is also worth noting is that many of Kiousis’ empirical conditions are technically 
compatible with old media, such as film or literature. After all, nothing disqualifies paintings, books, 
and films from being considered “communication technologies.” Further, Kiousis’ notion that 
interactivity can occur “asynchronously” over indefinite durations—and not only “synchronously,” 
or in real-time—makes room for artworks that may be encoded with an expression that is received 
over an indefinite amount of time.  
However, there is a crucial point where Manovich’s “old” media interactivity ostensibly 
clashes with Kiousis’ criteria of interactivity; and that is in regard to the issue of “reciprocal message 
exchanges/third order dependency,” or what could be understood as successive acknowledgments 
of previous messages in subsequent messages.121 In Kiousis’ conception, interactivity requires a 
back-and-forth communication exchange, and this relationship must be dynamic, not merely 
reflexive—each response must reckon with the previous message, ensuring some sense of continuity 
and progression in the exchange. When applying this condition to Manovich’s reception-based 
                                                 
121 Robert P. Hawkins, John M. Wiemann, and Suzanne Pingree, "Sage Annual Review of Communication Research: 
Advancing Communication Science," in Interactivity: From New Media to Communication, ed. Sheizaf Rafaeli (Beverly Hills, 
CA: SAGE, 1988). “Third-order dependency refers to the extent to which messages respond to and/or implicate 
previous messages in an exchange, creating the possibility of meaningful dialogue.” Oxford Bibliography. 
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interactivity, say, when a person encounters and interprets a modernist painting, this mutual 
reciprocity is much harder to establish. The responsiveness seems to only be occurring one way as 
only the receiver is capable of participating. And, even if we agree that when a person beholds a 
painting, watches a film, or reads a novel, they are filling in gaps in the work—and thus responding 
to the artwork—the static, traditional artwork does not, in turn, measurably respond in a way that 
acknowledges the preceding input of the viewer or reader.  
It would certainly seem, then, that mutual reciprocity is the express material design quality of 
interactivity that differentiates video games as a categorically “new” medium, from those 
“traditional” media, such as novels and films, on a material level. Video games would be interactive 
because they solicit input from users through an interface (comprised of some combination of 
visual, aural, and tactile cues), the player input is then processed through the programmed protocols, 
and then the game expresses responsive feedback to that user input through the dynamic and 
variable interface. Put another way, the video game prompts a player to press “x,” the player presses 
“x,” and the avatar on screen jumps. This interface varies responsively, allowing it to ostensibly 
communicate back to the player that it has received and accounted for the player’s practical input 
during its ongoing operation. Compared to a film, there is undeniable distinction. A film may rely on 
someone to screen it, but does not react dynamically. If a spectator uses a DVD remote to fast 
forward over the gory parts of Pulp Fiction, the content of these forms does not vary, it remains 
oblivious to the user’s action. Quite plainly films cannot communicate a variable response because 
they are not materially designed with a programmable structure that allows them to react to the 
beholder’s input.122  
                                                 
122 This aligns with Preston’s argument that “the best way to account for the properties of interactive artworks is for 
their display types to be parts of them, parts which are in turn displayed.” Preston, "Some Ontology of Interactive Art," 
277. 
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Still, Manovich, for one, would not find this material distinction to be all that important. For 
him, this material approach is too “literally” focused on the “physical interaction between a user and 
a media object,” while neglecting the psychological realm of interaction.123 In fact, Kiousis’ 
definition might actually agree with Manovich in this regard because it contains a significant 
qualification in its second clause, one which recognizes the subject positions involved with 
determining interactivity between humans and objects. In the first clause, interactivity is presented as 
a measurable condition that can be deduced through empirical data and analysis. In the second 
clause, interactivity becomes highly subjective and dependent on individual determinations, on a 
given person’s “ability to perceive the experience” as interactive.  
Once interactivity is filtered through a tenuous realm of subjective perception, cognition, 
and comprehension, the material distinctions can be disregarded to some extent. Consider, for 
instance, the fallacy of empiricism when it comes to defining “communication technology,” “its 
mediated environment,” and the “participants.” In Kiousis’ example of a landline phone call 
between two people, the participants, and other components of the interaction are straightforward: 
a) the literal phone is the communication technology, b) the wires are the mediated environment, and c) the 
people conversing are the participants. However, imagine another phone call where one of the 
conversing persons is replaced by an automated voice menu. When we introduce a computer 
running a responsive software program designed to have a conversation with a human, we introduce 
a whole new set of complications. In addition to the phone, and the phone lines, an assessment now 
has to account for the computer running the automated program, the program’s software, and so 
on. Kiousis argues that both people and objects (“machines”) can be participants, so with whom or 
with what can we say person on the phone is communicating? When we introduce a computer 
running a software program, the second participant becomes a kind of imagined construct. We can 
                                                 
123 Manovich, Language. 
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still account for the person, the phone, and the phone lines, but concerning the second participant 
perhaps we need to account for the computer running the automated program, the program’s 
software, the software’s programmer, the computer’s engineer, the logic designer, the voice actor 
who supplies the voice, etc.  
The same set of issues arise when settling the terms of interactivity in the instance of a 
person playing a single-player video game. Some of the terms seem apparent—the player is a 
participant sending a message, accomplished, say, by pressing a computer key and moving the mouse; 
the computer hardware running the game constitutes the communication technology because it is the 
material medium that makes the communication possible; the video game’s software provides the 
mediated environment allowing room for a range of messages. At the same time, we could say that the 
messages are themselves communicated primarily through changes in the interface, which provide 
visual and aural cues to both acknowledge the player’s inputted messages and provide reciprocal 
prompts as messages back to the player. The underlying question is, however, with whom—or with 
what—is the video game player communicating? Who or what is the second participant responding 
to the player in this interaction? And does it matter if their messages communicated are all 
programmed ahead of time?  
From players’ perspectives, there are really several plausible accounts of their interlocuter 
while playing a single-player video game. In one version of the events, players might imagine that 
they are interacting with the video game itself, which would be understood as a complex and 
dynamic enough software program that the game is a kind of entity responding dynamically to the 
player’s inputs. Along the same lines, and depending on the game, video game players could imagine 
that they are interacting with a fictional, non-playable character existing within the game’s diegetic 
world. If the players have a more material conception of playing a video game, they might envisage 
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themselves interacting with the computer hardware, because it is that which processes the inputs 
before computing and rendering responses using the software interface.  
However, there is yet another plausible account of playing a single-player video game, one 
which greatly challenges whether interactivity is really all that different in video games compared to 
film. In this scenario, players imagine themselves essentially communicating with the figure of the 
game designer akin to the literary author or film director in the capacity of an “author function.” In 
this formulation, the game designer is a discursive construct or “projection,” which organizes the 
player’s reception of the game by imagining the game as a purposeful, creative articulation—an 
authored expression. This apprehends the video game primarily through an aesthetic framework and the 
video game becomes an interpretable text emanating from an originating, intentional sensibility. This 
formulation, however, challenges the expectation for a literal third-order reciprocity. The game 
designer is not literally responding, they have merely programmed a textual communication that 
contains layers and hidden protocols. 
Returning to Kiousis’ definition of interactivity with this mind, helps explain the 
considerable discrepancy between Kiousis’ two clauses in his definition of interactivity. In the first 
clause—“the degree to which a communication technology can create a mediated environment in 
which participants can communicate…and participate in reciprocal message exchanges”—
interactivity is cast as a measurable material condition, a relationship that can be deduced through 
analysis of definite data. In Kiousis’ second clause however, interactivity becomes highly subjective 
and dependent on an individual’s subjective determination: “with regard to human users, 
[interactivity] additionally refers to their ability to perceive the experience as a simulation of 
interpersonal communication…”  Once interactivity is filtered through the nebulous realm of 
subjective perception and individual comprehension, the material conditions ostensibly lose their 
objective authority. Interactivity becomes a moving target, a condition that must be historicized, 
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contextualized, and situated because of its dependency on heuristic norms and subjective processes 
of interpretation. This is supported by Kiousis’ ultimate conclusion that “interactivity is both a 
media and psychological factor that varies across communication technologies, communication 
contexts, and people’s perceptions.”124 This notion of interactivity acknowledges that context 
matters in judging a given object as “interactive.” 
If, however, interactivity is “both a media and psychological factor” how does one side 
affect the other? Instead of fully giving up on the term interactivity, the rest of this chapter will 
explore whether video games’ material qualities justify rethinking what interactivity really entails in 
the way video games are experienced. That is, do video games’ material and responsive design 
provide a variance of interactivity that justifies distinguishing video games in kind (and not just in 
degree) from forms like film? As we will see, those who argue that that video games should be 
distinguished, assume that video games’ material form inherently provides a more empowered, 
agentic receptive role.  
Perhaps the best way to evaluate these ideas, though, is through a close reading of a 
particular video game. Consequently, we will look closely at Davey Wreden’s 2010 The Stanley Parable 
because it is an example of a video game that puts tremendous amount of pressure on the 
assumption that all video games are interactive and the folly of divining the qualities of the video 
game experience through material form alone. 
2.2 PLAYING WITH THE STANLEY PARABLE 
In fairness, classifying The Stanley Parable as “video game” already provides a misleading set of 
associations for those unfamiliar with trends in video game production over the past ten years. For 
one thing, The Stanley Parable lacks the identifiable characteristics associated with popular mainstream 
                                                 
124 Kiousis, "Interactivty," abstract. 
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video games, such as a clear set of rules, easily definable objectives, a sense of competition, or a 
measurable notion of progress. Yet, there is also little doubt that The Stanley Parable is culturally 
identified as a video game, and, along with titles such as the meditative Dear Esther (The Chinese 
Room, 2008; 2012) and the critically acclaimed Gone Home (The Fulbright Company, 2013), it falls 
into a category of independently produced, smaller-scale video games that use the first-person 
perspective while breaking from associated generic conventions of shooting or puzzles. Each of 
these games focuses almost entirely on producing and exploring a diegetic environment laden with 
embedded narrative. However, in contrast to the sincerity and melodrama that permeate the more 
self-serious storytelling found in Dear Esther and Gone Home, The Stanley Parable’s narrative has a 
facetious, reflexive tone, as it takes a confrontational disposition in relation to the player.  
To be clear, claiming that The Stanley Parable is a self-reflexive rumination on the video game 
form does not require a close or “redemptive” reading because it quite bluntly puts the issues of its 
form at the center of its content. A number of scholars have already read the game as a rumination 
of storytelling in video games including Bradley Fest who explains that “The Stanley Parable is the 
contemporary independent videogame avant-garde’s most clear critical reflection on itself [and its] 
autocritique lays bare the medium and its conventions in what can often be unflattering ways, 
treating videogames with a merciless yet playful irony.”125 In The Stanley Parable, the player controls a 
character named Stanley after he finds himself suddenly aware that he seems to be alone in his 
usually bustling office building. The player controls Stanley as he explores his office and, depending 
on the path the player chooses, the narrative will cascade in one of several absurd directions. All the 
while, the game provides reflexive commentary about non-linear storytelling and the experience of 
                                                 
125 Bradley J Fest, "Metaproceduralism: The Stanley Parable and the Legacies of Postmodern Metafiction," Wide Screen 6, 
no. 1 (2016). Other scholarly work on the Stanley Parable focusing on how it disrupts narrative conventions of video 
games see Lars AWJ de Wildt, "Precarious Play: To Be or Not to Be Stanley," Press Start 1, no. 1 (2014); Souvik 
Mukherjee, Video Games and Storytelling: Reading Games and Playing Books (Springer, 2015); Astrid Ensslin, "Video Games as 
Unnatural Narratives," Diversity of Play  (2015); Michael James Heron and Pauline Helen Belford, "All of Your Co-
Workers Are Gone: Story, Substance, and the Empathic Puzzler," Journal of Games Criticism 2, no. 1 (2015). 
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playing video games. This is even made clear before the game’s narrative officially begins, when the 
unusual interface of the games’ “menu screen” announces the game’s intention to disrupt the 
player’s conventional experience of first-person video games. Usually a video game menu screen is 
the equivalent of a book’s table of contents or a DVD menu selection screen. It is an element of 
practical design used only to facilitate access to the content itself. The status of The Stanley Parable’s 
menu, however, is different (and perhaps more akin to a title sequence in a film). When the program 
is first loaded, the selection menu depicts a computer at a desk displaying a duplicate of the menu 
screen it is contained within, producing an endless recursion in which the renderings get 
exponentially smaller until they are unrecognizable—or unrenderable—in a manner similar to a live-
feed video camera pointed at a screen rendering its image (Figure 0-B2.2-A).  
 
Figure 2.2-A. Menu Screen for The Stanley Parable.  
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When the player moves the cursor with the mouse in this menu, each cursor on the successive 
screens moves along concurrently, producing a peculiar feeling for the player of staring at, and 
controlling, both a real-world computer screen and a representation of a computer screen 
simultaneously. Perhaps the implication is that the game “The Stanley Parable” also exists within the 
diegetic world of the game. Alternatively, maybe the player’s world should be considered to exist 
within the diegetic framework of the game. Either way, the menu screen begins the game’s extended 
effort to make the player hyper-aware of the formal frames that position the player in relation to the 
game’s world. This accords with the seemingly non-diegetic text on screen stating that “You are 
playing THE STANLEY PARABLE,” indicating that the experience of playing The Stanley Parable, 
has commenced prior to the player selecting the option to “Begin the game.” 
Given an even more scrupulous analysis—one that perhaps already engages with this 
decidedly functional menu design as an element of an aesthetically interpretable text—the layers of 
The Stanley Parable’s rumination on the video game form are even more multifaceted. Even the 
seemingly unremarkable framed landscape wall-art hanging in the upper right corner of the menu 
screen provides an outlet for demonstrating how the video game’s text is subject to one’s critical 
disposition. What should or could we say is the function of this diegetic artwork? The number of 
issues raised by this landscape art alone is quite astounding to contemplate. Among other possible 
interpretations is that the detail is at once 1) an instance of plausible detail adding a sense of realism 
to an office environment; 2) a suggestive foreshadowing of the game’s obsession with narrative 
frames, here providing a literal representation of multiple “frames” within frames; 3) a comment on 
the functional utility of popular art, which here provides a faux-window onto the outside world for 
both the diegetic worker—not unlike how a video game is associated with popular art and can 
simulate visions of natural environments; 4) a somewhat oblique reference to the similar-looking 
iconic Microsoft Windows XP background scene known as “Bliss”—an observation that provides 
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both an associative pun to “windows” and a nod in the direction of the millions of office workers 
forced to deal with “Bliss”; 4) a specific predictive reference to one of the game’s many possible 
narrative “endings,” specifically the “happy ending” in which Stanley escapes the office and arrives 
in a similar pastoral setting; 5) a fictional representation of artwork, which is ambiguously either a 
diegetic painting or a photograph. Still, what makes The Stanley Parable exceptional as a video game is 
not merely that a humanities scholar could conduct various credible critical readings of it, but that, 
as we shall see, The Stanley Parable explicitly compels the player to contemplate what the game means, 
that is, to interpret it as a we would any authored, aesthetic objects.  
After selecting “Begin the game” in the menu, The Stanley Parable opens with an introductory 
cinematic sequence, or what is also known to players as a “cut-scene,” which provides background 
exposition through spoken narration. The voice of an omniscient narrator—complete with the 
authority mustered from a stodgy masculine British accent—begins with the line, “this is the story of 
a man named Stanley…” while the virtual camera tracks in through a generic office towards the 
door of one particular office. Over a montage mostly consisting of Stanley working at his computer, 
the narrator explains that Stanley was a happy office drone in a big company whose only job was to 
push buttons on his computer as commanded, until, one day, the orders stopped coming in and he 
found himself suddenly alone in the office. The player’s control picks up with Stanley facing his 
computer as the narrator’s voice fades out. It is the at next moment, however, that that the game 
introduces the player to its central reflexive device, the voiceover narration.  
Once leaving Stanley’s office and entering the adjacent room filled with empty cubicles and 
adjoined offices, the omniscient narrator from the opening cinematic sequence makes a surprising 
return: “All of his co-workers were gone. What could it mean? Stanley decided to go to the meeting 
room, perhaps he had simply missed a memo.” There are a few reasons that this use of voiceover 
narration violates norms in video games, ones that are worth examining in further detail. As in 
Hakimi/97 
 
fictional films, a non-diegetic third-person, voiceover narration can be a helpful expository shortcut 
in video games for setting a scene (like the text crawls in the opening of Star Wars) or moving from 
to location to another. Yet, also as in fictional film, the use of this type of narration is usually 
relegated to the “framing narration,” interstitial moments between levels or sequences.126 In addition 
to violating the framing norm, The Stanley Parable’s voiceover narration also demonstrates access to 
Stanley’s interiority, which provides a level of omniscience not usually found in visual storytelling 
media. As Sarah Kozloff points out, “[third-person, voiceover] film narrator[s are] perfectly capable 
of telling us what characters are thinking, yet such ‘inside views’ seldom occur.” Relying on an 
omniscient third-person narrator to explain what characters are thinking would likely come across as 
painfully unsubtle and overly didactic, which is why films generally try to communicate this 
information in more subtle, diegetic, and motivated ways, such as through acting or perhaps even 
first-person voiceover narration.127   
As a video game, The Stanley Parable’s use of voiceover narration also undermines the 
perception that players are supposed to be taking on the role of Stanley while playing. In this 
moment, however, the narrator is not describing what they are thinking and Stanley’s knowledge of 
“the meeting room” is a moment when players confronts the incongruity of Stanley’s foreknowledge 
and their own. Consequently, retaining the third-person perspective and referring to Stanley’s 
thoughts, serves only to make players aware that, while they are in control of Stanley’s actions and 
decisions to some degree, they are not in control of the character’s thoughts. Their role is limited by 
the design of the game. 
                                                 
126 The notion of a “framing” storyteller comes from Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method (Ithaca, 
N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1980).  The observation about film is made by Sarah Kozloff, Invisible Storytellers: Voice-over 
Narration in American Fiction Film (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 71-5. 
127 Kozloff, Inivisible, 81. Because it is in the ocular first-person perspective, The Stanley Parable it can be a challenge to 
express Stanley’s interiority at a given moment. However, video games and films have certainly come up with creative 
workarounds to this. Perhaps, steering the view to focus on an object, or having an object glow, or including first-person 
voiceover narration or having a non-playable character reacting. 
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In fact, playing The Stanley Parable mostly consists of the dynamic stemming from the 
incongruity between the narrator’s descriptions and what the player chooses to do with Stanley. The 
key illustration of this occurs when Stanley reaches the first fork in his path, a hallway that leads to 
two open doors. Before the player can decide which door to open, the narrator’s dialogue seems to 
become out-of-sync with the concurrent events: “When Stanley came to a set of two open doors, he 
entered the door on his left.” The continued use of past-tense narration, along with the narrator’s air 
of confidence, faces the player with a conundrum. If the player chooses to move Stanley through the 
door on the left, the narrator’s statement is true and the narration served as instruction from a 
reliable narrator. If the player chooses instead to enter the door on the right, defying the narrator’s 
previous statement, the player has rendered the narrator into an unreliable narrator, seemingly 
violating the game’s plan. 
From this initial decision point forward, the game presents the player with a cascading series 
of decisions—almost always regarding the voiceover narrator’s instructions to Stanley—which 
continue until the player reaches an end to a narrative branch. Most of these endings entail direct 
confrontations between the player/Stanley and the voiceover narrator who frequently violates 
formal divisions by seeming to either directly address the player and/or the character of Stanley. In 
one ending, for example, the narrator triggers a time bomb designed to inevitably explode regardless 
of the actions taken by Stanley in the game, and the narrator proceeds to mock Stanley and the 
players for their inability to stop the bomb. In another ending, Stanley is forced to choose between 
either essentially watching an endless laser show or committing suicide by jumping to his death. All 
the while the narrator makes it clear that the act of committing suicide will be taken as horribly 
cynical criticism of the both the narrator and the larger game. In yet another path, Stanley is asked to 
give his feedback on what is presented as the narrator’s own prototype video game, a pretentious 
and simple game “all about the desperation and tedium of endlessly confronting the demands of 
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family life.”  Perhaps the best way to understand The Stanley Parable’s branching structure is through a 
fan-created flowchart that maps out the forking paths in a manner that may recall the (fig 3): 
 
Figure 2.2-B. A fan-made chart mapping out The Stanley Parable' s narrative branches. 
Each “ending” (shown here in red) is a point of no return, in which the player has guided Stanley 
through enough in-game decisions to trigger a certain sequence of narrative events that culminate in 
a forced cut to a loading screen, before the game appears to start over from the beginning of the 
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narrative as the player rejoins Stanley from the point when he initially leaves his office. After each 
ending, the loading screen itself is lined with the seemingly infinite Mobius-strip of a statement 
“…the end is never the end is never…” In fact, The Stanley Parable is meant to be replayed, so that 
player can make different choices and explore other possible outcomes. If, on an initial playthrough, 
the player travels through the first left door as instructed by the narrator, then the right door 
becomes a tantalizing option for the next playthrough, etc. Each decision point becomes marked as 
a moment that players should return to on another playthrough, so they find out what occurs when 
the alternate decision is made.  
In a certain sense, the flowchart illustrating The Stanley Parable’s branching structure 
epitomizes key aspects of the variable, responsive material structure of the video game form in 
general. Each node containing multiple extensions designates a point when the game’s interface 
prompts the player to make a clear decision and input instructions, choosing a path for Stanley so 
that the game can continue to operate and express its content. Though this flowchart only maps out 
narrative events, such as Fry’s visualization of Pac-Man (Figure 2.1-A, p.82), it displays the variant 
expressive potentials embedded within the single video game object. In theory, this chart illustrates 
the argument that video games—and similar digital forms—engender an exceptional amount of 
agency in the act of reception. Among these scholars, George Landow argues that hypertextual, 
variable forms, including video games, “create an active, even intrusive reader…[who] infringes on 
the power of the writer, removing some of it and granting it to the reader.” Jay Bolter similarly 
explains that when “the reader performs the text,... [this] define[s] new levels of creativity that fall 
between the apparent originality of the romantic artist and apparent passivity of the traditional 
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reader.” 128 Regardless of whether “interactivity” describes this variable responsive structure, these 
scholars agree that video game’s material form enables players to operate as collaborative agents 
over the textual expression.  
And yet, as we shall soon see, The Stanley Parable plainly rejects the premise that its form in 
any way provides meaningful textual agency. It compels us to contemplate whether the variability 
and responsive structural configuration of video games translates into something that is experienced 
as a dynamic interaction. At the same time, the game also undermines the assumption that its 
variability and responsiveness produce a receptive experience that is altogether different from one 
that can be found in a non-variable medium like film. To understand this, though, we need to 
articulate how The Stanley Parable provides a somewhat radical notion of what constitutes the video 
game as a textual experience. 
2.2.1 The Video Game Experience and Textual Agency 
One reason it is tempting to agree with the argument that video games provide distinct aesthetic 
experiences because of their material differences is because this position seems to offer something 
of a compromise between the material and aesthetic approaches to video games. At once, video 
games can be apprehended as aesthetic objects, in that they are understood as interpretable texts, 
and yet they are also distinct kinds of aesthetic experiences because of their variable and responsive 
material design, which produces a new form of aesthetic engagement. This is, essentially, why 
Aarseth’s concept of “ergodic literature”— what he also calls “cybertexts”—has been so influential 
in video game scholarship because, for Aarseth, video games are different in kind because they are 
                                                 
128 Bolter, Writing Space, 2nd, 173. George P. Landow, Hypertext 3.0 : Critical Theory and New Media in an Era of Globalization, 
3rd ed., Parallax (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 125,36]. Also see Stuart Moulthrop, "Rhizome and 
Resistance: Hypertext and the Dreams of a New Culture," Hyper/text/theory  (1994). 
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“machine[s] for the production of variety of expression.” Not unlike the arguments from Landow 
and Bolter, that a new material form engenders a new type of agency, Aarseth’s argues that the 
“mechanical organization of the text fundamentally changes how the text is beheld.” The materially 
variable and responsive structure of this category of works engenders a type of collaborative 
reception that firmly surpasses the “psychological” participation that Manovich envisions as implicit 
to all aesthetic reception. When the “user” provides input into a cybertext, “the user will have 
effectuated a semiotic sequence, [a] selective movement [which] is a work of physical construction.” 
This literal and material effectuation is tangible and quantifiable—something Aarseth calls 
“extranoematic”—that is absent in the way film or literature is perceived.  
For Aarseth, being a “construction of a different kind,” is felt in the act of reception:  
A reader, however strongly engaged in the unfolding of a narrative, is powerless. Like a 
spectator at a soccer game, he may speculate, conjecture, extrapolate, even shout abuse, but he 
is not a player. Like a passenger on a train, he can study and interpret the shifting 
landscape, he may rest his eyes wherever he pleases, even release the emergency brake and step 
off, but he is not free to move the tracks in a different direction. He cannot have the player's 
pleasure of influence: "Let's see what happens when I do this." The reader's pleasure is the 
pleasure of the voyeur. Safe, but impotent. 
The cybertext reader, on the other hand, is not safe, and therefore, it can be argued, she is not 
a reader. The cybertext puts its would-be reader at risk: the risk of rejection. The effort and 
energy demanded by the cybertext of its reader raise the stakes of interpretation to those of 
intervention. Trying to know a cybertext is an investment of personal improvisation that can 
result in either intimacy or failure. …The tensions at work in a cybertext, while not 
incompatible with those of narrative desire, are also something more: a struggle not merely for 
interpretative insight but also for narrative control: ‘I want this text to tell my story; the story 
that could not be without me.’ 129 
The variable structural design of the form engenders a new type of agentic reception, something 
closer to collaboration.130 Like Landow, Aarseth puts it in terms of power relations as the video 
game player is imbued with a kind of authority not only over the interpretation of the text, but over 
the compositional expression of the initial text itself. 
                                                 
129 Aarseth, Cybertext, 3-10.  
130 See ibid., 79-81. 
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What makes The Stanley Parable such a provocative and productive video game to read in 
relation to this idea is that it resoundingly strips that power away from the player, making the 
argument that the receptive agency provided by video games probably never existed to begin with. 
To commence explaining The Stanley Parable’s conception of video games, we might begin 
with the branch of the game that goes into effect once the player follows each of the narrator’s 
directions from start to finish. (In other words, when the narrator says the line “Stanley leaves his 
office,” the player then moves Stanley out of the office; when the narrator says the line “Stanley 
entered the door on his left,” the player moves Stanley through the door on the left, etc.) In the 
ending sequence triggered upon following this path, Stanley ultimately escapes his office complex 
and is let out into a pastoral scene (reminiscent of the cliché landscape painting found in Stanley’s 
office in the opening moments of the game). In this supposedly ideal conclusion to the game’s 
narrative, the player has enabled Stanley to escape the vague looming threat in the office, and set 
Stanley free. The voiceover narrator explains:  
Was it over? [Pause] Yes! [Stanley] had won! He had defeated the machine, unshackled 
himself from someone else’s command, freedom was mere moments away. And yet, even as the 
immense door slowly opened, Stanley reflected on how many puzzles still lay unsolved. Where 
had his co-workers gone? How had he been freed from the machine’s grasp? What other 
mysteries did this strange building hold? 
In Aarseth’s understanding, in reaching this ending, the player has collaborated in the production of 
the text’s composition, and the player should accordingly feel empowered that the text expressed 
their individual story. Yet, reaching this ending provides precisely the opposite sense. The player has 
“won,” “earned freedom” and “defeated the machine” by exactly following the voiceover narrator’s 
every instruction. The word “command” is especially poignant here because it is usually the 
computer program that responds to “commands.” Has the player “escaped someone else’s 
command” by being commanded by the program in the form of the narrator? In choosing to obey 
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the commands made by the game, the player has effectively merely turned the pages or flipped the 
tape as instructed. 
In Aarseth’s conception of the ergodic cybertext, picking a specific path from among the 
others is an act of composition and “effectuating the text.” However, reaching this, or any other 
“ending” in The Stanley Parable, lacks narrative denouement and the sense that the “text” is in any 
way complete. Upon reaching this sequence—which, it should be mentioned, takes less than ten 
minutes—the narrator poses certain rhetorical questions that make us aware that we have only 
encountered a very narrow sliver of what actually comprises the game’s actual textual form. Those 
unanswered questions are for the moment unsettled; their answers remain buried elsewhere in the 
game’s variable form. The narrator refers to the remaining “puzzles” and “mysteries,” implicitly 
acknowledging its affiliation with ludic and narrative traditions. In doing so, The Stanley Parable 
recognizes how the material structure must be understood as both variable and finite. The ludic 
elements of The Stanley Parable promise a material design that depends on a user to functionally exist. 
The narrative elements remind us that this is a story that has been written ahead of time, one that 
can be uncovered, but not created anew. What The Stanley Parable implies, alternatively, is that the 
video game’s text is not simply the version perceived on a given encounter; rather, the text is the 
sum of multiple encounters, and even the potential for other encounters. This conception counters 
the assumption that choosing a single path—and apparently ending the game—in any way provides 
the player with any sense of agency over the textual form. This fundamentally pushes back against 
the assumption that encountering the ending signifies the conclusion of the text, and it also 
undermines the supposed agency that the player wields as a supposed collaborator. 
Another particularly telling sequence demonstrates precisely how insignificant the player’s 
actions are in the collaborative effectuation of the textual expression. In this sequence, the player 
must take Stanley off the prescribed path to essentially lock Stanley in a broom closet. In this 
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iteration, the player will direct Stanley to follow the path prescribed by the narrator until the point 
that the player spots an office door marked with the words “Broom Closet.” The player will click the 
command to open the door (unlike most doors, this one opens) to reveal a fairly unremarkable 
depiction of a broom closet. The player can have Stanley move inside the closet and then close the 
door, but, once inside, the player can only look around at the non-actionable props (some cleaning 
supplies). After a moment, the narrator comments on the decision of the player by shifting the 
spoken narration accordingly: 
Stanley stepped into the broom closet, but there was nothing here, so he turned around and 
got back on track. [Pause.] There was nothing here, no choice to make, no path to follow, 
just an empty broom closet. No reason to still be here. [Pause]…You do realize there’s no 
choice or anything in here, right? If I had said “Stanley walked past the broom closet” at 
least you would have had a reason for exploring it to find out. But it didn’t even occur to me 
because literally this closet is of absolutely no significance to the story whatsoever. I never 
would have thought to mention it. [Pause] …Maybe to you this is somehow its own 
branching path. Maybe when you go talk about this with your friends you’ll say “oh, did you 
get the broom closet ending? The broom closet ending was my favorite!” I hope your friends 
find this concerning… [Pause]Well, I’ve come to a very definite conclusion about what’s 
going on right now. You’re dead. You got to this broom closet, explored it a bit, and were 
just about to leave because there’s nothing here when a physical malady of some sort shut 
down your central nervous system and you collapsed on the keyboard. Well in a situation like 
this, the responsible thing is to alert someone nearby so as to ensure that your body is taken 
care of before it begins to decompose. [Yelling:] HELLO!! ANYONE WHO 
HAPPENS TO BE NEARBY!! THE PERSON AT THIS COMPUTER IS 
DEAD!! HE OR SHE HAS FALLEN PREY TO ANY NUMBER OF 
YOUR COUNTLESS HUMAN PHYSIOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES. 
IT’S INDICATIVE OF THE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF YOUR 
SPECIES. PLEASE REMOVE THEIR CORPSE FROM THE AREA 
AND INSTRUCT ANOTHER HUMAN TO TAKE THEIR PLACE AT 
THE COMPUTER, MAKING SURE THEY UNDERSTAND BASIC 
FIRST-PERSON VIDEO GAME MECHANICS, AND FILLING THEM 
IN ON THE HISTORY OF NARRATIVE TROPES IN VIDEO GAMING 
SO THAT THE IRONY AND INSIGHTFUL COMMENTARY OF THIS 
GAME IS NOT LOST ON THEM… 
Each “pause” represents a temporary cessation of the dialogue in which the player must remain in 
the broom closet doing nothing, and at each of these moments the player is unsure whether or not 
there is additional scripted dialogue coming so a major component of this sequence is the player’s 
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curiosity, waiting to see how far the script continues in this direction. It is essentially a game of 
chicken where the game is challenging the player to continue to do nothing and the player is curious 
to find out how far the game’s design stretches this narration in a sequence in which apparently 
nothing is happening. All the while the narrator mocks the player for being unable to take a more 
active role to change the narrative. For the player, this act of disobedience, this cessation of activity 
is essentially a choice, which, in theory, is a moment of collaboration in the textual expression. By 
choosing not to move Stanley out of the broom closet, the player is deciding to be a “passive” 
spectator, thus triggering, this iteration of the text. 
Yet there is another way of analyzing this scene—one The Stanley Parable reveals and 
advocates for—which challenges Aarseth’s understanding of the player’s sense of meaningful 
collaboration. For the player, there is a something of a paradox in this moment, one that leads to 
both triumph and humiliation. While players have seemingly composed this particular sequence 
through their patience, they are also confronted by the fact that their literal, material input is 
irrelevant. The game’s narration has successfully guided the player into making the decisions 
required to compose this moment. To have even accessed this sequence, the player inevitably 
followed out a path scripted ahead of time. The feeling of individuality and autonomy must be 
coupled with the realization that the player has been previously scripted into the boundaries of larger 
text. The dialogue perhaps even invites us to consider a scenario in which the narrator’s hypothesis 
is correct—imagine that players have been incapacitated to the extent that they are unable to move 
Stanley out of the broom closet. The dialogue, the entire sequence of events, exists whether or not 
the it was the player’s choice to keep Stanley in the closet. The process of this expression is 
indifferent to the player’s supposed agency. The player is instead exposed as inconsequential to the 
variant compositions embedded within the material structure, which while variable, is hardcoded to 
provide a stable experience regardless of the input. If meaningful collaboration or effectuation 
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requires the player’s agentic participation, the game is exposing how inconsequential the player’s role 
is in the production of what effectively is perceived as the interpretable text.  
In playing The Stanley Parable, it quickly becomes apparent to the player that transgression is 
the game. What initially feels like a rebellious act, is rendered into a tacit obedience. From this 
perspective, the only way the player can collaborate or express narrative agency would be to affect 
the composition in a manner that was not sanctioned ahead of time by the game’s design. The effort 
to escape the prescriptive protocols and express agency outside the games rules manifests in a search 
for weaknesses in the game’s authority. One sequence that illustrates the game’s shrewd cognizance 
of this occurs if the player, without any prompting or instruction from the narrator, laboriously 
maneuvers Stanley across the top of a few desks and cubicles walls, to essentially jump out of an 
open window. It seems that what the player has discovered is a structural flaw in the way this space 
was composed, which left an environmental loophole in the level design. The apparent flaw in the 
level’s careful environmental architecture provides a gap and now Stanley falls out the window into 
an empty, white space seemingly devoid of visual design. For the moment, it seems the player has 
succeeded in escaping the parameters of the game—not merely uncovering what was meant to be 
uncovered, but actually inventing a new composition by exploiting a glitch and inhabiting a space 
devoid of the designer’s intentionality and control.131  
In theory, this would constitute a moment of genuine textual effectuation, but, being The 
Stanley Parable, this event too is soon revealed to be carefully orchestrated. After a few seconds, the 
narrator’s voice suddenly chimes in: “At first Stanley assumed he had broken the map, until he heard 
this narration and realized it was a part of the game's design all along. He then praised the game for 
its insightful and witty commentary into the nature of video game structure and its examination of 
                                                 
131  We will discuss glitches and exploits in more detail in the next chapter. That is, many games, even carefully crafted 
games, are so immense that they include accidental gaps in design that might result in walls that a player can 
inadvertently pass through, falling outside a game’s architecture and into a liminal, undesigned space. 
Hakimi/108 
 
structural narrative tropes.” As the narrator points out, knowing gaming culture description of a 
significant environmental design glitch (“breaking the map”), the player’s probable assumption that 
they had expressed agency by exceeding the game’s parameters was an elaborate ruse designed into 
the game. The implication is that every idea, instinct, or strategy the player develops has already been 
anticipated by the game’s designer. The larger text has carefully calculated the range of possibilities 
for the player’s experience.  
As the scene continues, the game essentially ridicules the notion that exploration and limited 
choices afford agency and allow meaningful collaboration in the production of the text. While in the 
empty space out the window, the narrator asks players to signal if they have grown tired of the space 
by moving one way or another. If players express that they are not tired of this scenario, the narrator 
resumes his lesson:  
Ah, then in that case we'll continue! But now here comes the real question: what do you 
think would have happened if you had told me that you wanted this to stop? Do you think it 
would have been particularly different? Would I have taken this same idea but rephrased it 
superficially to fit that answer? Perhaps you never would even have thought of it if I hadn't 
brought up the issue in the first place! Oh, now think about it, will it be worth it for you to 
restart, and then come BACK here, just to do the other option? Clearly this whole gag takes 
some time, what if the other option is even longer! How long will you spend in total just to 
have heard all the narration! Or – oh this is rich! - perhaps you've just played the other 
option and now you've come to see what happens in this one! So what do you think, which 
choice was the better one? Imagine if you had selected ‘continue’ on your first playthrough, 
how tantalizing it would be, not knowing what happens when you pick the other option… 
There are several discerning observations about the player’s orientation toward the game implicit in 
this scene. For one thing, the game acknowledges Aarseth’s pivotal idea that within this form each 
decision does carry the “risk of rejection.” Here the narrator essentially taunts the player’s 
investment in the time spent getting to this point. At the same time, players are  also being taunted 
because of their compulsion to keep playing to satisfy their curiosity. In this way, The Stanley Parable 
acknowledges the player’s drive to uncover the magnitude of the predesigned text. The player’s chief 
recourse in the face of this decision is repetition—essentially conducting the experiment again to 
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encounter the path not taken. At the same time, the game admits that it is unaware if this occasion is 
the repetition because, as it has been pre-written, it is utterly indifferent to the choices made. The 
sense of responsiveness is revealed to be another illusion built into the text. The stakes are also 
lowered because it seems there are no real consequences in a variable responsive narrative scenario 
that can be easily reconstituted and re-rerun. As in most video games, finding out the results of the 
decision not taken, requires playing the game again, or perhaps, saving the game right before a 
decision is made and reloading the scenario to see the other path.132 
In fact, this idea is essentially the unifying lesson in almost every path the player chooses for 
Stanley. Each time players feel like they are making a choice, the game in turn provides a sardonic, 
exaggerated reaction mocking the idea that the player’s input managed to fundamentally alter the 
game’s expression. In one ending, the voice of a second voiceover narrator, this time a female, 
ostensibly freezes the diegetic world as yet another embodiment of the deus ex machina. Here she 
casts the relationship between Stanley and the primary narrator as a plain analogy of the player’s 
futile attempt to express any meaningful agency in the face of the carefully programmed parameters 
built into the game’s design:  
“When every path you can walk has been created for you long in advance, death becomes 
meaningless, making life the same. Do you see now? Do you see that Stanley was already 
dead from the moment he hit start?...But listen to me, you can still save these two, you can 
stop the program before they both fail. Push escape and press ‘quit,’ there’s no other way to 
                                                 
132 Indeed, game developers are aware that the stakes of decisions are decreased when the experiment can easily be rerun 
and a decision can be reversed. This has led to a number of innovations in game design trying to thwart the repeatability 
of scenarios. Some games, like BioShock (2k Games, 2007), will disable the saving function at a point when it seems a 
consequential decision must be made. Other games, like, Mass Effect, will cascade decisions so that each scenario relies on 
a series of previous decisions. This relies on the fact that sane players would not possibly have the time to replay the 
game enough to reconstitute each branch. Other games have devised ways to ensure that some decisions do carry 
relatively permanent consequences. Undertale (Toby Fox, 2015), for instance, will acknowledge the player’s actions on a 
previous playthrough making one’s past, seemingly inescapable. Additionally, rogue-like games are defined by a 
combination of the inability to repeat a scenario because death cannot be undone, and procedurally generated elements 
that ensure infinite scenarios that, in theory, cannot be reencountered. At the same time, all of these efforts are, to some 
extent, thwarted by the propensity for video game players to share their experiences in the aggregate. If you wanted to 
see what happened if you made a different decision, just find the YouTube video of the person who made the other 
decision or find a wiki in which players have mapped out the different scenarios. 
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beat this game. As long as you move forward you’ll be walking someone else’s path, stop now 
and it will be your only true choice.”  
Quite explicitly, The Stanley Parable resists the notion that the player has any real agency. The 
argument the game seems to be making is that the player’s role remains decidedly inconsequential to 
what should be understood as the video game’s true text expression. The player’s “choices” are 
circumscribed within the larger textual expression of the game.  
One reason The Stanley Parable’s deterministic standpoint is important is because it challenges 
the conventional wisdom concerning a video’s game’s “text” proposed by a number of influential 
new media scholars. Aarseth’s concept of ergodic literature, for one, considers a video game’s “text” 
that which is essentially constituted and expressed during a given playthrough. We find a comparable 
idea in from Nick Montfort’s materialist-centric approach to interactive fiction, which “present[s] 
different texts to be read depending upon the actions of the reader.”133 Similarly, Bolter’s logic 
concerning hypertexts implies that players’ power to alter the textual “sequence” of the video game 
means they are altering something fundamental about the text itself.134 However, one of the central 
premises of The Stanley Parable is that its form is not ascertained through an individual iteration—by 
what occurred on a single play-through—because its text is comprised of the entire system of 
protocols and all potential iterations. Each branch of the decision tree remains a primary part of the 
text even when it is not expressed, and the “paths not taken,” which Aarseth sees as empowering for 
the player because they imply investment and ownership, instead remind the player how their role is 
                                                 
133 Nick Montfort, Twisty Little Passages: An Approach to Interactive Fiction (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003), vii. 
Montfort calls a transcript of a given encounter an “interaction text,” essentially a recording that documents the 
interaction. The presumption is that in interactive fiction, the reader is provided with a set of options and the text itself 
responds to the how the reader deals with these options. In interactive fiction, a reader could, say, prompt the text for 
additional description and this action changes the actual text. Ibid., 16.   We might also add Kirschenbaum to this list. 
134 Jay David Bolter makes a version of this point in regards to books where “the text [is] a sequence of words on the 
page entirely determined by authors and printers.” The implication is that with “hypertexts,” a category that could also 
include video games, the sequence of the “text” is in part determined by readers/players. Bolter, Writing Space, 2nd, 174. 
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somewhat inconsequential in relation to the larger textual form. The player’s choices and the path 
taken are already carefully inscribed into the text.  
In The Stanley Parable, what appears at first to be the player’s agency in a collaborative textual 
expression, is really an indication that considerable parts of the primary text remain concealed. In a 
sense, then, it is the player—and not the computer program—who is required to be responsive and 
variable. The video game as a text remains fundamentally unchanged while the player is compelled 
to keep testing out different inputs through processes of repetition with variation in an effort to 
disclose the hidden chambers of expression. From this perspective, The Stanley Parable undermines 
experimentation, all in the effort to implicitly uncover protocols underlying the textual form.  
2.2.2 The Narrational Role of the Player and the Spectator 
While The Stanley Parable undermines the causal link between a responsive, variable form and the 
player’s feelings of narrative agency, the game does not discount the idea that video games provide a 
distinct receptive experience compared to what a film can provide. Put another way, perhaps 
Aarseth and others have exaggerated the video game player’s assured collaborative role in the 
narrative, but it still seems plausible that video games provide an aesthetic experience that is 
different in kind, rather than merely degree. If this is indeed the case, what role can we say a player has 
in video games that seems different from a film spectator?  
At a minimum, we should reckon with the fact that video game players interpose in the 
video game’s expression in a manner that finds no equivalent dynamic in traditional film 
spectatorship.135 Pressing play on a remote control to watch a movie—or, even a more diachronic 
and cooperative act like hand-cranking a Mutoscope to produce moving images in a flipbooks—may 
                                                 
135 The “traditional” qualifier here is because of 360-degree and VR films. For more thoughts on this, see later footnote 
137 from this chapter. 
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enable a film’s expression, but playing a video game not only enables the video game’s expression, it 
also seemingly alters the composition and content being expressed. Further still, video games plainly 
register measurable feedback based on the player’s actions in a way that traditional films do not. 
That is, when players input a command through a keyboard or controller, this input is then 
articulated visually or audibly within the video game’s expression. Even a reflexive (and somewhat 
defensive) example like The Stanley Parable implicitly illustrates this measurable distinction.  
The question is, however, do these distinctions provide enough justification to critically 
understand the video game experience as categorically different from the film experience? Are these 
experiences in any way comparable? If so, what insight can comparisons between these media 
provide? One way to further consider these questions is to recall that The Stanley Parable essentially 
begins with what can be considered a cinematic sequence before transitioning into a first-person 
video game where the player makes decisions. And, looking closely at the precise moment when The 
Stanley Parable ostensibly hands control over to the player is a way of examining the distinctions 
between cinematic spectatorship and video game playing. 
The Stanley Parable’s opening cinematic sequence, which provides the backstory, might simply 
be thought of as a short opening film, or more precisely either an example of digital animation or 
machinima. Regardless, it is decidedly not something that can be “played” in the manner of a video 
game because the player’s input does not change what appears on screen, and the player is instead 
asked to watch. The sequence is also edited together in conventional filmic style. The opening shot 
(Figure 2.2-C) tracks in through an office space towards a private office door reading “427,” while 
jaunty non-diegetic music plays, and the voiceover narrator begins: “This is the story of a man 
named Stanley. Stanley worked for a company in a big building where he was employee # 427...”. As 
the perspective reaches the door, the sequence cuts to what is presumably the inside of office 427 
(Figure 2.2-D), and we get the first shot of Stanley through a long barrier shot peering at him from 
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directly behind. While the perspective tracks in, Stanley sits at his desk working, lit as if by a 
spotlight. Before the perspective gets too close to Stanley’s back, however, it cuts to a faux-
surveillance perspective (Figure 2.2-E) signaled in part through a grainy, extreme high-angle, which 
zooms in and out to reframe Stanley. During this shot the narrator explains Stanley’s job: “orders 
came to him through a monitor on his, telling him what buttons to push, how long to push them, 
and in what order.” 
 
Figure 2.2-C Tracking in to Stanley’s office door. 
 
Figure 2.2-D. Stanley working. 
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Figure 2.2-E. Surveillance shot of Stanley working. 
 
The sheer formal mundanity of these first few shots illustrates how even this quirky video 
game relies on conventional cinematic storytelling in this opening sequence. The shots are motivated 
and reflect the narrator’s dialogue—the perspective tracks in as the narrator introduces the world, it 
tracks in further as he introduces the character, and it cuts to a surveillance-like shot as he explains 
Stanley’s mysterious job and orders. Even the seemingly incongruous surveillance shot is familiar 
film and televisual trope for implicitly communicating the sense that this character is being observed 
by some mysterious presence within the diegesis.  
On the other hand, The Stanley Parable’s cinematic sequence delivers subtle but edifying 
departures from typical conventions for cinematic sequences in comparable narrative, first-person 
video games. Aside from providing a much more banal scenario then one might expect for a video 
game, the most radical formal strategy in The Stanley Parable’s cut-scene is how it establishes Stanley 
as a character who exists separate and apart from the player. This positions the player into a 
particularly distanced spectatorial perspective, especially when compared to canonical first-person 
games such as Halo: Combat Evolved (2001), Half-Life 2 (2004), and Bioshock (2007), and more 
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independent, nontraditional counterparts such as Gone Home or Dear Esther. Each of these games 
begins with opening cinematic sequences—in the sense that players are not immediately granted any 
control over a moving image—but of these, only Halo spends any time outside the first-person 
perspective. Like The Stanley Parable, Halo provides an extended, edited sequence with multiple angles 
and shots, however, Halo works to minimize distance between the player and the player’s avatar, 
providing only a quick glimpse of the avatar’s armored suit (fig 7) before the scene immediately cuts 
to the first-person perspective and the moment where the player takes control (fig 8). If thought 
about in terms of standard cinematic point-of-view setup using a shot/reverse-shot structure, after 
cutting to the point-of-view in reverse-shot, the perspective remains in this view for the duration of 
the scene/level. 
 
Figure 2.2-F. From Halo’s opening cinematic, showing Master Chief, players’ soon-to-be avatar. 
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Figure 2.2-G. The following shot, as the player takes control of Master Chief’s POV. 
 
In contrast, The Stanley Parable’s opening cinematic sequence makes the atypical decision to cut to 
Stanley’s point-of-view only to cut out again, completing the standard three-shot shot/reverse-
shot/shot sequence: Stanley focused on his computer cut to a computer from Stanley’s perspective 
cut to a third shot showing Stanley staring at his computer. Where other first-person games seem to 
take pains to avoid highlighting the distinction between the player’s perspective watching over the 
diegetic world and the avatar’s perspective in the world, 136 The Stanley Parable reinforces the split by 
couching the point-of-view shot within a third-person narration. In a following shot, the distance 
between the player and Stanley is shown quite literally, as a shot that begins in a relatively medium-
close-up of Stanley tracks out to such a distant vantage point that Stanley’s office is rendered into a 
small fragment of a larger unrendered space, something like an interior set on an empty soundstage, 
or, more aptly, the image of a video game level in the process of being designed. 
                                                 
136 For more on this see, Calleja, In-Game, 126-32. 
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Figure 2.2-H Screenshot from The Stanley Parable’s opening cinematic sequence 
Even as we are soon to “become” Stanley, we are urged to keep this overarching image in mind—a 
menial drone in someone else’s constructed world. The actual transition to the player’s control 
occurs during the final shot of the opening cut-scene, when the narration notably returns to a 
perspective closely resembling the earlier point-of-view shot from Stanley’s perspective, this time as 
he watches a blinking green cursor on his computer screen (Figure 2.2-I).  
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Figure 2.2-I The moment players are given some control over the perspective 
On this occasion though, perspective begins to slowly track away from the computer, 
communicating that the view is slowly adjusting so as to directly merge with a more plausible 
eyeline. The narrator’s description at this moment underscores the strangeness underlying this 
transfer of control: “Something was very clearly wrong. Shocked, frozen solid, Stanley found himself 
unable to move for the longest time…” The irony underlying this line of dialogue is that Stanley is 
“frozen solid” because the game is still operating in a cinematic mode and therefore has yet to grant 
the player the ability to move Stanley. The actual handover only occurs during the subsequent line of 
dialogue, as a slight tilt up of the camera shifts the perspective from a slightly elevated angle to one 
that seems eye-level, signaling Stanley’s gaze is moving away from the computer. While the narrator 
is mid-sentence—“…as he came to his wits and regained his senses…”—the tilted angle levels off 
and the game fully transfers control to the player before the narrator finishes his sentence—“he got 
up from his desk and stepped out of his office.” The player can now use the keyboard and mouse 
(or a suitable controller) to control Stanley within the diegetic world, guiding Stanley’s actions and 
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perspective. What was a cinematic point-of-view shot representing the perspective of the character, 
has now perhaps become something else entirely. 
This transfer of control in The Stanley Parable is subtle to the point that a player would be 
forgiven for failing to notice it has even taken place, nevertheless, in theory, it represents a crucial 
modal division between the film and video game address. The fact that the image appearing on 
screen remains virtually unchanged, exemplifies how close these media are to one another, yet it also 
illustrates how different their respective acts of reception. In the beginning of the shot, the image 
should be understood essentially as a third-person, cinematic representation of Stanley’s perspective, 
something supported by its previous use in the sequence. However, by the end of the shot, the 
image is ostensibly what we think of as a first-person perspective in video games. As a video game 
image, the player’s agency over the visual composition potentially resists the status of representation. 
What appears on screen is rendered into something more ambiguous. While still in the cinematic 
sequence, the point-of-view shot is still a representation of the Stanley’s perspective. However, once 
the player is granted some amount of control over the images’ composition, what appears on screen 
exceeds the representation of the character’s perspective because now, to some extent, it also 
illustrates the player’s perspective.137 
                                                 
137 This distinction is significantly less pronounced, however, when we compare video games to 360-Degree and Virtual 
Reality films. In these films—if they can indeed be called films—the image that appears on screen is subject to change at 
the spectator’s discretion. The image expressed at any given moment is just a fraction of what could be expressed. One 
could argue that these examples are effectively no different from the fact that a spectator’s attention of a traditional film 
is only focused on a select portion of the frame, so effectively this distinction is inconsequential. Tati’s Playtime (1968) 
provides an illustrative, albeit extreme case-in-point for this argument because it includes a number of extreme-long 
shots that refrain from directing the spectator’s attention, and provide multiple visual narratives simultaneously. The 
spectator is compelled to choose what to focus on at any given moment. However, what still separates video games, 360 
videos, and VR films from this is clearer when considering secondary onlookers—those watching the player’s screen or 
Twitch stream, those sitting next to a person who is using a keyboard to move the perspective around during a 360-
degree-video, or those observing a live or recorded feed of the VR spectator’s experience. In these cases, the primary 
spectator implicitly limits the range of viewing for the secondary viewer, effectively providing an additional level of 
mediation (or narration) between the text and what is viewed. Additionally, video games are further distinguished from 
360 and VR films because video game players effect happenings within the diegesis. 
 
Hakimi/120 
 
The central distinction between these modes, it would seem, stems from the player’s agency. 
Once the player is granted control, the status of the expression and the way the form addresses its 
onlooker shifts accordingly. The implicit presumption is that while operating in a cinematic mode, 
the expression onscreen and through the speakers is a product of some anterior intentional agency; 
it is the manifestation of some imprecise, external force that, for the sake of clarity or the “author 
function,” we might attribute to a director. However, once the cinematic sequence ends, and the 
player been granted some modicum of control over the image, this can no longer be the case exactly. 
Effectively, the player now informs what appears on screen, deciding things like where Stanley 
looks, how long he spends in a room, and where his body is positioned. Once in the gameplay 
mode, then, the player is no longer only being addressed solely as a non-diegetic spectator with some 
control over the composition of the image while observing the unfolding events from the vantage 
point of their own world, the player is now also being addressed as a participant acting in the 
diegetic world, one who either is “Stanley” or controls Stanley’s actions.  
In fact, much of the way The Stanley Parable works is by deliberately breaching the gap 
between the player’s positions inside and outside the fictional world by purposefully 
desynchronizing them from one another. When the narrator says that Stanley “stepped out of his 
office,” the past-tense designates an action that has already occurred in the diegetic world. Yet, this 
statement contradicts what the player sees and experiences on-screen as the player has not yet had 
the opportunity of guiding Stanley to accomplish this task by the end of the narrator’s description. 
What is billed as a description of Stanley’s diegetic action, instead becomes an awkward non-diegetic 
instruction to the player. While this tension could be missed by the player in the moment, it still 
marks the beginning of the game’s insistent effort to strain any harmony between the player’s dual 
roles as both a non-diegetic puppeteer and diegetic actor. 
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 While The Stanley Parable’s reflexivity specifically highlights these dual positions by 
deconstructing them, the broader suggestion is that all narrative video games effectively address 
players in the same way. To some extent video game scholars have already recognized this. For 
instance, Robert Buerkle makes a version of this argument when he explains that all video game 
narration essentially falls on a continuum between internal (diegetic) and external (nondiegetic) 
positioning and, that these modes of address occur simultaneously. Similarly, Alexander Galloway 
makes a similar division in his consideration of the player as “non-diegetic operator” and a “diegetic 
operator.”138 Accordingly, an analysis of The Stanley Parable illustrates how the player’s input shapes 
the camera movement, camera angles, and the composition of the frame, and corresponding diegetic 
decisions, such as what Stanley is doing and where he is positioned. Still, it is the presumption of 
agency that seemingly engenders the dual address, because the player must be solicited into taking 
up this role in regard to the expression of the text.  
Yet, the mode of address that positions the player both outside and inside the fictional world 
is perhaps less of a departure from film spectatorship than most video game scholars have 
presumed. Vivian Sobchack’s phenomenological approach to film spectatorship provides a model of 
the film experience that finds complementary understanding of the cinematic spectator. For 
Sobchack, “cinematic perception” has a “double and reversible nature” because we, as spectators, 
experience these images and sensations both directly and through a kind of mediation: “the 
viewer…shares cinematic space with the film but must also negotiate it, contribute to and perform 
the constitution of its experiential significance.”139 While Aarseth would argue that “performance” is 
less impactful in cinema compared to a video games because it “takes place all in the [spectator’s] 
                                                 
138 Robert Buerkle, Of Worlds and Avatars: A Playercentric Approach to Videogame Discourse (University of Southern California, 
2008), 275-82. In Alexander Galloway’s terms this would be a “the diegetic operator act” where the operator’s 
incitement causes an “action inside the imaginary world of the gameplay.” Galloway, Gaming Essays on Algorithmic Culture, 
33. 
139 Vivian Carol Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 1992), 8. 
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head,” Sobchack’s point is that the cinematic text inevitably addresses spectators as collaborators 
both inside and outside the film world and we experience it accordingly.140  
What is more, Sobchack considers the cinematic spectatorial dynamic as something of an 
active communication between the spectator and the text: When we watch films, we are “engaged in 
a living dialogue with a world that sufficiently exceeds our grasp of it as we necessarily intend toward 
it, a world in which we are finitely situated as embodied beings and yet always informed by a decisive 
motility.” In her understanding, film spectators indeed maintain a level of primary, unmediated 
experience while watching a film as we negotiate our experience in relation to the images we are 
presented with. We live them both as firsthand experience and as something mediated, which is why 
Sobchack stresses the way a film’s narration remains beyond the spectator’s influence. That is, the 
“decisive motility” that informs our experience could formally be understood as the multiple layers 
of narration that effectively facilitate and circumscribe the “living dialogue” that we have in relation 
to a given film. On a practical level, spectators are subject to camera movement, mise-en-scène, 
editing—all of which are aspects of narration or the “decisive motility” that are set prior to the 
subjective spectatorial experience. 
With this in mind, The Stanley Parable helps us recognize that the range of “decisive motility” 
certainly shifts when it comes to video games, but it does not vanish altogether. In The Stanley 
Parable, this “decisive motility” would have to include the performative role of the voiceover 
narrator who embodies the designer’s will, but it also must include the subtler parameters in relation 
to the physical properties of the diegesis and the literal architecture that provides the navigable 
spaces of the game’s world. The player’s control over Stanley as a window into the diegetic world is 
subject to layers of both diegetic and non-diegetic limitations. Without hacking the game, the player 
cannot move Stanley through walls, alter the object textures or structures, or change the way 
                                                 
140 Aarseth, Cybertext, 1. 
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narrative sequences are triggered. Similarly, the player can only have Stanley look around to the 
extent that this ability makes sense in relation to Stanley’s offscreen body. Each diegetic constraint 
also informs what is possible for player to influence in terms of non-diegetic narration. The range of 
camera movements and angles, what can be part of the mise-en-scène, the lighting, are all tied to 
what the game’s designer has permitted the player to affect in the diegetic world. The player cannot 
create narrational edits or compose new dialogue unless the game allows for this to occur. In The 
Stanley Parable, as in most narrative video games, the player’s range of choices are meticulously 
circumscribed within the game’s coded parameters, and so the player’s experience is still—like 
Sobchack’s notion of film spectatorship—greatly “informed by a decisive motility” that “exceed[s] 
our grasp.”  
The Stanley Parable demonstrates, then, that the player’s primary contribution while playing is 
in narration rather than narrative. Once we recognize that the video game text should include all 
possible iterations, what appears to be a player’s collaborative agency is revealed to be a limited 
contribution to the narration of the text. Meaningful agency and the perception of meaningful 
interaction is perhaps only possible if the player is granted the ability to actually manipulate the 
underlying parameters of the text in a way that was not designated ahead of time. However, if a text 
is materially designed to account for all possible permutations, then there is no real ability to 
meaningfully affect the textual parameters.  
This leads us to the observation that video game critics have tended to greatly exaggerate the 
range of player agency based solely on the material variability of the form, when in reality players are 
highly limited in their capacity to shape that form.141 The limitations of player’s role is all the more 
                                                 
141 Bolter imagines video game players as “performers” not unlike actors and musicians in “dramas or musical scores.”  
The problem with Bolter’s analogy is that the video game performance is much more circumscribed then he realizes. 
Additionally, in the next chapter, we will discuss the how film spectators are similarly performing a role. This conception 
helps support the notion that video game playing provides a receptive distinction in a matter degree rather than kind. 
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clear when in the context of formalist narratological models, like those devised by Edward Branigan, 
which have long recognized the multiple simultaneous levels of narration operating in fiction that 
exist in a range from inside to outside the diegesis.142 Without closely reiterating all eight layers of 
narration Branigan suggests, in most video games the player’s contribution needs to be qualified 
distinctly in terms of the limited influence over only a few of these levels of narration. Meanwhile 
most levels of narration in most games remain firmly outside the player’s control. So, while video 
game players, as co-narrators, might be said to contribute to the textual expression more so than in 
film, it is also crucial to recognize how the range of their contribution is decidedly defined within 
highly designed parameters. 
Another relevant point—one missed by those generalizing about video games based on their 
material properties—is the tremendous diversity among video games in terms of where and how 
players are granted spaces to influence the narration. Even within just those video games in MoMA’s 
collection we find a sizable range, one that coincidentally The Stanley Parable provides direct insight 
into in one of its narrative branches. In a certain sequence where the voiceover narrator takes up the 
guise of a frustrated game designer, he transports players into facsimiles of two iconic first-person 
games that also happen to have been acquired by MoMA, Portal and Minecraft. While in these worlds, 
the narrator cheekily contrasts Minecraft’s open-ended “sand-box” plotless structure with Portal’s 
more rigid storytelling, the latter being used as an example of what the narrator refers to as 
“something more narrow and linear, something that really makes [the player] feel utterly irrelevant.” 
Even while The Stanley Parable is specifically focused on storytelling, the comparison effectively 
suggests several different ways that these games differ in terms of textuality and receptive agency. 
Portal’s plotline and prescribed limitations provide clear ways to analyze it in relation to narrative 
                                                 
142 Chap. 4, “Levels of Narration,” Edward Branigan, Narrative Comprehension and Film (London; New York: Routledge, 
1992), 86–124. 
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films, while Minecraft’s seemingly endless capacity for building sub-worlds makes it feel less 
restrictive, but also something that is perhaps less “authored” altogether.143   
2.2.3 Realism and Interaction  
The Stanley Parable is a particularly fitting game to consider in relation to other media because it may 
be the clearest example to date of a video game that fits neatly into the cross-media tradition of 
lighthearted works fixated on their own authorship and reception. The list of these facetious meta-
texts would likely include the literary works of Laurence Sterne and John Barthes; some of the films 
and animations of Jean-Luc Godard, Hollis Frampton, Woody Allen, Chuck Jones, and Charlie 
Kaufmann; and perhaps some of the paintings by Reneé Magritte and Pablo Picasso. (If this list 
sounds too high minded, it should be noted that more than any other text, The Stanley Parable shares 
much with the more accessible “Charlie Kaufman-lite,” film Stranger than Fiction (2004)—even 
beginning with the same opening line: “This is a story about a man named…”144) These are works 
that flout the expected function of, say, telling a self-contained story by making the formal narration 
visible, performatively compelling their beholder to reflect on the conventions of their respective 
forms. Locating The Stanley Parable’s position within this tradition is helpful precisely because it 
allows us to articulate both the qualities of narration shared across media, as well as what aspects 
may be more prevalent in video games.  
                                                 
143 Part of the point here is that any video game that is understood as an aesthetic object, must also be understood as a 
mediated textual experience on a continuum with other aesthetic forms. The critical aesthetic framework, which 
apprehends an object as a meaningful textual expression, relies on the presumption of an anterior purposiveness, or 
what is effectively the “author function.” So, when a video game is understood as an aesthetic object, we imagine it to be 
“authored” and thus acknowledge a level of “decisive motility.” Alternatively, it is quite possible that, at a certain point, a 
game like Minecraft is no longer apprehended as an authored text, but only as a platform or a tool for making other 
authored texts. What is essential to recognize, though, is that the amount of decisive motility afforded to a player is 
entirely dependent on what the video game designer has allotted within the game’s parameters. 
144 Phelim O'Neill, "The Guide: Pick of the Day: Stranger Than Fiction," The Guardian (London, England) 2008.  
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Depending on one’s critical proclivity, this metatextual tradition could be associated with 
modernism, postmodernism, Brechtian “distanciation,” Wollen’s (related) “counter-cinema,” 
Michael Fried’s “theatricality,” the Russian formalist concept of “defamiliarization,” and probably a 
number of other formal movements.145 Regardless how they are categorized, what remains 
consistent across these works in their respective media are calculated and performative violations of 
the formal strategies that conceal narration in a mode we associate with realism. To be clear, the 
notion of “realism” to which I refer is a formalist, historically contingent stylistic concept, one that is 
characterized more by concealed narration and an illusionism—something we will discuss more in 
depth in the Chapter 3—than any connection to a mimetic capacity or “social realism.” Following 
Frederic Jameson, realism is in large part about producing the sense of coherent fictional world, one 
that the beholder can experience without questioning its integrity. Jameson describes how “realism 
and its specific narrative forms construct their new world by programming their reader” effectively 
“training them in their new habits and practices… new subject positions in a new kind of space.” 146 All 
of this occurs without the reader being aware, through a relatively seamless narration. 
If realism effectively programs beholders through a kind of invisible narration, then there is 
a clear resemblance between MoMA’s notion of “interaction design” in its description of video 
games and the formal strategies of realism. As we may recall, MoMA’s statement in regard to video 
games includes the equation between “quality of interaction” and “synthesis of form and function.” 
This characterization, however, not only works for purely functional objects, but it works for works 
                                                 
145 There are several theoretical constructs through we might associate with this reflexivity: Brechtian “distanciation”; 
Wollen’s related “counter-cinema”; Michael Fried’s “theatricality”; Russian formalist “defamiliarization.” Peter Wollen, 
"Godard and Counter-Cinema: Vent D’est’," in Movies and Methods: An Anthology, ed. Bill Nichols (Univ of California 
Press, 1985). Colin MacCabe, "Theory and Film: Principles of Realism and Pleasure," Screen 17, no. 3 (1976). Michael 
Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (Univ of California Press, 1980). Bertolt Brecht, 
Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, vol. 542 (Macmillan, 1964). 
To remain consistent with the next chapter’s discussion of play and Caillois notion of mimetic play, it is also helpful to 
think about realism in terms of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief.” 
146 Fredric Jameson, Signatures of the Visible (New York: Routledge, 1990), 166. This idea is something we will come back 
to in the next chapter. 
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of realism as well because the “synthesis of form and function” is also an effective way to describe 
the formal strategies for producing a work that hides its narration. After all, the Classical Hollywood 
film—one that can be linked with a period specific notion of conventional realism—has a form that 
is always functional because it tells a story and produces a fictional world seamlessly and 
economically through an “invisible” narrational style.147 Every stylistic decision of the narration is 
motivated in the service of telling a coherent story that keeps viewers immersed, engaged, and 
informed. In this sense, the classical style is comprised of functional components operating in 
concert in order to create a work of realism—not unlike how complex design objects are comprised 
of functional components that together allow them to “work.”  
As in film and literature, then, “realism” in video games is a moving target that must be 
situated and historicized. However, while the specific strategies for meeting this target surely change 
with context, a principle component of video game realism requires minimizing the discrepancies 
between the video game’s dual addresses in relation to the player’s experience. This means reducing 
players’ mindfulness of their role outside the diegesis using strategies like avoiding non-diegetic 
narration whenever possible, disguising non-diegetic narration as motivated diegetic narration, 
relying on acceptable generic conventions for expressing non-diegetic narration, or acclimating 
players to non-diegetic narration until it becomes conventional. Significantly, these are all aspects of 
the experience that The Stanley Parable performatively thwarts. The reflexive metatexts intentionally 
undermine their operation by strategically disrupting the synthesis of form and function and draw 
attention to those processes normally taken for granted in the reception of works of realism. By 
reflexively countering realism’s programming revealing and caricaturing the strategies normally used 
                                                 
147 David Bordwell, "Classical Hollywood Cinema: Narrational Princioples and Procedures," in Narrative, Apparatus, 
Ideology: A Film Theory Reader, ed. Philip Rosen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 26. In “classical narration, 
style typically encourages the spectator to construct a coherent, consistent time and space of the [story’s events].” See 
ibid. For more on this see David Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1985). 
Hakimi/128 
 
to create the sense of coherent narratives and believable worlds, these metatexts are also articulating 
the functional design that principally enables the suspension of disbelief.  
The implication from all of this is that what MoMA thinks of as interaction, and what 
scholars like Aarseth think of as narrative collaboration, are largely the product of video games 
operating in the style of realism. That is, video game realism entails maintaining the illusion of the 
player’s meaningful agency over the narrative and sense of a truly reciprocal communication. The 
Stanley Parable unmasks this because it disrupts the player’s sense of agency and interaction precisely 
by countering the conventions of realism in video games. Players’ agency and interaction are 
exposed as illusions cultivated by a variable and responsive material form, one that has a tendency to 
mask an authored text as a truly dynamic unfinished text because of its mode of address. As we turn 
to a discussion of interactive design in film, we will see that this mode of address is also not 
determined by the material form itself.
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CHAPTER 3 
Play-spaces beyond Video Games:  
Playing In and With Film Worlds 
3.1 AESTHETICS AND GAMEPLAY: RESONANCES 
ACROSS MEDIA 
In the introduction, we discussed two valences of play relevant to thinking about video games: the 
first is the valence of play we associate with gameplay; the second is the play which evolved from the 
more performative playing of a musical instruments to the reception-based playing recorded media. 
Instead of seeing these valences of play as wholly distinct modes of experience, this chapter suggests 
that gameplay and aesthetic reception are much more linked than most realize. This helps us explain 
why it is that that key formalist accounts of aesthetic reception in painting, literature, and film, sound 
a lot like description of playing a video game. Perhaps this is not all that surprising when we recall 
Lev Manovich’s argument that “interactivity,” a quality so closely associated with video games,1 has 
long been central to aesthetic experiences across media. But how does this so-called aesthetic 
interactivity operate in practice? To answer this, we will begin with the art critic behind Manovich’s 
argument, E.H. Gombrich, whose theories of aesthetic reception influence is found in several 
theories across media that seem to unexpectedly prefigure elements of gameplay found in video 
games.  
One explanation for Gombrich’s cross-media influence is his blend of formal and 
phenomenological conceptions of the aesthetic experience—both through close readings of 
                                                 
1 This point was discussed previously in the Introduction and Chapter 2. 
Hakimi/130 
 
aesthetic objects and consideration of how those objects are experienced in practice.2 Another 
advantage of Gombrich’s approach is that it provides a productive outlet for deriving the aesthetic 
encounter through introspection: in his 1960 work Art and Illusion, Gombrich explains that “if we 
watch ourselves in our reaction [to paintings], we are presented with a kind of slow-motion picture 
of the mechanism that jumps into action whenever we search for the meaning of an image.” Here 
we begin to see how Gombrich already imagines aesthetic reception in dynamic terms we might 
associate with gameplay. For Gombrich, aesthetic reception is not some passive process where people 
experience a painting’s objective expression; it is a dynamic, operational exchange, as reception 
entails systematically interrogating a painting by implicitly testing theories or readings in an ongoing 
effort to derive “meaning of an image.”3 For Gombrich, “meaning” is less about identifying a 
definitive signification, than it is about understanding the experience one has in an encounter with 
an artwork through a cognitive process of reception. Gombrich’s term for the individual 
apprehending the aesthetic object is the “beholder,” which is in part noteworthy for its cross-media 
application. In a chapter called “The Beholder’s Share,” Gombrich explains that we, as beholders, 
assume a “state of readiness to start projecting, to thrust out the tentacles of phantom colours and 
phantom images which always flicker around our perceptions.” For Gombrich, it is the beholder’s 
                                                 
2 In relation to film studies, the combination of focusing on both the film text and the viewer’s mode of perception 
makes room for some of the principle critical approaches in theories of reception. Take, for example, Janet Staiger’s 
account of media reception theories, in which she positions all reception theories (and theorists) according to where they 
derive meaning. There are the “text-activated” theories privileging the film text as the site of understanding reception. 
There is also the “reader-activated” theories, alternatively, acknowledge the theoretically innumerable ways in which 
spectators could experience a text. Staiger also identifies the “context-activated” approach—with which her own 
historical materialist approach aligns.Janet Staiger, Interpreting Films: Studies in the Historical Reception of American Cinema 
(Princeton University Press, 1992), 35. In theory, Gombrich’s approach would be open to all three. 
3 E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (New York U6 - ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-
8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook
&rft.genre=book&rft.title=Art+and+illusion&rft.au=Gombrich%2C+E.+H&rft.series=Bollingen+series%2C+35.+Th
e+A.+W.+Mellon+lectures+in+the+fine+arts%2C+5&rft.date=1960&rft.pub=Pantheon+Books&rft.externalDocID=
3050728&paramdict=en-US U7 - Book: Pantheon Books, 1960), 186. “Meaning” is rather layered term for Gombrich 
which also includes an artworks’ “effects.” Even works that resist “meaning” through abstraction and randomness—the 
action paintings of Jackson Pollock, being Ghombrich’s example—are nonetheless beheld through frames of reference 
to representative forms of signification. Ibid., 231-32. 
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operation that brings the work to fruition; the artwork only really exists in the way it is experienced. 
Once the beholder views it, the painting “has no firm anchorage left on the canvas—it is only 
‘conjured up’ in our minds” before we “project[s] it…into the mosaic…of the canvas before [us].” 
Beholders engage with an image through their own subjective ideas and preconceptions, their own 
unique receptive styles what he later calls “a game of projections.”4 
At the same time, beholders are not granted free reign over the text’s interpretation in this 
framework. Gombrich describes reception in terms of a “mechanism,” suggesting an involuntary 
process that triggers in the act of reception. In this active yet delimited role, Gombrich imagines the 
beholder in terms that resonate remarkably well for video game players. As we have previously 
noted, video game players actively make choices, but those choices are always funneled ahead of 
time by the game’s design parameters, and Gombrich’s beholder is similarly involved in what he calls 
a “guided projection” where the beholder’s metaphorical journey is “activated” by the formal 
qualities of the work. Beholders, in this model, are being hailed by the painting to participate, as they 
are “induced to project” some framework of apprehension based on “the clues presented,” not 
unlike how video game players are cued to provide inputs by the game’s address. Additionally, in 
both video game playing and Gombrich’s notion of aesthetic reception, there is a sense of progress 
through trial-and-error, as players and beholders test out paths and investigate routes. Gombrich 
describes the process where “misreadings…flit through our minds but are usually discarded before 
we become aware of them and because they are overlaid by the more consistent and more tenable 
hypothesis.” It is all the more fitting that Gombrich uses ludic terms to describe this aesthetic 
process as an “interplay between the artists and beholder” where beholders search for a “solution to 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 160, 78. 
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the puzzle which the image presents to us,” and perhaps “take pleasure in this game of reading 
brushstrokes.”5 
About 15 years after Gombrich’s account, we find a related notion of reception making 
again making the comparison between aesthetic objects and puzzles, this time in Wolfgang Iser’s 
reading of literary reception in The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. Specifically, Iser 
describes textual ambiguities as “puzzles that [readers] have to solve [themselves].”6 In addition to 
resembling Gombrich and using ludic analogies, Iser’s model of reception also provides a resolute 
connection to the computational aspects of video games. He describes textual reception in terms 
that could very well be something found somewhere in a Human-Computer Interaction textbook, if 
his “reader” stands in for “user,” and “text” for “interface”: 
The text is a whole system of… processes, and …there must be a place within this system for 
the person who is to perform the reconstituting. This place is marked by the gaps in the 
text—it consists in the blanks which the reader is to fill in. …The gaps function as a kind 
of pivot on which the whole text-reader relationship revolves. Hence the structured blanks of 
the text stimulate the process of ideation to be performed by the reader on terms set by the 
text…The blanks leave open the connections between perspectives in the text, and so spur the 
reader into coordinating these perspectives—in other words, they induce the reader to perform 
basic operations within the text.  
Retroactively, much of Iser’s language sounds like computer programming jargon with 
phrases such as “system of…processes,” “function,” and “basic operations.” In Iser’s model, the 
text is like a computer interface that requires a user’s input to run. The author’s role is to “designate 
instructions for the production of the signified,” but the fruition of the text is accomplished by the 
reader, who renders “indeterminacy” into “determinacy.” While the text is elastic, the indeterminacy 
does not connote absolute relativity. Instead, it provides something more like a negotiation: “the 
meaning of the text remains related to what the printed text says, … [yet] it requires the creative 
imagination of the reader to put it all together.” In this conception, texts are comprised of 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 180-86, 59, 81. 
6 Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading : A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 129. 
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communicative protocols that provide guidelines and instructions, but do not dictate interpretations. 
Furthermore, because there is no fixed signification, the eventual text might also always be shaped 
by formal, historical, contextual, and socio-political variables.7 Iser’s author resembles the video 
game designer who constructs the schema within which a subsequent, conscious presence will 
eventually operate. Both the author and the game designer are figures who encode a set of 
possibilities and define a range of experiences to some degree, but the code cannot entirely 
determine the subsequent encounter it engenders.  
As with Gombrich, Iser’s notion only understands an artwork itself through the aesthetic 
experience, which is why the book is something other than what is written on the page. Instead the 
artworks are abstract concepts or what he calls the “virtual position” between the literal text as given 
and the reader’s realization: “[the artwork’s’] actualization is clearly the result of an interaction 
between the two, and so exclusive concentration on either the author's techniques or the reader's 
psychology will tell us little about the reading process itself.”8 For Iser, there is no “definitive” fixed 
version of an artwork, only a series of iterations enabled by the literal words on the page as they are 
filtered through the reader’s subjective imaginations, a theory he develops in part by citing 
Gombrich.9  
When these same ideas are applied to film studies, Gombrich’s influence has perhaps found 
its greatest purchase in the theories of David Bordwell, whose textbooks could be said to have had 
an inordinate influence on the entire discourse. For one thing, Bordwell’s basic conception of 
spectatorship is based on Gombrich’s idea that “perception is a process of active hypothesis-
                                                 
7 For this equivocation, Iser is also harshly criticized by Stanley Fish. See Stanley Fish, "Why No One's Afraid of 
Wolfgang Iser," Diacritics 11, no. 1 (1981). In a sense, Fish’s criticism of Iser’s overly broad notion of the text could apply 
to Gombrich and Bordwell as well. However, this does not negate their use here.  
8 Iser, The Act of Reading : A Theory of Aesthetic Response, 20-22. 
9 Ibid., 90-93. 
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testing,” which Bordwell cites as a pivotal component of his own theory of narration.10 Further still, 
in a chapter of Bordwell’s 1985 Narration in the Fiction Film aptly titled “The Viewer’s Activity”—a 
chapter title undoubtedly mimicking Gombrich’s own chapter “The Beholder’s Share”—Bordwell 
echoes Gombrich’s conception of a responsive dynamic between the aesthetic object and the 
viewer, explaining that a “film cues the spectator to execute a definable variety of operations.” And, 
like Iser, Bordwell use of terms such as “execute” and “operations” seem to pave way for a 
connection to computer programming. This is further explained by Bordwell’s computational 
articulation of human perception: “seeing is…not a passive absorption of stimuli. It is a constructive 
activity, involving very fast computations, stored concepts, and various purposes, expectations and 
hypotheses.” Bordwell conceives of human cognition as a series of operational process—sensorial 
data is inputted, decrypted through a configuration of internal references points, and rendered in the 
imagination as it is apprehended. 
This framework also informs Bordwell’s description of the aesthetic experience, which both 
continues to echo Gombrich and provides yet another analogic description for playing video games 
provided we imagine some slight alterations (i.e. if “artwork” was changed to “video game” and 
“spectator” to “player”):  
The artwork is necessarily incomplete, needing to be unified and fleshed out by the active 
participation of the perceiver. To some extent, artworks exploit the automatic nature of 
bottom-up processing; in such cases, the work can create illusions. But art is a domain of top-
down procedures. The spectator brings to the artwork expectations and hypotheses born of 
schemata, those in turn being derived from everyday experience, other artworks and so forth. 
The artwork sets limits on what the spectator does. Salient perceptual features and the overall 
form of the artwork function as both triggers and constraints. The artwork is made so as to 
encourage the application of certain schemata, even if those must eventually be discarded in 
the course of the perceiver’s activity. 
                                                 
10 Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, 186. 
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Both the artwork and the video game provide a set of givens, which are, in turn, perceived, 
comprehended, and responded to through the spectator/player’s activity. The work itself is a 
product of negotiation. The formal qualities of the artwork correspond with scripted protocols in a 
software program; they provide the rules and parameters that structure the encounter, but they do 
not wholly determine the outcome. What an artwork means, how it is experienced, depends on the 
perceiver’s “goal oriented” activity.11 As a player choosing how to navigate the calculated design of a 
video game, the spectator finds a way to apprehend the given work.  
3.1.1 Gameplay Guide 
The resonance between aesthetics and video games is even less of a leap if we recognize a related 
receptive premise. In these admittedly abridged accounts of Gombrich, Iser, and Bordwell’s theories 
of aesthetic reception, we find a common strategy to define the artwork as an abstract construct—
one that essentially exists only as a negotiation between the given object and the perceiver’s 
interpretation. In each account, the experience itself is bounded to a degree by the formal 
parameters set by the object and related discursive conventions, yet tremendous agency is afforded 
to perceivers in their ability to freely navigate those parameters in their subjective experiences. All of 
this is premised, however, on the assumption that the perceiver is approaching the object as 
something authored to subsequently experienced. This aesthetic lens apprehends the cultural artifact 
with the assumption of purposefulness, a metaphorical or representational significance. In other 
words, the aesthetic object is apprehended under the assumption that it is playable. 
The connection between gameplay and reception is indeed one made by Bordwell and Kristen 
Thompson in their ubiquitous and discourse-shaping film studies textbook, Film Art, which 
                                                 
11 Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film, 30-38. 
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describes film reception akin to “games” where separate “rules” and “…the laws of everyday reality 
don’t operate.”12 The “game” in this context is more than a simple analogy for how films are 
consciously interpreted or comprehended through playful language practices; it is a way of 
approaching film as something as an encounter operating in its own dimension of sorts. When we 
watch a film, we are being placed in a world apart from—but not unrelated to—the world we 
experience as “reality.” The very dichotomy of the diegetic and non-diegetic address is premised on 
the construction of a fictional world. Notably, this conception recalls Johan Huizinga’s foundational 
concept in (game)play theory regarding the “magic circle,” which has become synonymous with 
“temporary worlds within the ordinary world dedicated to the performance of an act apart.”13  
Both gameplay and aesthetic reception operate under a set of rules defined in part by their 
alterity from the conditions and consequences operating in what we take to be the real world. As 
such these experiences are placed outside the realm of the practical concerns of the everyday and 
into a somewhat distinct discursive sphere. What Bordwell and Thompson understand as the 
“game” engendered by film reception essentially takes place in what Huizinga calls a “play-space.” 
These play-spaces may be thought of abstractly—perhaps similar to how Iser imagines the “virtual” 
meeting place of the reader and the text—but, in narrative works, these spaces entail a more literal 
articulation in the notion of the diegesis.14 And, while there is already substantial discourse regarding 
the topic of narrative, aesthetics, and world-building,15 the congruences between the characteristics 
                                                 
12 David Bordwell, Kristin Thompson, and Jeremy Ashton, Film Art: An Introduction, vol. 7 (McGraw-Hill New York, 
1997), 74. 
13 The “magic circle” got singled out from Huizinga’s larger list of play-grounds to be the most oft-cited and canonical 
phrase to come out of Huizinga’s work. Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens; a Study of the Play-Element in Culture (Boston,: 
Beacon Press, 1955), 10. It is also worth mentioning, that while Huizinga deems the artist and the poet as operating in a 
mode of play, he does not explicitly recognize the aesthetic reception as existing in a play-space. 
14 Fluck, "Imaginary Space; or, Space as Aesthetic Object." 
15 For examples see Jesper Juul, Half-Real : Video Games between Real Rules and Fictional Worlds (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2005); Walter Benjamin and Rolf Tiedemann, The Arcades Project (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999); Mark J. P. Wolf, Building Imaginary Worlds : The Theory and History of Subcreation (New York: 
Routledge, 2013); Lubomír Dolezel, Heterocosmica : Fiction and Possible Worlds (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1998); Marie-Laure Ryan, Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
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of video game playing and narrative film reception in this regard is still a vastly underexplored topic. 
Accordingly, this chapter uses the resonance between gameplay and aesthetic reception to 
demonstrate reasons why it is productive to think about our encounter with narrative film worlds 
akin to ways we encounter the play-spaces of narrative video games. 
To investigate and illustrate this idea, this chapter looks closely at Peter Weir’s The Truman 
Show, which is a remarkable film for demonstrating how video game playing can relate to film 
reception. On its face, The Truman Show has absolutely nothing to do with video games, and, yet, it 
feels uncannily familiar to those who enjoy narrative video games, something a few critics have 
already noted. 16  This is because the film has a rather unusual way of positioning its spectator in 
relation to the fictional world it creates. Specifically, the film’s multiple diegetic layers allow the 
spectator to remain both in a reflexive position outside one layer of the film, while remaining 
effectively absorbed inside another layer of the film. This produces a mode of engagement that feels 
particularly resonant with video game players’ roles as external narrators and participants. Further 
still, The Truman Show’s narrative provides a tremendously productive allegory for the process of of 
coming into consciousness during the act of reception and effectively engaging works of realism as 
critical play-spaces. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1991); Daniel Yacavone, Film Worlds : A Philosophical Aesthetics of Cinema (New York, US: Columbia University Press, 
2015). The foundational works of theory in this discourse are Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Pub. Co, 1978). and Kendall L Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts 
(Harvard University Press, 1990). 
16 I am not the first person to note the film’s resonance with video games. See Rolf F. Nohr, ""The Truman Show"," in 
Space Time Play: Computer Games, Architecture and Urbanism: The Next Level, ed. Drew Davidson, et al. (Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2007); Jim Blascovich, "Social Influence within Immersive Virtual Environments," in The Social Life of 
Avatars (Springer, 2002).  
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3.1.2 Experiencing The Truman Show 
The Truman Show is a film that defies easy categorization because it seems to embody several formal 
and cultural contradictions. It is a mainstream Hollywood film starring a box office draw in Jim 
Carrey, but it is also a high-concept film that does not fit into any discernible genre, and it is directed 
by Peter Weir, a filmmaker who had gained credibility as a foreign art-house director of films such as 
Picnic at Hanging Rock (1975) and The Last Wave (1977), before producing mainstream prestige 
Hollywood films like Dead Poet’s Society (1989). Likewise, The Truman Show’s themes ostensibly 
grapple with narrative and social matters that seem both pointed and broad, as the film examines 
notions of utopia, the myth of the “American Dream,” television culture, the nuclear family, artistic 
ethics, psychological delusions, privacy, and theism. The film has also had a fairly unusual cultural 
legacy in that it became associated with a phenomenon that mental health professionals have 
dubbed the “Truman Show Delusion,” which describes instances when the symptoms of paranoid 
schizophrenia manifest in delusions that resemble the premise of the film.17 Relatedly, the film 
seems especially prescient in retrospect because it directly presaged both the surge in reality 
television production of the late 1990s, and the mainstream practice of people broadcasting their 
personal lives through internet social networks.18  
While the film was well received by popular critics upon its release, it has received relatively 
little sustained scholarly attention within film studies.19 One possible explanation for this is that the 
                                                 
17 Joel Gold and Ian Gold, "The “Truman Show” Delusion: Psychosis in the Global Village," Cognitive neuropsychiatry 17, 
no. 6 (2012). 
18 The Truman Show was released well after reality television shows like MTV’s The Real World which began in 1992, but 
before staple reality shows like CBS’s Survivor and Big Brother. 
19 The attention it has received from scholars almost always reads the film as commentary on mass media and 
surveillance. See Mark Deuze, "Media Life," Media, Culture & Society 33, no. 1 (2011); Lavoie Dusty, "Escaping the 
Panopticon Utopia, Hegemony, and Performance in Peter Weir's the Truman Show," Utopian Studies 22, no. 1 (2011); J 
Macgregor Wise, "Mapping the Culture of Control: Seeing through the Truman Show," Television & New Media 3, no. 1 
(2002); Ronald Bishop, "Good Afternoon, Good Evening, and Good Night: The Truman Show as Media Criticism," 
Journal of Communication Inquiry 24, no. 1 (2000). 
Hakimi/139 
 
film can, at times, feel heavy-handed in its attempt to evoke a sense of pretentious symbolism, 
something evidenced by character names such as Truman (“true man”) and Christof (“of Christ”). A 
related point is made by Simone Knox in what is perhaps the only article to provide a 
comprehensive close-reading of The Truman Show. She argues that scholars have neglected the film 
because its blatant self-reflexivity resists formulaic critical interventions. For Knox, meta-texts like 
The Truman Show present additional challenges because they “contains a degree of (self) analysis 
already,…pre-empting…the analyst’s job.”20 This would certainly be an astute observation to apply 
to the reflexivity of last chapter’s The Stanley Parable, however, as Knox also argues, The Truman Show 
cannot simply be categorized as a reflexive work. This is because The Truman Show layers its 
reflexivity within the diegesis of the film by placing reflexivity within a larger, non-reflexive frame. In 
fact, what distinguishes The Truman Show’s reflexivity from the overtly performative reflexivity in The 
Stanley Parable, is one of the chief reasons the film is so instructive for connecting film spectatorship 
to video game playing.  
As with other narratives often characterized as self-reflexive, The Truman Show provides a 
diegesis within the diegesis. Specifically, within the primary diegesis of The Truman Show film, 
Truman inhabits what is essentially a second-order fictional world of the television program “The 
Truman Show.” (For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the world Truman believes as real—that is, 
the diegesis depicted on the television show “The Truman Show”—as “Seahaven”; the diegetic 
television show itself will still be called “The Truman Show”).21 A few critics have read The Truman 
Show’s layers as ideologically problematic because they privilege the cinematic world as authentic, 
                                                 
20Simone Knox, "Reading the Truman Show inside Out," Film Criticism 35, no. 1 (2010): 18. 
21 The film’s end credits are actually broken down into three categories: “Truman’s World,” “Christof’s World,” and 
“The Viewers.”  To some extent, “Truman’s World” is essentially what I am calling “Seahaven,” while “Christof’s 
World” and “The Viewers” are both part of the primary diegesis of the film The Truman Show. This is complicated 
however, by the diegetic actors breaking character while on the setting for the television show, ostensibly shifting them 
from Truman’s World to Chirstof’s World.  
Hakimi/140 
 
true, and real, in opposition to the televisual world which is artificial, deceptive, and fake.22 However, 
as Knox points out, the film’s narrative frames present a more nuanced relationship than a simple 
oppositional dichotomy because of their “co-presence.”23 More importantly, the layers have a strong 
parallel with narrative video games’ tendency to position players in roles both inside and outside the 
game worlds simultaneously.24 In order to understand this idea, though, it is crucial to comprehend 
how The Truman Show’s layers operate both in relation to each other and the film audience. 
 Though many of the details behind The Truman Show’s premise are disclosed late into the 
film, they are worth recounting at the start of our analysis to better illustrate the idiosyncratic ways 
the film provides expository information to the spectator. One important moment of exposition 
comes about an hour into the film through a faux behind-the-scenes special, presumably being 
broadcast on television in the film’s world. In it we learn that Truman, the main character of the film 
and the television show within the film, was a baby adopted by a television production company, 
and he has since spent his life as the oblivious star of a 24-hour television show. Just about 
everything he does is recorded surreptitiously by hidden cameras, filtered through a production team 
covering it like a live event, and broadcast live to the world. The town of Seahaven, in which 
Truman has spent his entire life, is actually a massive and elaborate studio set disguised to look and 
feel like an idyllic island town. All the people Truman encounters in his life are hired actors. Within 
the diegesis, the television show is presented as something like a hybrid of a reality show and soap-
opera as it ostensibly depicts a non-performing, non-fictional protagonist within an otherwise 
                                                 
22 Sconce Jeffrey Sconce, Haunted Media: Electronic Presence from Telegraphy to Television (Duke University Press, 2000), 168. 
That is, the film fails to reveal reality is equally constructed. See for example Kevin H Martin, "The Truman Show: The 
Unreal World," Cinefex 75 (1998); Jonathan Romney, "The New Paranoia: Games Pixels Play," Film Comment 34, no. 6 
(1998). 
23 Knox, "Reading the Truman Show inside Out," 11. 
24 In regards to video games and “layers,” Galloway in particular refers to the various intensities of agitation between the 
various layers of the game itself.” Galloway, Gaming Essays on Algorithmic Culture, 36. This point is deftly expounded upon 
by Kirkpatrick’s connection between video games and aesthetics in a way that resonates with the connections I am 
making here. See Kirkpatrick, Aesthetic Theory and the Video Game, 62-63. Neither of the thinkers are as set on the 
“narrative” qualifier, however this is one I will relate to fictionality and realism later in this chapter. 
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fictional world. The plot of the film involves Truman becoming increasingly aware that his world is 
artificial, and the final act of the film depicts a battle of wills between Truman and the 
creator/director of his world, Christof, as Truman attempts to discover or escape the forces that 
have kept him complacent.  
One of The Truman Show’s shrewdest feats is how the film manages to position the spectator 
in relation to both of its diegetic worlds right from the outset. In writer Andrew Niccol’s shooting 
script for the film, the film spectator’s knowledge about Seahaven’s artifice remains closely tied to 
Truman’s perspective, which means the spectator only becomes aware of the multiple diegesis when 
Truman does.25 In this way, Niccol’s script is plotted more akin to other films of the era also notable 
because the protagonist is often unknowingly in a “virtual world.” Specifically in The Matrix (The 
Wachowskis, 1999), Vanilla Sky (Cameron Crowe, 2003), Dark City (Alex Proyas, 1998), eXistenZ 
(David Cronenberg, 1999),  and Total Recall (Paul Verhoven, 1990), the spectator’s vantage point is 
fairly closely aligned with the protagonist’s perspective, and this allows the revelation of an artificial 
world to provide a plot-twist for the film spectator.26 By diverging from this strategy, and 
immediately revealing that Seahaven is a fictional world to everyone besides Truman, The Truman 
Show fosters a more nuanced and layered spectatorial experience compared with these other film 
examples because it asks the spectator to maintain somewhat incongruent positions simultaneously.  
To understand how The Truman Show orients the spectator in relation to the film’s worlds, it 
helps to look closely at the opening of the film. Within an impressively economical opening 
sequence lasting a little over two minutes, The Truman Show establishes its multiple diegetic layers in 
rather subtle manner, which nonetheless conveys a tremendous amount of information. To begin 
                                                 
25 Niccol, Andrew. “The Truman Show (Shooting Script)”. http://www.movie-scripts.net, 1998. 
26 Knox makes a version of this point: “The Truman Show differs from predecessors such as Philip K. Dick's novel Time 
Out of Joint or films like Total Recall (1990) in that it does not ask its audience to work out (along with the protagonist) 
that things are not quite as they seem.” Knox, "Reading the Truman Show inside Out," 9. 
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with, the film forgoes an opening-credit sequence, and instead cuts immediately from the Paramount 
Pictures logo—which here is shown without any accompanying sound, minimizing our cognizance 
of it as film—to a close-up of a face staring directly at the camera (Figure 3.1-A).  
 
 
Figure 3.1-A. The Truman Show's opening shot.  
While direct address is somewhat atypical in mainstream fictional films, this shot here is also 
coded as a televisual recording through a few subtle visual and aural cues: the resolution and colors 
are more reminiscent of video quality than of a 35mm print; the depth of field is flattened to seem 
almost two dimensional; the character’s head is only partially visible in frame, in a manner that subtly 
implies that a televisual ratio of the era (4:3) is being forced into a wider aspect ratio more associated 
with cinema; finally, the sound is somewhat degraded, indicating it is a secondary recording. This 
suggests that the film spectator’s view into the diegetic world is mediated by another screen, likely a 
screen that exists within the first-order diegesis—a suggestion later confirmed when this 
composition is repeated within the context of a television interview an hour into the film. 
Consequently, this moment is less of an instance where a character or narrator breaks “the fourth 
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wall” to address the film spectators (e.g. Alfie talking to the film spectator in Alfie [Lewis Gilbert, 
1966])), and more an instance of the conventional use of a news broadcast, something of a common 
strategy for providing exposition in fictional films. Still, without a preceding shot clearly to put this 
shot in context, on an initial viewing this shot certainly blurs the line between the diegetic and non-
diegetic narration. In this way, the opening shot foreshadows The Truman Show’s almost duplicitous 
concern for drawing spectator’s attention to the narration within the diegesis, while also 
surreptitiously relying on parallel, more conventional narration conventions in relaying the story. 
As the opening sequence continues, the sense of a mediated diegesis continues to be 
extended. In the second shot, the film cuts to an extreme close-up of a pair of eyes ( Figure 3.1-B), 
here seen through blur of low-resolution and interlaced horizontal lines once again signaling that the 
image the spectator sees is a depiction of a diegetic screen. The perspective swiftly zooms out to 
reveal that the filmic spectator has been watching a close-up of another screen, this one seemingly 
built in to a wall, indicating a screen not usually found in a person’s home (Figure 3.1-C). In the 
lower right corner of the diegetic screen, the word “LIVE” fades into view in a font evoking the 
late’90s notion of the “digital” (perhaps because of an association with digital clocks).  
 
Figure 3.1-B. The Truman Show’s second shot, 
immediately after the cut. 
 
 
Figure 3.1-C. The second shot after zooming out
The implied layers within this shot are quite astounding: we see a man (Truman) staring at himself in 
a bathroom mirror—suggested by the barrier of cosmetics and the trappings of bathroom interior 
design—yet he is also unknowingly staring at a diegetic hidden camera behind the glass, which is 
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being watched by a diegetic television production team and being broadcasted, so that, by extension, 
Truman is also staring at a diegetic televisual audience, and then, us, the extra-diegetic film spectator.  
The next shot seemingly ends the “cold open” (or pre-credit sequence) by ostensibly 
beginning the film’s titles, yet even this moment reinforces the diegetic layers. The first intertitle 
states “starring Truman Burbank as himself,” as if the person we just saw is “Truman Burbank” and 
not the instantly recognizable actor Jim Carrey. The film has replaced the conventional non-diegetic 
opening credits with what is essentially a diegetic credit sequence; we are watching the credits for the 
fictional television show rather than the film. For the moment, the address places the film spectator 
within the diegesis, watching the credits for a diegetic television show. 
One of the film’s primary feats is positioning the film’s diegetic layers relationally, where the 
fictional Seahaven is couched as a fictional world that exists within the primary diegesis of The 
Truman Show. This idea is foregrounded in the film’s opening dialogue, which Christof provides 
during the opening shot:  
We’ve become bored with watching actors giving us phony emotions; we’re tired of pyrotechnics 
and special effects. While the world he inhabits is in some respects counterfeit, there’s nothing 
fake about Truman himself. No scripts, no cue cards. It isn't always Shakespeare, but it’s 
genuine. It’s a life. 
The statement and its platitudes are teeming with irony. We, the film spectators, are about to watch 
a film filled with the “phony emotions,” “special effects,” and “scripts,” which is exactly what is 
being undermined. However, because of the way the film situates Seahaven relatively as second-tier 
diegesis, Christof’s statement is effectively true in his world. Our suspension of disbelief as 
spectators must somehow include the notion that Carrey’s Truman is not part of the scripted 
production. This allows the larger diegesis to remain the relative “real” world in comparison to the 
false television world of Seahaven. 
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In fact, the film’s primary tactic for generating humor lies in the dramatic irony between how 
we, the film audience, see Seahaven, and how Truman sees Seahaven. We are constantly reminded 
that Seahaven is a charade, and this knowledge permits us to recognize the farcical measures used to 
keep Truman compliant and complacent enough so as not to exceed the literal and metaphorical 
boundaries of Seahaven. The exaggerated propaganda Truman encounters discouraging him from 
leaving his hometown includes the newspaper’s headlines that the town was “Voted the Best Place 
on Earth;” the posters in the travel agency warning travelers of potential “terrorists,” “disease,” 
“wild animals,” and “street gangs” elsewhere; and Seahaven’s television airing of the imaginary 
“classic” film, Show Me the Way to Go Home, that comes with the preamble describing it as “hymn of 
praise to small-town life.” As film spectators, we can snicker at the sheer artlessness of these 
contrivances because the measures taken by the television production to keep Truman from wanting 
to leave Seahaven are comically unsubtle. Effectively we see them as poorly disguised diegetic 
narration, but to Truman—at least in the first half of the film, this narration is ostensibly invisible. 
He has no reason to see his world as an artifact, as a cultural object designed with some sense of 
intentionality, so he has no frame of reference to see Seahaven as narrated. What in fictional realism 
functions as invisible narration, for Truman is merely “real.” The film spectator, meanwhile, is 
granted knowledge, not only that Seahaven is a cultural object designed with purpose, but also that 
one of its creator’s aims is to continue to conceal this fact from Truman.  
While it may seem, then, that the film spectator’s perspective is aligned with the diegetic TV 
audience who is shown watching “The Truman Show,” on many occasions film spectators actually 
shift between the diegetic layers, thus inhabiting distinct positions in relation to the film’s worlds. 
One illustrative example comes from an early occasion when the film momentarily exits Seahaven 
and the televisual address, and provides a view into the larger diegesis. It is a transition that occurs 
so quickly that one could easily overlook it. But, following Gombrich’s advice to “watch ourselves in 
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our reaction” and look at the “slow-motion picture of the mechanism that jumps into action 
whenever we search for the meaning of an image,” we find a tremendously complicated set of 
relations at work here. In the first shot of the sequence ( 
Figure 03.1-D [shot 1]), we, the film spectators, see Truman through medium-long barrier 
shot, looking longingly at a sweater he is holding. The film then cuts to a close-up of two bartenders 
looking off-screen ( 
Figure 03.1-E. Shot 2 of the sequence 
 [shot 2]), as one of them leans in and asks, “What’s he doing?”—a question the film 
spectator is likely asking as well. The status of these bartenders is not made clear until the next shot 
(Figure 3.1-F [shot 3-a]), which provides an eyeline match with a television displaying a diegetically-
mediated version of shot 1. By this point, we understand that the bartenders are those who watch 
“The Truman Show” on television. As the shot continues (Figure 3.1-G [shot 3-b]), the image of 
Truman on the television then dissolves through a cliché ripple effect, signifying a dream or memory 
sequence, to (Figure 3.1-H [shot 3-c]) an establishing shot of a school and a younger looking 
Truman looking off-screen. The next shot (Figure 3.1-I [shot 4]), returns to the non-mediated 
televisual address, where the film’s address is once again synced the television show broadcast of 
“The Truman Show.”  This provides the match to Truman’s off-screen glance with a point-of-view 
long shot of a girl sitting in the grass. The final shot (Figure 3.2-A[shot 5]) closes out the point-of-
view sequence by essentially repeating a version of shot 3-C, although without the television screen 
mediating the view. 
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Figure 3.1-D. Shot 1 of the sequence 
 
Figure 3.1-E. Shot 2 of the sequence 
 
 
Figure 3.1-F. Shot 3-a of the sequence 
 
Figure 3.1-G. Shot 3-b continued
 
 
Figure 3.1-H. Shot 3-c continued 
 
Figure 3.1-I. Shot 4 of the sequence 
 
 
Figure 3.1-J. Shot 5 of the sequence 
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Within this relatively short transitional sequence, the film’s address quickly shifts from inside 
Seahaven to the primary diegetic world and then back to Seahaven (now as a flashback of Truman’s 
college years). As the film moves between these layers, it also effectively repositions the film 
spectators in relation to the images and worlds presented. Part of what makes this such an 
interesting feat is how these transitions occur across two rather extraordinary versions of the 
conventional “shot/reverse-shot” arrangement. Shot 1 begins in the televisual address displaying 
Seahaven, signaled by the surveillance qualities of the barrier shot onto Truman. At this point, the 
spectator is subtly aware of the camera’s diegetic presence as it watches Truman. However, in Shot 
2, when we see the waitresses who are looking up at the television, the camera’s diegetic presence 
evaporates because we are now located in the primary diegetic world. Shot 3 provides a reverse angle 
on the waitresses’ gaze, aligning the film spectator with the point-of-view of those waitresses 
watching the diegetic television. What we implicitly discover is that the reverse-shot is also a version 
of the televisual address from shot 1, however now this address is contextualized within the primary 
diegetic world on the television screen, and what was previously the implied mediation of the 
televisual address becomes situated in the primary diegetic world. In shots 3-c, 4, and 5, the 
narration is returned to Seahaven, through mirrored inverse of the previous shot/reverse shot 
arrangement. In fact, technically these shots even share shot 3, although this must also recognize 
that there is a diegetic edit on the television screen in shot 3b. 
Part of what makes this so extraordinary is how, as a block, shots 1, 2, and 3-a provide an 
unusual variation on the archetypical “suturing” associated with the shot/reverse shot arrangement. 
In theory, suturing is about positing the spectator in the film’s world through a reverse angle, which 
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resolves the (unconscious) tension of off-screen space through the illusion of a complete world.1 
However, the reverse-angle here does not provide a shot located inside Seahaven, but instead, pulls 
the spectator into another layer altogether. At the same time, the spectator may be “sutured” into 
the primary diegesis in the sense that the offscreen point-of-view of the television becomes located 
in this primary diegesis, even as we remain somewhat unresolved in relation to Seahaven. We believe 
Seahaven exists, but only as an artificial construct within the primary diegesis. Meanwhile, shots 3b, 
4 and 5, provide us with a classic point-of-view shot using Truman in Seahaven, which in theory 
would provide another instance of suturing, this time in Seahaven. Perhaps, though, it has become 
impossible to disremember the level of mediation that remains between us and Truman’s world. 
Further, not only is Seahaven still an artificial world, but the Seahaven we return to in shots 4 and 5 
contains another layer of mediation because the flashback Seahaven is no longer “live.”  Whereas 
the previous views of Truman were meant to feel “present-tense,” evoking a sense of contingency 
and mundanity, the “past-tense” flashback-Seahaven is a clearly edited sequence jumping across 
swaths of time. In this sense, it is easier to recognize the calculated mission of the narration to 
communicate a functional component of Truman’s motivation (perhaps it is something like a reality 
show’s “previously on…” roll in montage feeling markedly different than the show itself). 
Another indication of the complex dynamics operating in this transition can be 
demonstrated with an analysis of how the flashback is signaled to the audience. In contrast to an 
earlier scene’s more understated flashback showing Truman’s father’s ostensible drowning, this 
                                                 
1 Jean-Pierre Oudart and Kaja Silverman adopted and popularized the term “suturing” in theories of spectatorship. The 
term, taken from Lacan, is read into the formal construction of narrative of cinematic spectatorship by way of a close 
semiotic and psychoanalytic reading. See Jean-Pierre Oudart, "Cinema and Suture Jean-Pierre Oudart,"  (1977). Kaja 
Silverman, The Subject of Semiotics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). in the sense that suturing involves various 
dialectics for the spectator—presence and absence, agency and lack of agency, identification and alienation, panic and 
reassurance—with the final result of the spectator remedying all the gaps between these tensions through an 
unconscious participation in the construction of the narrative world as one that should be whole. 
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second flashback lacks any subtlety. In shot 3-b, the ripples on the television (along with the 
preceding dialogue), indicate that the television broadcast of “The Truman Show” is using a non-
diegetic queue to indicate that it is supplementing its live feed of Truman with additional expository 
narration; “The Truman Show” is providing relevant backstory with a prepared and edited montage 
of clips from the show’s past. For one thing, it is a way for The Truman Show film to provide the 
relevant exposition to the film audience about what Truman is doing. However, instead of taking 
ownership of a trite and clunky use of a flashback as means to provide exposition, The Truman Show 
attributes this decision to the television production of “The Truman Show.” For the film spectator, 
the trite artifice of the ripples provides a hackneyed cliché, but within the diegesis, the television 
audience seems to take no notice. The diegetic television address is willing to suspend their disbelief 
in relation Seahaven in a way that we as film spectators are never quite asked to do. Instead, we can 
view the television audiences as naïve spectators in their obliviousness to the mediation the televisual 
broadcast.2  
Part of what The Truman Show demonstrates in these transitions between diegetic layers, is the 
ease with which spectators can engage with the film’s very different registers. As the film nimbly 
moves between its worlds, the spectator is positioned both inside and outside the worlds of the film, 
sutured and un-sutured. When the film portends to show Seahaven through its representation of the 
televisual narration, the spectator occupies a more distant position. The narration is itself part of the 
theatrical performance, so the spectator can view the seams that hold Seahaven together. This role 
finds spectators on some level aware of the mediating intentionality behind the image, an authorial 
expression that intends to shape how meaning is apprehended by the diegetic television audience. 
                                                 
2 In the eventual confrontation between Truman and Christof taking place during The Truman Show’s final scene, Truman 
asserts his definitive independence by claiming that Christoph “never had a camera in [Truman’s] head.” This flashback 
sequence depicting Truman’s memories, demonstrates that the television production effectively did have a camera in 
Truman’s head. 
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When the narration leaves Seahaven, the primary diegetic world is presented in a more conventional 
manner and the mostly invisible cinematic narration places us back into a more typical mode of 
spectatorship associated with realism. Yet, the fact that the movie balances these modes in parallel, 
and that they do not seem to disrupt each other, provides insight into how the fictional narratives 
worlds within film can be understood more like the play-spaces of video games.  
3.1.3 Dual Engagement and Ludic Space 
The Truman Show’s propensity to address the film spectator both outside and inside the film’s world 
corresponds to the last chapter’s observation that, when we play narrative video games, we engage 
the game worlds both from inside as participants and from the outside as co-narrators.3 When the 
film uses the televisual address, the reflexivity acknowledges the spectator’s presence outside the 
fictional world, as the spectator scrutinizes Seahaven’s design as a manufactured environment. This 
corresponds with video games’ non-diegetic address that implicitly acknowledges the player as a text, 
an operational co-narrator needed to propel the game’s expression from outside the game world. In 
video games, this will be often used to impart operational or expositional information to the player, 
perhaps the health of a character, the correct route through a maze, or a particular mission’s 
objectives. Within this mode, players are not “sutured” into the world of the game, as they remain 
somewhat cognizant of the world as a construct. Alternatively, when The Truman Show leaves 
Seahaven and effectively obscures its narration, the film operates in a more conventional narration 
                                                 
3 One way to recall this idea is through the opening moments from the narrative game Portal 2 (Valve, 2011), which 
provides as succinct an example as any. The game opens in the first-person perspective as the player’s character 
seemingly wakes up in a locked motel room. Moments later, an unidentifiable robotic-sounding voice is broadcast over a 
diegetic intercom, and it orders the character to look “to look up at the ceiling,” apparently as part of the protagonist’s 
regimented exercise routine. Almost concurrently, a non-diegetic cue appears on screen, superimposed over the diegetic 
world, instructing the player to provide the extra-diegetic physical action that will translate into the character looking up 
at the ceiling. Functionally Portal 2’s non-diegetic and diegetic narration are oriented to the player’s perspective. 
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where the mediating frame effectively disappears, and spectators are drawn into the diegetic world 
with a more classically suturing address. This corresponds to when video games’ diegetic address 
deliberately conceals its awareness of the player’s presence by effectively embedding the narration 
into the game world. It asks players to make believe the world they are experiencing is real and that 
they are subjects in that world, often conflating the player’s perspective with that of a character, 
avatar, or some other diegetic representative. Video game play is partly about a constant interplay 
and negotiation between these two addresses, as games work to draw the player into the narrative 
worlds, but also rely on an active spectator to engage the fictional world by performing actions in 
player’s own world. 
What makes The Truman Show unusual is not that it contains these addresses, but how the 
film layers them in parallel to each other, something connected to Knox’ observation of the “co-
presence” of the filmic and televisual modes. This is significant because of how the modes of 
address/spectatorial positions correspond with a familiar critical binary: the diegetic address 
positioning the spectator inside the fictional world is aligned with realism, while the non-diegetic 
address positioning the spectator outside the fictional world is aligned with reflexivity.4 Often 
realism and reflexivity are associated with oppositional modes of reception. Realism’s tendency to 
hide the narration and minimize the viewer’s awareness of the production through seamlessness is 
linked with ideologically-suspect concepts like “immersion,” “illusionism,” and “absorption.” 
Reflexivity, on the other hand, draws attention to the narration, breaking the illusion of the film’s 
world by keeping the spectator at a distance. Consequently, reflexivity—especially when paired with 
modernism—is often considered more critically progressive, linked to the avant-garde, and 
associated with concepts like “distanciation,” “theatricality,” and “demystification.”  Another 
                                                 
4 Depending on one’s critical framework, this conception of “reflexivity” could be associated with either “modernism” 
or “postmodernism.” Regardless, it is understood in opposition to realism’s tendency toward immersion. 
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ostensible facet of this opposition is that diegetic realism pretends the fictional world exists on its 
own, while non-diegetic reflexivity acknowledges the world as a fictional construct.  
While playing narrative video games, however, we are seemingly engaged in both modes in 
parallel, enabling us to play both in and with the game world at once. This idea seems related to 
Manovich’s notion of “meta-realism” which he explains as something which “incorporates its own 
critique inside itself…[as it] it continuously and skillfully deconstructs itself…” For Manovich 
though this a model that is common—or perhaps even ubiquitous—in new media forms like video 
games because of how illusionism works differently in new media. As he explains, “new media 
objects keep reminding us about their artificiality, incompleteness, and constructedness [by] 
present[ing] us with a perfect illusion only to reveal the underlying machinery next.” For Manovich, 
these media provide users with additional agency. As he notes, “as the user navigates through space 
the objects switch back and forth between pale blueprints and fully fleshed out illusions. The 
immobility of a subject guarantees a complete illusion; the slightest movement destroys it.”5 In this 
characterization, “meta-realism” in video games is effectively a product of the popular conception of 
the discord between immersion and interactivity, the assumption that full-fledged “immersion” is 
inherently beyond a form oriented toward the interactive perceiver.6  
Yet, where Manovich ostensibly connected this meta-realism to the material conditions of 
computational forms and responsive interfaces like video games, The Truman Show demonstrates how 
films too can engender something quite comparable despite a more non-responsive form. Moreover, 
The Truman Show’s correspondence with video games helps articulate how “meta-realism,” and its 
                                                 
5 Manovich, Language, 185-6. 
6For more on this idea, we would look to Janet Murray and her discussion of the “holodeck” from Star Trek The Next 
Generation, where the virtual experience is sensually indistinguishable from a real-world experience. The point to 
remember though is that when it comes to the holodeck, the participant is, on some level, cognitively aware that they are 
participating in a fictional space. Janet Horowitz Murray, Hamlet on the Holodeck : The Future of Narrative in Cyberspace (New 
York: Free Press, 1997). 
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parallel modes of inside and outside receptive positions, are really about approaching the fictional 
world as a designed play-space. To explore this idea, it is imperative to recognize narrative realism’s 
specific affinity with ludic spaces. 
To begin, it is helpful to recognize the confluence between Bordwell’s notion of aesthetic 
perception and Huizinga’s concept of (game)play. Specifically, Bordwell’s argument that “what […] 
distinguishes aesthetic perception and cognition from the non-aesthetic variety” is the supposition 
that “aesthetic activity” has “nonpractical ends,”7 sounds remarkably similar to Huizinga’s definition 
of “play”:  
We might call [play] a free activity standing quite consciously outside ‘ordinary’ life as being 
‘not serious’, but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly, it is an activity 
connected with no material interest and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds with its own 
proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner.8 
For these thinkers, gameplay and aesthetic reception are, respectively, modes of experience that can 
be at once distinguished and partitioned from the real world, yet can also be taken earnestly in their 
own right. The game world and the fictional world exist in spaces that have tenuous consequential 
relationships to the real world, yet we can also be absorbed into these worlds and treat them as if 
their consequences matter. That is to say, the aesthetic experience and gameplay exist in a sub-world. 
Significantly, we find several complementary formulations of alternate worlds being utilized 
by theorists thinking about ludic and aesthetic reception.9 Caillois, for one, describes a mode of 
gameplay associated with his category of mimicry (simulation) as a an engagement that “presupposes 
                                                 
7 Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film, 32. Of course, deciding what is “practical” and “not-practical,” is based on 
subjective, contextual, and social factors as opposed to quantifiable material qualities. Consequently, the same object can 
be experienced both as practical and non-practical—art and design, fiction and reality—depending on the vantage point 
one takes and how it presents itself. The non-practical is that which is not “real” because it has no consequences. This is 
consistent with the last chapter’s discussion of design and art objects being distinguished by the perception of 
functionality. 
8 Huizinga, Homo Ludens; a Study of the Play-Element in Culture, 12. 
9 The most complete scholarly work combining these the ludic and aesthetic in terms of world-building and make-
believe has been done by Kendall Walton. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. 
Surprisingly, Walton does not connect his work or cite to Huizinga or Caillois in this work. 
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the temporary acceptance…of a closed, conventional, and in certain respects, imaginary universe.”10 
In Michael Fried’s description of being absorbed by a painting, we find a similar idea of a “closed” 
world: “the world of the painting appear[s] self-sufficient, autonomous, a closed system independent 
of and, in that sense blind to the world of the beholder.” For Fried, this creation of a world is what 
engenders a “virtual trance of imaginative involvement” for the spectator,11 a phrase which sounds 
remarkably like those found in Caillois and Huizinga.  
However, it is Frederic Jameson who specifically links the world-building capacity of fiction 
to realism—a point we touched on at the end of Chapter 2. Jameson describes what he calls the 
“demiurgic praxis” within literature where…  
realism and its specific narrative forms construct their new world by programming their 
reader; by training them in their new habits and practices, which amount to whole new 
subject positions in a new kind of space; producing new kinds of action, but by way of the 
production of new categories of the event and of experience, of temporality and causality, 
which also preside over what will now be come to be thought of as reality.12 
Jameson’s statement is especially helpful because it brings us back to a recognition of how texts 
strategically build their worlds using formal techniques. In the previous chapter we discussed this in 
terms of interactive design, which makes sense considering his use of the word “programming” 
evokes computer software with outward facing interfaces. We know that software like video games 
include worlds that are literally programmed, but Jameson is explaining how this is a standard 
function of “specific narrative forms” related to realism. All fictional worlds must not only be built, 
but programmed in a way that they can be experienced in a particular way by a perceiver. The design 
                                                 
10 Caillois and Barash, Man, Play, and Games, 19. 
11 Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews (University of Chicago Press, 1998), 48. It is worth noting Richard 
Rushton’s insightful distinction between absorption and immersion. Rushton argues that the “mode of absorption is one 
in which the spectator goes into the film – that is, is absorbed in or by the film – whereas in the mode of immersion the 
film comes out to the spectator so as to surround and envelop her/him.”  
12 Jameson, Signatures of the Visible, 166. My Italics. 
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of these worlds is oriented toward how they will be eventually navigated. They are imaginary spaces 
that are, in a sense, designed to be inhabited and acted upon (in a cognitive/perceptual sense). 
As spectators and players, even as we may navigate these worlds from within, we do not 
mistake this experience for what we understand as reality. This is because both gameplay and aesthetic 
reception are defined by our implicit awareness that these experiences are not real, that we remain 
outside the fictional worlds. Jameson makes a version of this point when he explains that the 
fictional world of realism must “be grasped as a false world, …one which is objectively false.”13 The 
tacit recognition that the fictional world is not our world is—perhaps counterintuitively—a 
requirement in a work of realism. If we apprehend the world as real, historical, or non-fictional—a 
notion we will continue to explore in Chapter 4—this would no longer be gameplay or aesthetic 
reception. This is why we find a similar prerequisite for a tacit cognitive dissonance in Caillois’ 
notion of the mimicry (simulation) playing “make-believe”—even watching others playing make-
believe. Caillois describes it as submitting to a “spell,” “illusion,” and an “artifice which for a given 
time [one] is asked to believe in as more real than reality itself.”14 There is an “ask” before the leap 
of faith, allowing the player to, on some level, knowingly submit. Whether playing a narrative game 
or watching a narrative film, there is an inferred contract that allows the spectator to experience and 
play with/in these imaginary worlds by first recognizing that they are designed. 
In significant ways, this idea is essentially found in Coleridge’s foundational “willing 
suspension of disbelief,” which similarly defines the contract of a serious engagement with any 
imagined world. In the interest of creating a coherent world, then, it would seem advisable for 
narration not to draw too much attention to this outside presence and the tacit contract. This could 
be said to aid any suspension of disbelief. When we watch a film in a mode of realism and treat the 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 167. 
14 Caillois and Barash, Man, Play, and Games, 23. 
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diegetic world as if it exists, we are, in a sense, willingly playing a game of make-believe. The 
audience must relinquish the logic that governs everyday reality, but the fiction must also present a 
world that is coherent and plausible enough to be experienced as “real”. We willingly suspend our 
disbelief and affectively experience these worlds as coherent, yet the spell is always in danger of 
being broken because our disbelief only stretches so far. The point is that the relative fragility of the 
fictional world recognizes the ever-presence of the outside, conscious mode of engagement that 
looms over the diegesis even in work of realism. Consequently, while the basic positions inside and 
outside a fictional world may be implicit in realism, the style only functions uninterrupted by 
suppressing spectators cognizance of their position outside the fictional world. If this is in fact the 
case, though, how do beholders reclaim their position outside the fictional world and become 
conscious of a worlds’ design?  
Part of what makes The Truman Show such a productive film to examine in relation to the 
reception of narrative worlds is that the central story provides a kind of thought-experiment about a 
subject unknowingly navigating a carefully authored world. In one sense, Truman provides a parable 
about a (video) game player so fully immersed in a game world that the player is unaware he or she is 
even playing a game. In another sense, Truman is akin to a fully sutured film spectator who mistakes 
the fictional world for reality. In this way, the film asks us to consider a hypothetical where a diegetic 
world is apprehended either as a non-diegetic world, a mediated perspective comprehended as 
unmediated, an intentional object is mistaken as unintentional, or a game mistaken for reality. 
Perhaps more importantly, then, The Truman Show imagines the process by which subjects become 
conscious of the narrational addresses that shape their orientation and perception.  
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3.2 LEARNING TO PLAY, PLAYING TO LEARN 
3.2.1 (Re)Cognizing the Glitch 
When we, as spectators, watch The Truman Show, we implicitly recognize the primary diegesis as a 
world that, in some sense, exists as an imaginary construct in our world. Our entire register of 
engagement is premised on our position outside the diegesis that recognizes the fictional world as 
fiction, rendering the experiences within that world to be non-functional, non-practical, and non-
serious. 15 This allows us to see how Seahaven operates by distinct rules compared to the rules of the 
primary diegetic world, just as the rules of the primary diegetic world operates differently from the 
rules of our own world (e.g. our world does not allow a corporation to adopt a baby and 
surreptitiously film that baby’s life). At the same time, we are implicitly judging the sub-worlds based 
on frames of reference outside that world. At most, the fictional world has a tangential, 
representational or metaphorical link to the world it exists in.  
Because Truman has only existed within Seahaven, he is unlike the film spectator or the 
game player because Truman has never submitted to a willing suspension of disbelief. For Truman, 
Seahaven is the world, and what happens in Seahaven has practical implications. The point is that 
Truman is not unwilling to suspend disbelief, but he is oblivious to alternative set of rules. Christof 
explains the principle behind this idea when he explains why Truman never questioned the 
authenticity of Seahaven: “we accept the reality of the world with which we are presented.” Since 
                                                 
15 As mentioned in the previous section, a key part of Bordwell’s notion of the aesthetic experience is that baseline 
assumption that the encounter lacks a practical application in the real world; that is, we must recognize the experience as 
“not-practical.” Likewise, for Huizinga, something can only truly be considered “play” if we know that it is “not-
serious.” However, considering last chapter’s discussion of “functionality” as the determining factor of “art” and 
“design,” we should also recognize that neither “practicality” nor “seriousness” are inherent to the object encountered; 
they are receptive positions based on subjective factors, which are also shaped by social contexts and discursive norms. 
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Truman has no frame of reference outside of Seahaven, he has no ability and also no cause to 
question his world as it is.  
Crucially, Christof’s logic also articulates a certain characterization of naïve film 
spectatorship in relation to a fictional world, such as the primary diegetic world of The Truman Show. 
In this mode of engagement, spectators implicitly agree to a premise when encountering a fictional 
world that is presented as coherent through a concealed narration. Presumably, as long as the film 
remains within the bounds of conventional plausibility, spectators have no drive to begin pulling at 
its seams. In the same way that Truman has no cause to consider the events of his life as 
orchestrated decisions shaping his perspective, naïve spectators will theoretically remain oblivious to 
the narrational choices made in the expression of this fictional world. Put another way, the spectator 
is unaware of the syntagmatic axis. For The Truman Show’s spectators, though, this obliviousness does 
not extend to our view of Seahaven, which is why even the naïve spectator can remain conscious of 
the choices made in crafting Seahaven. In this way, the process by which Truman becomes aware of 
the mediated address, and essentially begins to close the gap between the filmic spectator’s 
perception of the manufactured Seahaven and Truman’s own perception, is essentially an account of 
how one manages to become conscious of a world’s narration from inside that world rather than 
relying on the external vantage point. 
The first event of the film that demonstrates Truman questioning his world arises when his 
morning routine is interrupted by an ostensible aberration. As he is getting into his car, a television 
studio lamp falls out of the empty blue sky, crashing right next to Truman. Truman then looks up 
and off-screen towards the sky where it fell from, and the film provides a reverse-shot depicting 
what is ostensibly Truman’s point-of-view. Knox interprets this point-of-view shot to “suggest for 
the first time that Truman is becoming conscious of another level to his world, that the periphery of 
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his vision might contain a thus far denied presence.” The point-of-view shot and Truman’s reaction, 
signal that this is something that potentially challenges the objective quality of his world. Certainly, 
Knox’s reading works within the context of where the narrative is headed and the film spectator’s 
awareness of the television show, however it is worth considering that, in theory, Truman has no 
frame of reference to make such an interpretation. What we do know is that Truman sees this as 
happening as a deviation from normality because it lacks clear casual motivation and it is the first of 
several incidents in the film that ostensibly breaks the internal rules of Seahaven. In the beginning of 
The Truman Show, we see Truman encountering aberrations ostensibly without effort—the light falls 
from the sky in front of him, his car radio suddenly broadcasts the production staff’s signal, a rain 
storm momentarily localizes around his body, and his “dead” father attempts to sneak back on set. 
While the film spectator can recognize these as (diegetic) setbacks within the film, Truman’s is 
initially unsure what to make of them. In Truman’s words “a lot of strange things have been 
happening.”  
To Knox, this series of events was, in some ways, inevitable because “every system, 
especially as big an operation as ‘The Truman Show,’ is likely to have glitches that come with the 
territory.”16 There is no indication that Knox’s use of “glitches” is intended to allude to the jargon of 
computer programming, however her use of the term is apt precisely for this reason. As a neologism 
of the computer-age popularized as astronaut slang for unexpected malfunctions, the term “glitch” 
already carries a connotation of an unforeseeable malfunction in complex technical system.17 It is 
something that arises in part because of the sheer number of variables in a network of interrelated 
protocols working together. In video games culture, what players refer to glitches when playing a 
game can vary significantly in terms of the degree of disruption a glitch causes and how it 
                                                 
16Knox, "Reading the Truman Show inside Out," 7.   
17 Oxford English Dictionary, "Glitch, N." (Oxford University Press). 
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manifests.18 Some glitches can be predictable and repeatedly triggered under specific conditions, but 
other glitches are not easily replicated, or possibly even wholly anomalous. A minor glitch might 
manifest as missing texture on a wall and the player’s flow of operating in a game world may not be 
interrupted. In a sense, these minor glitches are akin to “continuity errors” in film, which may go 
unnoticed if not egregious. At the same time, a significant glitch, perhaps a “game breaking glitch” 
will render a game inoperable, perhaps causing the program to suddenly crash and lose stored data.19   
Even though many glitches occurring in video games can be overlooked or ignored, we 
could say that every recognized glitch carries the potential to change the player’s orientation toward 
the game world. For one thing, by definition the glitch presupposes that a plan—a purposeful 
design, an intended order —has gone awry. For Truman, each glitch can be evidence that the world 
he took for granted as given is, in fact, designed. It is an aberration, a break from a pattern, an 
unexpected mutation, that provides the potential to ascertain a greater purposive scheme through 
that scheme’s breakdown. If the glitch is a moment when an ordered system confesses its imperfect 
construction, that confession must be heard.  
When we read the aberration as glitch, it means that we have acknowledged the larger design 
of the system, and we recognize that the system’s design has exceeded the designer’s control. For 
Truman, to see an occurrence as a glitch would mean that he already comprehends his world as one 
that operates according to an authored mechanism. While every glitch can provide a momentary 
                                                 
18 Eben Holmes gives a helpful explanation of the glitch: “glitch—the spectral appearance of failure in the virtual worlds 
of computers, cyberspace and videogames in which paradoxes and extremities of distance, geometry, velocity and 
shadow fold in on a single object/surface/function in the world until it—like Marx’s table—becomes a Thing.” Eben 
Holmes, "Strange Reality: Glitches and Uncanny Play," Eludamos. Journal for Computer Game Culture 4, no. 2 (2010): 255-56. 
19 In the sense that the glitches are understood as design flaws, glitches are closely related to “bugs” because both 
describe something that is ostensibly broken. Still, there is, perhaps, a slight if important distinction between a glitch and 
a bug. One way to understand might be that the glitch is the expression—the symptom or manifestation—of a bug. One 
prevents glitches by fixing bugs, glitches are, how bugs are experienced. Glitches are what is noticed or felt by the player, 
while bugs are what are identified by the developer as something that needs to be fixed. In this way, the bug describes a 
glitch once that glitch is diagnosed. The glitch manifests in the diegetic world, while the bug is the diagnosis from the 
extra-diegetic world. 
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glimpse of a larger invisible mechanism, one must also be able recognize the glitch as a malfunction. 
But how is Truman able to read these aberrations as glitches and not heretofore unknown features 
of his world. Perhaps if Seahaven lights can fall out of a cloudless sky, and rainstorms can be 
isolated over individuals, what allows Truman to see these events as something “strange”? 
One proposition is that, for a given occurrence to be apprehended as a glitch and not a 
feature, it must both break continuity and lack a motivated, diegetic explanation. The fact that 
Truman can recognize these occurrences as “strange” means that Seahaven has developed 
conventions, rules that establish norms of what it possible and what is impossible. These are 
patterns that make certain events more or less probable. Whether or not Truman is aware that he 
has internalized these conventions, the fact that he can recognize things as strange, means he expects 
his world to operate within certain parameters. However, his unwilling suspension of disbelief is 
challenged when enough aberrations occur in proximity to one another that it changes Truman’s 
orientation in his mode of perception. It is not that Truman comprehends the totality behind the 
constructed nature of Seahaven, but he enters into a more skeptical, investigatory mode of 
perception. He is no longer a wholly naïve spectator as he begins to experiment with a perception 
that sees the ostensibly random or coincidental, as purposeful.  
One scene in particular provides a productive illustration of how Truman’s perspective 
transforms as he ceases to passively wait for glitches and instead begins seeking them out. The scene 
starts with Truman taking an uncharacteristic break before heading to work, choosing instead to sit 
outside on a bench and observe the busy morning routine around him. A diegetic television camera 
filming the “The Truman Show” placed inside a car, audibly whirrs as it zooms-in to capture 
Truman looking off-screen (Figure 3.2-A), before the film cuts to a medium shot from Truman’s 
point of view. This shot shows a man and woman eating at a nearby table (Figure 3.2-B), and then 
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cuts back to Truman looking (Figure 3.2-B), completing the point-of-view circuit. The pattern 
continues over the next few shots as Truman surveys his scene somewhat suspiciously, before 
ending in a close-up on Truman’s eyes. 
 
Figure 3.2-A. Truman looks off-screen 
 
Figure 3.2-B. Truman’s point of view. 
 
Figure 3.2-C. Return to slightly zoomed in shot of Truman looking off-screen. 
In another context, this three-shot series would be an almost entirely unremarkable. This brief point-
of-view shot depicting people talking over breakfast might merely express the idea that Truman is 
looking around for something. Meanwhile, the idiosyncratic details of the extras, whose conversation 
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we momentarily catch a few words from (“l love that idea.” “It’s pretty cool, isn't it?”), would merely 
provide a bit of detail, perhaps adding a sense of depth to a world. On the other hand, through the 
film’s diegetic layers and the implicit knowledge of Truman’s skepticism, the sheer mundanity of the 
scene is part of what makes this significant. As Truman undergoes this transformation, he is 
effectively aligning his perspective with that of the filmic spectator in that he is becoming attuned to 
how Seahaven is filled with concealed narration. For the film spectator, these literal extras are also 
diegetic extras. We are aware that they serve a purpose within Seahaven’s ruse and Truman also 
begins viewing the inane behavior as purposeful and intentional, a calculated performance aimed at 
his vantage point. In something of a twist on the typical point-of-view shot, it is Truman who 
essentially begins to identify with the film spectator’s external perspective. 
Following his examination of Seahaven’s extras, the music swells and Truman walks into 
street traffic, raising his hands to stop cars, as if his actions, and not the drivers’ actions are 
controlling the flow of traffic. Like a video game player who, upon stumbling across an initial glitch 
begins searching for more, we watch Truman enter a new mode of engagement with his 
environment. As in video game design, the world’s limitations are hidden most efficiently when the 
freely-agentic subject can remain within predictable spaces. This is why the diegetic narrations 
behind Seahaven direct Truman to express his agency within the space it has previously allotted for 
him as often as possible through diegetic justifications—e.g. police restricting movement beyond a 
point because of toxic chemicals conceals the fact nothing exists beyond the horizon. Once Truman 
begins to believe that his world is purposefully designed, his aim is to discover his world’s 
parameters by triggering glitches instead of merely waiting passively for glitches to occur. Searching 
for glitches is about actively testing the fictional space’s fortitude and integrity, and the glitch is the 
point when the effort to conceal the artifice has failed. 
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An important part of Truman’s recognition is not only that his world is a designed program, 
but also that it is particularly oriented towards his vantage point. The world he previously imagined 
as a self-sustaining and indifferent ecosystem, actually exists only in relation to his presence. In this 
same sequence, Truman unexpectedly forces his way into a random building and triggers a glitch—
an elevator with a missing wall reveals the back stage of the studio (Figure 3.2-D). An ostensible 
elevator door opens and reveal the television show's backstage. As Truman watches dumbfounded, a 
production staff worker rushes to slide the false elevator wall back into place. 
 
Figure 3.2-D Sequence in which Truman rushes unexpectedly into an office building.  
Truman brief encounter with the back stage particularly recalls a phenomenon within video 
games where players discover a glitch that leads to their avatar “falling off the map.” When this 
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occurs, the player has seemingly slipped by the environmental design’s “collision” parameters—the 
rules defining how diegetic objects impede movement in space—into an area of the larger map not 
meant to be traversed. Just like in Seahaven, the video game world has limitations. To balance 
appearance and performance, video games are often designed in a way that allows their artificial 
worlds to be rendered piecemeal and in relation to the player’s perspective. The supposition is that 
the only areas of the game world that need to be fully calculated by the computer at a given moment 
are those which the player sees or the avatar encounters. In video game design, the extent of what is 
“clipped” depends on how a game is designed, but usually this means that visual layers and the 
physical properties are rendered when they are deemed relevant to the player’s avatar. One helpful 
illustration of this idea can be found within a “behind-the-scenes” featurette about the game Horizon 
Zero Dawn (Guerrilla Games, 2017), which demonstrates how the visual components of the diegetic 
world essentially are only rendered in relation to the direction the player is looking. The illustration 
(Figure 3.2-E) shows the world not from the player’s perspective (which is a close third-person in 
the game), but from a bird’s-eye-view, the designer’s perspective. Here the player’s vantage point is 
represented by the nodal point at the bottom center of the frame, as the player essentially turns the 
avatar on its axis, the point-of-view pans, and the world’s visuals render and de-render, accordingly. 
Only what the player is currently viewing, and some linked assets, are visually rendered at any 
moment. 
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Figure 3.2-E The diegetic world visually “exists” in reference to players' in-game perspective. 
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When Truman stumbles into a space that has not been rendered within his diegesis, he is like a video 
game player falling off the map and realizing the diegetic world only remains coherent from a certain 
perspective. Like a room on a soundstage, it exists through a framed vantage point.  
In many video games, when the player’s avatar enters a doorway to another location the 
game will cut to a loading screen, during which time the environment the player’s avatar came from 
will stop being rendered, and the forthcoming environment will begin to be rendered. In video 
games wherein one can travel quickly through large navigable spaces without encountering loading 
screens players will often witness the environment essentially in the process of loading as the 
computer processes the level-design instructions from the game’s code, and incrementally renders 
the environment in plain view of the player. Sometimes occurrences of this phenomenon are 
essentially experienced as glitches, because buildings or trees may appear so suddenly that the 
player’s avatar may collide with a physical obstruction that only appears visually after the collision. 
So, when Truman stumbles backstage and into a section of Seahaven that has been “clipped,” he 
witnesses the world rendering as they place the wall back into place. What previously appeared to be 
an “objectively false” world, in Jameson’s terms, is revealed to be “some mere appearance or 
figment.”20 The realism is breaking down because the internal rules of the world are not detailed or 
dynamic enough. The design of the world did not anticipate the extent of how it would be 
navigated.  
For seasoned video game players, The Truman Show’s final scene provides a familiar 
illustration of limitations of fictional world design. In the scene, Truman is in a boat escaping 
Seahaven by sailing in what appears to be a sort of endless horizon. In a long shot, we see Truman’s 
boat moving slowly from the left side of the frame toward the right side, the direction of the 
                                                 
20 Jameson, Signatures of the Visible, 167. 
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horizon, while a tempered piano score provides a hopeful air. The music suddenly stops as the boat 
literally crashes into the horizon, which is revealed to be a painted backdrop. While Truman is 
initially flummoxed when he reaches this previously invisible border, for video game players this 
occurrence has a definite label: “hitting an invisible wall.” Invisible walls are common occurrences in 
video games that neglect to conceal their non-diegetic limitations within the diegetic world. When a 
player manages to navigate to the end of the space designed to be navigable, the game’s visual 
representation can clash with the collision parameters. An open road or an expanse that appears to 
continue on, functionally provides a dead end. Invisible walls are not glitches, per se; they are instead 
decisive design concessions. Still, like glitches, they can interrupt the illusion of a world by revealing 
the designer’s hand, the constructed nature of the sub-world that is necessarily limited compared to 
the primary world.21  
Robert Buerkle notes that invisible walls “result from the discrepancy between the game’s 
systemic logic and its fictional logic. […] While the fictional world may be limitless, the gameworld is 
decidedly finite.”22 While Buerkle is specifically referring to video games, a similar logic works for 
film as well. What Buerkle calls the “gameworld” could just as easily describe any narrative diegetic 
world as we experience it. That is, in film the diegetic world is similarly finite in the sense that 
everything that does not appear within the narrative representation—everything left in Iser’s terms 
“indeterminate”—remains unrendered and undefined. The literal text is the “gameworld,” which 
creates parameters, but the fictional world remains limitless until we recognize those parameters. In 
                                                 
21 For game designers looking to avoid such moments of disenchantment, invisible walls can be avoided through diegetic 
justifications. That is, instead of reaching an invisible wall, players could reach an insurmountable concrete wall, one that 
is motivated by the architecture of the diegetic city. Or the game could let players know that the water they want to 
navigate is infested with sharks, so as soon as our avatar ventures out to a certain point, the sharks end the player’s 
effort. It is worth noting how this demonstrates how diegetic decisions, and the ways the worlds are represented, might 
be influenced by efforts to conceal technical limitations. To oversimplify, open-world video games might be more likely 
to be set on islands to avoid explaining why character cannot simply travel elsewhere.  
22 Buerkle, Of Worlds and Avatars: A Playercentric Approach to Videogame Discourse, 141. 
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occurrences in video games, such as falling off the map or running into an invisible wall, the player is 
confronting the realization that the “off-screen” space of a diegetic world is only functionally 
rendered in our imaginations. This is not merely a metaphor or an analogy, but an understanding of 
how fictional, diegetic worlds are effectively produced in the beholder’s imagination during the act 
of reception—in part, our willing suspension of disbelief renders the off-screen diegetic space.23 
This idea is even implied in Gombrich’s and Bordwell’s conceptions that an artwork only 
functionally exists as a projection in the spectator’s imagination. Likewise, as it was presented to and 
experienced by Truman through most of the film, the off-screen spaces of Seahaven functionally 
exist despite never materially existing. When we hit an invisible wall, we are confronted not only by 
the narrational artifice, but our own role in rendering that off-screen space. Further, Buerkle notes 
that “if we wish to look, we could find countless examples of…discrepancies [like the invisible 
wall].”24 If a player searches for discordance that reveals the narration embedded into the diegesis, it 
will be found repeatedly. What is taken for granted, however, is that video game play does actually 
relies on players to experiment and search for such discrepancies. 
3.2.2 Critical Exploits 
In video games, glitches can potentially be outlets for radical transformations, and the productive 
counterpart to the glitch is the “exploit.” These are instances in which players use glitches as 
                                                 
23 V.F. Perkin’s makes a version of this point in his argument that “the world is everything (in space and in time) 
surrounding and embedding our immediate perceptions. There is always an out-of-sight just as there is always an off-
screen.”  VF Perkins, "Where Is the World? The Horizon of Events in Movie Fiction," in Style and Meaning: Studies in the 
Detailed Analysis of Film, ed. John Gibbs and Douglas Pye (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005). 
24 Buerkle, Of Worlds and Avatars: A Playercentric Approach to Videogame Discourse, 141. 
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loopholes, and subvert the rules of the game without technically leaving the game’s boundaries.25 
Glitches may expose a video game’s underlying construction, but exploits actively meddle with the 
invisible parameters by finding new possibilities. If a player’s avatar jumps over a wall and falls off 
the map, this would be a glitch; if a player jumps over a wall to skip past challenges, this would be an 
exploit. Often exploits are about finding ways to use the game’s protocols in unintended and 
counterintuitive ways. For instance, in a racing game like Mariokart 64 (Nintendo, 1996), players have 
figured out how to fall or jump at strategic locations in race courses to skip over large segments of 
those courses. In another rather extreme example of an exploit, players discovered a way to 
effectively rewrite the code of Super Mario World (Nintendo, 1990) through a series of diegetic 
actions that take advantage of how the platform’s processor allocates memory while computing the 
game’s code. This exploit allows players to effectively inject an entirely new set of rules into the 
game, or even to create entirely new games using Super Mario World assets as a set of baseline 
materials.26 Regardless of the particular ends of any exploit, its presence suggests not only the 
player’s acknowledgement of a fictional world’s design, but also the player’s effort to challenge the 
dominion of the game’s designer as the sole definer of a game world’s rules.27  
To some extent, discovering or inventing exploits is simply an extension of how players 
approach play-spaces as complex systems that are perpetually unresolved. Just like Knox’s assertion 
that glitches were inevitable because of Seahaven’s enormity, Alex Galloway makes the point that 
“hacks and other software exploits [inevitably] pop up in the complexity of the software network, 
                                                 
25 “Hacking” or “modding” entails using additional software to modify a game’s code or assets from the outside. 
Exploits are about changing the game from within. 
26 The details of the glitch and exploit are quite technical. See Rick Osgood to Hackaday, 2015, 
https://hackaday.com/2015/01/22/reprogramming-super-mario-world-from-inside-the-game/. 
27 Like “bugs,” exploits might motivate the developers to create software “patches” (updates to the code) to block 
exploits and improve balance in competition. However, on occasions, designers can marvel at the ingenuity of exploits 
and leave them in or even build additional content to accommodate such exploits, (essentially rendering the glitch and 
exploit into a retroactive feature). 
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exploits which can never be predicted, as the computer scientists would say, ‘statically.’” It is the 
intricacy of the system itself that leaves it vulnerable because, the more details its presents, the more 
opportunities for malfunctions. Galloway also makes a constructive point about how exploits only 
occur in a “software program,” a system that has been intentionally designed to operate according to 
parameters, and not in a “natural language,” a system that develops without any conscious 
management and without prescriptive rules.28  This distinction is crucial because it separates the 
world, which operates as system designed through a natural language, and a world, a sub-system that 
has been created and operates within limited, authored parameters. For Galloway, “exploits operate 
intensively within and through the rules of the symbolic system, while natural language operates 
extensively as a result of a combinatorial discursive logic never intent on probing the boundaries of 
allowable style.”29 That is to say, exploits and glitches exist only in relation to an artificially 
constructed system with definitive borders. To use words like glitch or exploit in relation to the natural 
world is to imply that mistakes can be made in nature. What appears to be a glitch in nature—for 
example, a genetic mutation—is not so much a malfunction, but an indication of a preceding lack of 
full comprehension of its operations; it indicates a flaw in our prior expectations. Likewise, so-called 
exploits in nature are more aptly be deemed “inventions” or “discoveries,” because the exploit only 
operates in relation to intended borders that have been designed to operate according to some 
plan.30 
                                                 
28 This idea is also helpful to think about in relation to how we play different kinds of games. A sand-box game like 
Minecraft operates more like a “natural language” in that it provides tools to invent new features. Consequently, building 
something never imagined by the game’s designers is not an exploit in the way it would be in a more tightly prescribed 
experience of Super Mario World.  
29 Galloway, The Interface Effect, 64-65. 
30 We could say that exploits do not exist in nature because if a natural law can be broken, then the law never existed to 
begin with. This relies on the premise that “nature” itself has a will and intentionality. Clearly, this skirts a theological 
discussion here about God as the “designer” of the natural world, one that certainly seems relevant considering The 
Truman Show’s clear religious metaphors. This comparison certainly provides a challenge to the distinction between the 
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Reconsidering The Truman Show through this framework allows us to see that Truman’s 
process of coming into consciousness is about discovering that his “natural language” is essentially a 
designed “program.” Those expressions thought to be chance or given are authored. Thus, Truman 
no longer experiences Seahaven as the world, because it is now a world. Put another way, 
Seahaven—the world he took as a given—is a construction, a diegesis filled with narration and 
expression. This allows Truman to be cognizant of the intentionality programmed into every facet of 
the world surrounding him. Each gesture, object, and happening are deliberate constructions 
functioning to some larger end. In a sense, Truman’s mode of perception is entirely paranoid in its 
suspicion of some grand design and conspiracy within Seahaven. However, within the diegesis, the 
machinations are real, so Truman’s paranoia is proved justified; (perhaps this film is a counter-
productive model to those suffering with mental illness and “The Truman Show Delusion”).31 
Effectively this investigative mode of perception is paranoid and schizophrenic if applied to a 
natural language, but justified and appropriately critical if applied to a designed program. In fact, as 
Truman begins seeing his world through this seemingly paranoid lens, he is increasingly aligning his 
perception with that of the film spectator, who always sees Seahaven through a layer of designed 
mediation.  
Yet another complicating factor of The Truman Show is that Truman is often additionally 
surrounded by authored expressions, which is not aimed at his perception, but instead aimed at the 
diegetic television audience of “The Truman Show.” For instance, the television broadcast “The 
Truman Show” also includes excessive product placements aimed at the diegetic TV audience, to 
which Truman seems mostly unaware. Much of the joke is that these product placements are 
                                                                                                                                                             
natural and programmed/designed under the assumptions that a) God designed the natural world and b) God’s design 
can have unintended malfunctions. However, I am not operating under these assumptions.  
31 See note 19. 
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anything but subtle, as they harken back to 1950s television’s live-reads, in which sitcom characters 
directly addressed an audience and endorsed a sponsored product. The Truman Show’s layers ensure 
the film spectator sees these advertisements as heavy-handed (in part, because they are for fictional 
products), while the diegetic television audience is apparently susceptible to such advertisements 
about whichTruman is oblivious.  
At the same time, Truman’s gradual enlightenment allows him to eventually sense that, even 
as his world exists in relation to his presence, the target of its address is often outside of his purview. 
We see this during a particularly tense moment for Truman, when his wife abruptly begins a live-
read ad, and Truman gets frustrated before asking her, “What the hell are you talking about? Who 
are you talking to?” For Truman, the realism of his world has malfunctioned, because a sloppy 
implementation of ad convention has allowed this narration to the television audience to be visible 
to those within the diegesis. As we may recall, Jameson’s notion of realism and Fried’s of absorption 
are premised on a fictional world that seems to exist on its own, one designed to seem wholly 
unaware of an extra-diegetic voyeur. For “The Truman Show” television audience, realism entails 
disguising Seahaven’s design so that Truman would believe it to contingent and un-authored. 
Truman’s enlightenment allows him to begin perceiving the narration embedded into the diegesis is 
aimed both at him and those television spectators who rely on Truman as a guarantor for 
plausibility.  
Crucially, we find an almost identical use of layered narration in the way video games 
designers will provide veiled narration to the player within the diegesis when they do not want to 
resort to non-diegetic narration for instruction. Video games often require players to essentially 
study the diegetic world to discern patterns and routines from the vantage point of an external 
narrator. Playing the same level twice, for instance, allows our second playthrough to include 
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omniscient knowledge about what to expect, a dramatic irony that was not present on the first 
playthrough. For example, the player must take note of the consistent routes guards take when 
patrolling a warehouse in Metal Gear Solid (Konami, 1998), or the way a giant beast telegraphs each 
attack consistently in Shadow of the Colossus (Team Ico, 2005). These are details that are effectively 
imperceptible to the diegetic avatar whose knowledge of its future does not match the player’s. The 
point is even that, though many instructive features are plausibly set in the diegetic world, they exist 
to be seen only by the player in role of an external narrator overlooking the game world.  
The result of this dynamic address is that players know to approach game worlds under the 
supposition that the diegesis is implicitly communicating hints about how it operates. At the same 
time, the player takes an active role in scrutinizing the diegesis as if it is meaningful to suss out 
hidden narration. We see Truman taking a similar approach to Seahaven as begins consciously 
observing and investigating the environment for clues to the logic behind the hidden construction. 
Like the video game player, Truman’s instinct is to test the limits of the design and figure out how 
far the design extends in its preparedness for his actions. When Truman begins haphazardly running 
into traffic, driving through a wall of pyrotechnic fire, and charging through a crowd of people, he 
has stopped treating the world as if the consequences were real. Instead he has begun to perceive his 
world within Caillois’ non-serious, play-space or Bordwell’s non-practical aesthetic space. That is to 
say, he begins treating Seahaven like a video game world.  
Like the video game player trying to advance through a puzzling narrative or challenging 
level, Truman begins closely observing and experimenting with his world to understand its hidden 
mechanisms and parameters, and potentially searching for exploits. At one point, Truman asks his 
wife to acknowledge the patterns that no longer appear to him as naturally occurring. After Truman 
correctly predicts the behavior of a few passersby, he turns to his wife: “Don't you want to know 
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how I did that? I’ll tell you. They're on a loop. They go around the block. They come back. They go 
around again. They just go round and round. Round and round.” Truman has taken notice of 
something beyond the glitch or invisible wall. Unlike the glitch, this bit of narration is exposed only 
in Truman’s interpretation and through his new-found mode of perception. We can assume this 
loop—and presumably others being employed within Seahaven—are nothing new, but only now has 
Truman attuned his perception to recognizing them and assigning significance. When stuck in traffic 
a moment later, Truman turns to his wife and says, “Blocked at every turn. Beautifully synchronized, 
don't you agree?” Truman is not marveling at a coincidence, but recognizing the ingenuity of the 
calculated design. 
 In many ways Truman’s playful orientation toward his world is similar to something found 
in films about characters forced to live moments or days over repeatedly, including Groundhog Day 
(1993, Harold Ramis), Source Code (Duncan Jones, 2011) and The Edge of Tomorrow (Doug Liman, 
2014). Part of what makes Truman’s experience distinct from these other films is that Truman’s 
recognition is not only about the lack of practical consequences, but that his world has been 
authored. While the characters in these other films may have missions, they do not attribute the 
details of their respective worlds to the intentionality of an author. Truman’s approach, however, is 
one that acknowledges an author function of Seahaven, which is why his response is to find a space 
to exert his own agency. During his final escape, Truman proves particularly canny in his ability to 
exploit a glitch in the way he is being surveilled by those in the television production crew. In this 
sense, he is formulating the author’s perspective in order to imagine how he, in turn, has been 
conceived in terms of reception.  
In this sense, the film provides a metaphor about authorial agency as Christof’s attempts to 
tighten control over the narrative is a large part of what goads Truman into denying the validity of 
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the author’s intentions. Had Christof left enough gaps, indeterminacy, and contingency within his 
design of Seahaven, Truman may never have recognized the constructed parameters of his world 
and begun to treat his world as a play-space. Christof’s refusal to allow Truman to operate as a co-
author of sorts, eventually backfires. In Christof’s attempts to maintain complete agency, he relies on 
increasingly implausible diegetic actions—causing the sun to rise in the middle of the night and 
providing a sudden rainstorm. Eventually, any illusion of Seahaven’s objective coherency is lost, to 
the point that the Christof eventually speaks to Truman through a direct address in a final deus ex 
machina: taking up the voice of god from the heavens.  
This moment of the designer’s exhausted resources recalls a particular discovery made by 
video game players trying to explore the entirety of the world of Grand Theft Auto III (Rockstar, 
2002). After using something like a glitch to scale past a wall that was designed to be impenetrable, 
the player will find themselves in a courtyard with a sign reading “You werent [sic] supposed to be 
able to get here you know” (Figure 3.2-F) 
 
 
Figure 3.2-F. A diegetic location in GTA:III ostensibly designed to be off-limits to players. 
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This message is not one left by another character. Instead this message has been left by the game’s 
designers for the player who has managed to find it. The game’s designers have, like Christof 
speaking to Truman, abandoned all pretense of concealing their narration with a reflexive direct 
address. The message itself is complex in that it both acknowledges the designer’s inevitable failure 
to maintain absolute agency over reception, yet it is also asserts the designer’s dominion, as if to say, 
“we even thought of this,” with a performative reflexivity reminiscent of The Stanley Parable. Still, 
what we find here is something like Truman’s relationship with Christof, where Truman’s increasing 
efforts to exert narrative agency essentially forces the narration to transform from realism to 
reflexivity. 
Notably, the idea of this reflexive reception comes up when Gombrich uses the phrase “the 
magic circle,” the same phrase that is now identified primarily with Caillois’ notion of play-spaces. 
Like Caillois, Gombrich’s “magic circle” describes the liminal space of reception, however his 
inflection in always associated with a more conscious, participatory role on the part of the beholder. 
In his account of the development of modernism in painting, Gombrich describes how 19th century 
painters strayed from a certain iconicity and representation to the point at which a “new function of 
art emerged.” With the increasing ambiguity and openness within the frame, “the artist gives the 
beholder ‘more to do’, [the artist] draws [the beholder] into the magic circle of creation and allows him 
to experience something of the thrill of ‘making’ which had once been the privilege of the artist.”32 In this 
context, the magic circle is not merely about the experiencing another world; here it seems to further 
imply a need for self-awareness, a sensation of agency stemming from the awareness of process of 
reception. The beholder must be cognizant of the process of creation. 
                                                 
32  Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, 160, my emphasis. Gombrich cites Huizinga 
elsewhere in Art and Illusion, however it is unclear whether Gombrich’s invocation of the term “magic circle” is supposed 
to reference Huizinga. Gombrich’s use is helpful into own right because it refers to the moment of the spectator’s 
awareness of their role. 
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In video games, this outside presence is routinely solicited and engaged in a way that we only 
associate with reflexivity in film narration. When playing narrative video games, we approach these 
worlds as play-spaces, at once apprehending the world reflexively and as immediately real. The 
suggestion I want to consider though is that the way one plays with a video game world and the way 
one experiences a film world are as much a product of the conscious mode of engagement as 
anything related to the media itself. What if “meta-realism,” “reflexivity” and “interaction,” are just 
names for how all sorts of narrative forms can be played?  
The Truman Show is exceptional because it provides two parallel modes of address—one 
leaning toward realism, the other pushing toward reflexivity. In so doing, the film demonstrates how 
meta-realism should not be understood, as Manovich insinuates, as a condition of new media or 
video games, but instead as a playful mode of engaging any fictional world. We could even say that, 
to a large extent, film scholars already approach works of realism akin to designed play-spaces. The 
film scholar already apprehends all fictional worlds through a lens of meta-realism and, 
consequently, our engagement with film already resembles that of the video game player who 
consciously tests boundaries and pushes the limits of possibility from inside and outside the fictional 
world. In our scholarly approaches to the narration in popular Hollywood cinema, our analytical 
readings sustain a recognition of how these film worlds feel as though they are real, while still also 
recognizing how these films worlds are manufactured using conventions, programmed to elicit 
certain experiences. We examine how films are constructed, but also conceive of how spectators 
navigate these spaces.  
In a number of ways, then, Truman and the experimenting video game player find an 
important counterpart in the scholarly film critic analyzing a work of realism. Video game players 
work to discover the rules of a game world by testing the boundaries of the game’s textual branches 
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and probing its iterative possibilities. As critical scholarship wrested agency away from the authority 
of a singular precise meaning, the point was to stop treating the author’s intended world as 
definitive, the text as a given, and instead to embrace the license to interpret freely what the text 
means and how it functions. Like video game players, critics can use the gaps and indeterminacies to 
contribute their own unique play style, which does not necessarily change the underlying game. 
Critics already approach texts and aesthetic objects as games. When scholars perform a close-reading 
of films, we use a combination of the game’s internal rules and our own critical context to decide 
our style of play. The evidence to support our theories of what a text means is harvested from the 
text, but neither the text (nor the author’s intentions) totally structure our interpretations. 
By recognizing film worlds as designed play-spaces, we can more consciously approach films 
like video games. From this approach, filmmakers produce a narrative world are akin to game 
developers, but use the tools of cinema to create an arena to be inhabited by the spectator. 
Spectatorial reception is, in turn, an act of gameplay, one which is both full of infinite interpretations 
and experiences that are delimited by the parameters set forth in films as designed. First and 
foremost, this perspective allows us to note that focusing merely on the film’s address or the 
spectator’s reception fails to think about film as a dynamic, reciprocal experience based on the way 
the spectator navigates the text. We might even call these creative readings “exploits,” as they create 
new ideas and experiences out of others’ authored expressions.
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CHAPTER 4 
Video Games and the Historical World1 
4.1 EXPEREINCES OF THE MOVING IMAGE 
Beginning in the introduction of this dissertation, I have made considered the case for situating 
certain video games within a lineage of certain media encoded with authored expressions. Like books 
containing stories, canvases containing paintings, gramophone records containing musical 
performances, and celluloid film containing movies, video game programs can contain deliberate—
but ultimately functionless—articulations subsequently experienced by beholders. Across all of these 
media, we can consider these to be aesthetic objects because they contain aesthetic expressions 
which can be subsequently experienced as such. Yet there is an important complication that arises 
when considering video games’ relation to film in particular— the photographic image’s ability to 
contain expressions taken from the historical world. 
Famously Benjamin explored the consequences of the photographic images’ ability to excise 
human subjectivity from the process of representing the world: “for the first time, photography 
freed the hand from the most important artistic tasks in the process of pictorial reproduction.”2 In 
theory, this has always been film’s unique power, to document the world and reveal something about 
it hidden in plain sight. This is a quality which is not filtered through an author’s expression, but 
conveyed through to the automatic process of recording and conveyance. While digital film and 
                                                 
1 A version of this chapter was previously published in the open-access journal Wide Screen. See Jedd Hakimi, "Playing 
Los Angeles Itself: Versions of and from the Historical City in La Noire and the"Semi-Documentary" Noir," Wide Screen 
6, no. 1 (2016). 
2 See the second version of “The Work of Art in The Age of Its Technological Reproducibility” in Walter Benjamin, 
Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith, Selected Writings: 1935-1938, vol. 3 (Harvard University Press, 1996), 102. 
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photo-realistic computer graphics stitched into the image certainly complicate our faith in the 
photographic image’s impassive documentation of the world, video games have never been thought 
of in terms of documentation to begin with. Like animation, video games ostensibly arise from 
painting or even literature, in that the world must be subjectively recreated rather than documented 
through recording. One of the principal challenges to creating critical parity between video games 
and film would be, then, their different ontological relationships to the world. In this chapter, 
however, we will consider this idea in further detail and question whether this distinction has been 
exceptionally overestimated.  
4.1.1  “The Most Accurate Version of Los Angeles” 
One of the chief pleasures of playing Team Bondi’s L.A. Noire (2011)—a police-procedural, open-
world3 video game in which the player controls a young detective solving criminal cases in post-war 
Los Angeles—is driving period cars around an ostensibly faithful depiction of 1947 Los Angeles 
complete with impeccably-modeled topography, street layouts, storefronts, and landmarks. It is a 
virtual landscape that is at least precise enough to evoke considerable reverie in the account written 
by journalist Christian Donlan who decided to play the game with his father, himself a native of 
1940’s L.A. and the son of an Angelino beat-cop. Donlan reported that his father was transfixed: 
…the whole experience was actually far more affecting and far more powerful [than we 
expected]. Dad just trailed off, really, lost in the texture of L.A. Noire… surfacing now 
and then to announce a car or a familiar sight. …I remember that restaurant-- Rialto? 
God, that place used to show all the old burlesque stuff. What's the name on that oil pump? 
                                                 
3 “Open-world” video games provide players with a fairly large environment to explore at will. Often these games make 
an effort to avoid restricting the player to a single task or single location during gameplay. 
Hakimi/183 
 
 
…So did my dad find L.A. Noire accurate? Intoxicatingly so…the little details were the 
most affecting, though: the tyre-changing bay outside a gas station, or the wooden crate of 
bottles stacked next to a vending machine…4 
The elder Donlan’s reaction is a testament to L.A. Noire’s environmental designers who were 
reportedly meticulous about the accuracy of their reproduction of the Los Angeles 1947 cityscape, 
drawing on archival material including period maps, photography and film footage.5  One effusive 
press account related that “Team Bondi pored over [archival material]…which provided the 
designers everything from building locations and conditions, public transportation routes, traffic 
patterns—the real arterial structure of a city preserved mostly in film and literature.”6 Donlan 
himself even makes the remarkably sincere claim that “as a result [of LA Noir], gamers will be 
immersed in the most accurate version of 1940s Los Angeles ever created.”7 Donlan is evidently 
overlooking the notion that the “most accurate version…ever created” would more likely be the 
original version of Los Angeles—the version people were “immersed” in because it was where they 
actually resided in 1947.  
Still, poking holes in Donlan’s statement (which, to be fair, may be referring only to video 
games) is far less productive than exploring some of the ambiguous terminology and ideas we rely 
on when referring to how cities are represented through the moving image. After all, what does it 
even mean to create an accurate version of Los Angeles? Within common parlance, designating 
something as a “version” implies that it is one of multiple existing iterations. Maybe, then, 1947 Los 
Angeles only becomes a version of itself—the original or historic version of Los Angeles—only once it is 
                                                 
4 Christian Donlan, "Night and the City,"  http://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2012-10-09-night-and-the-city. 
5 Much of this information was culled from a number of Los Angeles archives including those of the University of 
Southern California and the University of California Los Angeles. See Nathan Marsters, "How Archivists Helped Video 
Game Designers Recreate the City's Dark Side for 'L.A. Noire',"  kcet.org/updaily/socal_focus/history/how-archivists-
helped-video-game-designers-recreate-the-citys-dark-side-in-la-noire-33822.html   
6 Joseph A. Bernstein and Dan Nosowitz, "How L.A. Noire Rebuilt 1940s Los Angeles Using Vintage Extreme Aerial 
Photography,"  popsci.com/technology/article/2011-05/using-extreme-aerial-photography-1920s-rockstar-rebuilt-
1940s-los-angeles-la-noire. 
7 Donlan, "Night and the City". 
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simulated, re-produced, and/or re-presented. We also probably want to avoid implying that the 
historic Los Angeles, a city developed by countless entities over time, was “created” in the same way 
as a representation of the city might be created by an intentional organizing force (e.g. a video game 
manufacturer). Concerning representation, we might also be concerned with assessing the level of 
“accuracy” of a given version. Even if LA Noire had managed to provide players with a photo-
realistic, spatially-precise, video game versions of Los Angeles—something which the game heralds 
the possibility of, even if it may not have accomplished8—it seems impossible to measure the 
“accuracy” of a given version of Los Angeles. 
Consequently, we are left with a series of interrelated questions. How do we compare a 
authored version of a city to the version that we presume to have historically existed? Do we compare 
it to other “versions” we have seen in representations or the traces left in archives and period 
footage? How might, then, a graphically rendered version compare to those countless photographic 
versions of Los Angeles which have served as settings in countless films and television shows? What 
is at stake in LA Noire’s attempt to (re)create a version of a location which has (or had) a real-world 
referent especially in relation to those seemingly parallel versions appearing in live-action television 
shows and movies? Should we assume that a film shot on location in Los Angeles in the period the 
game depicts, something like He Walked by Night (Anthony Mann, 1948), provides a more accurate 
                                                 
8 Besides the current technical and economic constraints that make such a feat impossible, there are those who dispute 
the historical precision of LA Noire for other reasons. In an extended blog post by the website 1947 Project, a website 
dedicated to history of 1947 Los Angeles, Nathan Marsak writes that LA Noire’s “omission of oft-photographed 
…buildings is a bit perplexing.”  He goes one to remark that “[LA] Noire shall then be the introduction for many to the 
wonderful world of 1947 Los Angeles, and as they learn it in its eidetic state, they are going to come away with a view of 
the City at a place in time that is almost, but not quite. If they learn it here first, then, when they subsequently see it 
presented accurately, they'll figure the simulacrum to be the true version.” Nathan Marsak to Nathan’s Blog, April 20, 
2011, http://www.1947project.com/47PplaysLANoire. .  
Further still, LA Noire’s own developers (or, more likely, their attorneys) downplay any expectations of the game’s 
“accuracy” in the legal disclaimer that briefly appears each time the game is loaded: “This videogame is a fictional story 
set in 1940’s Los Angeles. It depicts invented fictionalized historical characters, groups, location, scenes and events in a 
manner that is not historically accurate.” 
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version of Los Angeles precisely because it relies on the city of Los Angeles to supply its own visual 
referent within the diegesis? 
 My motivation for raising these questions is less about trying to determine a hierarchy 
amongst specific texts and forms of representations in terms of accuracy, than it is about 
interrogating broader issues related to the representation, historicity, and visual memory of real- 
world locations that become diegetic worlds through moving image media.  
It is also crucial to acknowledge that because LA Noire specifically depicts Los Angeles, a 
location so frequently visualized already as the center of film production and thus the de facto 
setting for so many movies, it places the game into a fairly robust conversation about distinct 
versions of the city. Thom Andersen’s brilliant video essay Los Angeles Plays Itself (2003) makes it 
eminently clear why Los Angeles in particular has spawned a plethora of prominent critical inquiries 
into the lived city’s relationship with its fictional counterparts. Among these is Mike Davis’ instantly 
canonical book, City of Quartz, in which he points out that Los Angeles is an exceptional city 
precisely because it has been “infinitely envisioned,” which is also what makes uncovering an accurate 
version of the city all that much more elusive.9  In what amounts to Davis’ faint dismissal of 
Baudrillard’s “hyperreal” Los Angeles,10 Davis sardonically insists that “beyond its myriad rhetorics 
and mirages, it can be presumed that the city [of Los Angeles] actually exists.”11 And so, Davis’ 
strategy for recovering some existent Los Angeles requires a thorough reckoning with those 
mythologizing “mirages,” each of which he understands as distinctive “attempts to establish 
authentic epistemologies for Los Angeles.”12 Like the noteworthy projects of Kenneth Anger, Joan 
Didion, Reyner Banham, Michael Sorkin, David Fine and Norm Klein, Davis’ recognizes that 
                                                 
9 Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles, New ed. (London ; New York: Verso, 2006), 23. 
10 See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 12-13. 
11 Davis, Quartz, 23. 
12 Ibid. 
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understanding the idea of Los Angeles inevitably involves a complex dialectic with its many 
collective versions.13 
Within the scope of this chapter, however, Los Angeles is representative of a broader set of 
questions regarding the relationship between a “real-world” city—the original, historic version that, in 
Davis’s terms, we presume “actually exists”—and its assorted visual simulacra. While there has been 
substantial critical attention paid to this phenomenon in film,14 there has been far less consideration 
toward understanding the parallel phenomenon in video games.15 Accordingly, Donlan’s slippage, 
which apparently supplants the lived experience of 1940’s Los Angeles with that of played 
experience of LA Noire’s digital version, provides as good a moment as any to reflect on what it 
means to “accurately” (re)create, (re)present, or document a version of a real-world city in a video 
game. The relevance for exploring this relationship is in part a response to the increasing prevalence 
of video games that use cities from our world as open-world settings—something we see in the 
Rockstar North’s Grand Theft Auto series’ parodic caricatures of New York, Miami, and Los Angeles; 
Bethesda’s Fallout series’ post-apocalyptic Washington DC, Las Vegas, and Boston; and Ubisoft’s 
Assassin’s Creed series’ depiction of a growing number of historical cities including Renaissance 
                                                 
13 See Kenneth Anger, Hollywood Babylon (Phoenix, Ariz.,: Associated Professional Services, 1965); Joan Didion, Slouching 
Towards Bethlehem, vol. 1st Touchstone (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979); Reyner Banham, Los Angeles: The 
Architecture of Four Ecologies (London,: Allen Lane, 1971). Norman M. Klein, The History of Forgetting: Los Angeles and the 
Erasure of Memory (New York;London;: Verso, 1997). David M. Fine, Imagining Los Angeles : A City in Fiction, 1st ed. 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000).See also Charles G. Salas and Michael S. Roth, Looking for Los 
Angeles: Architecture, Film, Photography, and the Urban Landscape, vol. 8 (Los Angeles, CA: Getty Research Institute, 2001); 
Ian Scott, "Filming Los Angeles: History, Hollywood, and the City's Disastrous Imagination," Literature/Film Quarterly 
37, no. 3 (2009). 
14 See various collections of essays including Tony Fitzmaurice and Mark Shiel, Screening the City (London: Verso, 2003); 
Barbara Caroline Mennel, Cities and Cinema, Routledge Critical Introductions to Urbanism and the City (London ; New 
York: Routledge, 2008); Mark Shiel and Tony Fitzmaurice, Cinema and the City: Film and Urban Societies in a Global Context 
(Malden, Mass;Oxford, U.K;: Blackwell Publishers, 2001); Andrew Webber and Emma Wilson, Cities in Transition: The 
Moving Image and the Modern Metropolis (New York;London;: Wallflower Press, 2008). On Los Angeles in particular, see 
previous note. 
15 Perhaps the only substantial and sustained attention comes from Robert Schweizer’s dissertation on video game cities. 
See Robert Thomas Schweizer, "Videogame Cities in Motion" (Dissertation, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2014).  
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Florence, Venice, Rome, revolutionary-era Paris and colonial cities of the Americas.16 As video 
games increasingly render their own versions of historic cities, aiming for some type of “accuracy” 
architecturally, geographically, topographically, historically, or otherwise—it is imperative to reflect 
on how we experience these games and the worlds they create. 
LA Noire may be a somewhat atypical example amongst these open-world city games in that 
it particularly aims to elicit the experience of a historic or “authentic” version of Los Angeles as 
opposed to the parodic, foreshortened, or fantastic renderings featured in the majority of video 
games, as mentioned above. At the same time, because it puts the “infinitely envisaged” Los Angeles 
front and center and relies heavily on cinematic modes of production, cinematic style, and film 
genre, 17LA Noire is also particularly instructive for situating this inquiry within an existing critical 
framework from film studies. While a more comprehensive critical account of LA Noire might 
engage with the noteworthy scholarship on Los Angeles as a city with an exceptional municipal and 
institutional history—especially as it relates to film noir18—or delve into the broader scholarly 
conversation about open-world video games,19 my more narrow aim here is instead to situate LA 
Noire in relation to a particular cinematic tradition of using real-world cities—as places, ideas, and 
phenomenological experiences—within moving images.  
                                                 
16 Rockstar North’s Grand Theft Auto games referenced here include Grand Theft Auto: Vice City (2002), Grand Theft Auto: 
San Andreas (2005), Grand Theft Auto IV (2009), and Grand Theft Auto V (2013). Ubisoft various subsidiaries developed 
Assassin’s Creed games referenced here include AC II (2009), AC Brotherhood (2010), AC III (2012) AC IV: Black Flag 
(2013), AC Unity (2014). Bethesda’s games referenced here are Fallout 3 (2008), Fallout New Vegas (2010) and Fallout 4 
(2015). 
17 In both its production and in its content LA Noire showcases its affiliation to cinema and cinematic history. Beyond 
the game’s overt references to specific films and an arching narrative that evokes film noir, the performances of all the 
actors in the narrative portions of the game were actually filmed on cameras using live actors and motion capture 
technology before they were adapted into the game’s world. 
18 See Nicholas Christopher, Somewhere in the Night: Film Noir and the American City (New York: Free Press, 1997); William 
Hare, L.A. Noir: Nine Dark Visions of the City of Angels (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland, 2004); Alain Silver and James Ursini, 
L.A. Noir: The City as Character (Santa Monica, CA: Santa Monica Press, 2005); Fine, Imagining Los Angeles : A City in 
Fiction. 
19See for instance Steffen P Walz, Toward a Ludic Architecture: The Space of Play and Games (ETC press, 2010); Gordon 
Calleja, In-Game: From Immersion to Incorporation (MIT Press, 2011). 
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On this note we will see that while LA Noire is unabashedly indebted to the film noir and 
neo-noir canon, the game’s tension between fictional narrative and historic versions of the city 
actually pinpoints a more peculiar cinematic lineage—specifically, that of a small cluster of noir-
adjacent films from the post-WWII period known as “semi-documentary” noir films, which are 
fictional narrative films that incorporate documentary features in atypical ways as we shall later see.20 
This connection particularly helps explain LA Noire’s seemingly idiosyncratic decision to choose 
Jules Dassin’s 1947 film The Naked City as the only film it fully adapts into a playable criminal case; 
“idiosyncratic” because The Naked City, as an example of semi-documentary noir, plainly lacks many 
of the more recognizable noire tropes—the “hard-boiled” detective character, the femme fatale, the 
low-key lighting scheme—that appear in other noir films referenced in the game. Moreover, the 
qualities of the semi-documentary noir allow us to recognize a critical framework for understanding 
LA Noire’s ability to signal the possibility of a video game variant of a documentary function. That 
is, following Bill Nichols, if we understand the documentary function to be comprised of images 
that serve as evidence in arguments about the historical world, this project hopes to use LA Noire to 
begin defining a video game documentary function that is both reminiscent of and distinct from that 
the documentary function contained within the photographic form. 
4.1.2 LA or Noir? 
In its very premise as a noir-esque, story-driven video game set in a historically scrupulous depiction 
of Los Angeles, LA Noire maintains certain tensions between contradictory narrative and 
                                                 
20 I say “noir-adjacent” because there is some debate about whether they should even be considered film noir. William 
Park refers to these films as “docu-noirs” but says “only some spirit of inclusiveness would admit them into the noir 
fold.” See William Park, What Is Film Noir? (Lanham, Md;Lewisburg [Pa.];: Bucknell University Press, 2011), 60. More 
discussion on the “semi-documentary” is found later in this chapter. 
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documentary-like ambitions. In its narrative aims, the game wants players to feel as if they are taking 
part in something like an elaborate, self-referential film noir, and thus inhabiting a stylized, resolutely 
fictional version of Los Angeles. At the same time, the game often retains a documentary-like 
ambition to make players feel as though they are navigating eight square miles of a historic version 
of 1947 Los Angeles.21 In terms of the former, the game’s designers are quite explicit in their 
indebtedness to a certain mythical Los Angeles cultivated by Hollywood through those noir films of 
the mid-century, evidenced in explicit namechecks and knowing citations of famous Los Angeles 
based film noir like Double Indemnity (1944), Murder My Sweet (1944), Sunset Boulevard (1950), and Lady 
in the Lake (1947).22 Each of these films are, for instance, included among the games “Gold Film 
Reels” challenge, which, in an obvious break from historical pretense and realism, provide players 
with an optional scavenger hunt for hidden film canisters strewn about the city. The homage to the 
version of Los Angeles of film noir also carries over into the game’s affected dialogue and lingo, 
which recalls those noir books and films of the era. At other times, though, what could be self-
reflexive noir stylization within a post-modern pastiche, might also function as techniques for adding 
realistic detail to the experience of navigating a historic version of Los Angeles. Conceivably, the 
characters’ seemingly stylized mannerisms could just as easily be depictions of 1940’s Angelinos who 
could have modeled and fashion themselves after the film conventions of the period. And, when the 
movie theater marquees around the city display films like Odd Man Out (1947) and The Lady from 
Shanghai (1947), films that certainly could have been on theater marquees at the point when the game 
takes place, these references are as much instances of a “reality effect”—adding non-essential but 
plausible details to diegetic landscape in a manner that provides an air of authenticity—as they are 
                                                 
21 The basic tenets of this tension are already apparent in the way the game presents the option for the player to play the 
game in either the more noir-like black-and-white or in the true-to-life mode of color. 
22 Notably, many of the titles specifically referenced in the game were released after 1947. In this way, they feel more like 
nondiegetic references. 
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winking references to those noir films. The point is that, by recognizing how the LA Noire relies on 
a text like The Lady from Shanghai to serve as both a reflexive citation and realistic historical detail, we 
can begin to understand the implicit tension between the game’s narrative and historic modes of 
experience. 
Essentially LA Noire’s conflicted ambitions reflect two distinct types of gameplay 
corresponding respectively to the fictional or historic versions of Los Angeles. To begin with, the 
fictional, “noir-esque” Los Angeles is expressed during the fairly lengthy, convention-heavy, 
narrative, which is strewn over the course of a couple dozen sequential police department “cases.” 
That is, contrary to the free-form nature of the elder Donlan’s encounter with the game, the central 
narrative of LA Noire puts players in control of Cole Phelps (voiced by and visually modeled after 
Aaron Stanton),23 a young American war veteran slowly working his way up through the ranks of the 
Los Angeles police department as a detective. Phelps is the player’s primary avatar, progressing 
through the game’s narrative by solving the increasingly available cases (many of which are loosely 
based on real-life crimes committed in 1940’s Los Angeles). This is accomplished by driving around 
between relevant locations, exploring crime scenes, collecting clues, inspecting significant objects, 
and interrogating persons of interest.24 While the narrative structure within individual cases provides 
                                                 
23 Aaron Stanton is one of several actors in the game selected from television’s Mad Men period drama (AMC, 2007-
2015). It is a production decision that perhaps aims to tap into a contemporary sense of the American mid-century by 
borrowing associations from other texts. 
24 While somewhat outside the scope of this dissertation, the interrogation sequences are actually paradigmatic 
expressions of the fundamental tension between LA Noire’s desire to provide an experience that is both authentic and 
“fictional” simultaneously. Without going into too much detail, the gameplay relies on closely reading the body language 
and facial expressions of these digital characters to determine a statement’s veracity. Consequently, the developers put a 
tremendous emphasis on utilizing innovative technology to closely capture and reproduce the details of actors’ 
performances in terms of facial expressions and body movements. The justification being that human performance will 
capture something more authentic then a completely fabricated image. In essence, the player is tasked with scrutinizing 
the actor’s performance, which has been translated into a digital animation, in order to determine the veracity of the 
character’s statements. The irony is, of course, that, in performing as a character, the actor is essentially always “lying” no 
matter how accurately they have been rendered. For an account of the technology. See Leigh Alexander, "L.A. Noire 
Debuts New Animation Capture Solution from Depth Analysis,"  
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some room for variation depending on a player’s actions and decisions, the larger trajectory of the 
narrative is entirely fixed.25 For instance, if a player misses enough clues or makes enough wrong 
decisions, the principal consequence is that the case must be re-played from the beginning in order 
to receive more cases and, thus, progress the narrative. 
It is crucial to recognize that the version of the city players encounters during this narrative 
mode of gameplay is the one brought to them through the scripted, pre-coded arrangement. Every 
characterization, every significant location, every line of dialogue, was thoughtfully composed to 
convey a particular segment of the city, one that the designers have principally constructed to feel 
reminiscent of film noir. Accordingly, within LA Noire, the narrative mode of gameplay often 
explicitly relies on cinematic narration, chiefly through a tremendous amount of “cut-scenes” 
(expository cinematic sequences during which players has no control), to relay its central story. 
These are sequences that particularly use conventional (although probably more “contemporary” 
than “classical”) cinematic techniques of narration including continuity editing—complete with 
establishing shots, general adherence to the 180-degree rule, and shot-reverse shots—along with a 
variation of camera angles, shot distances, and camera movements. Moreover, while such a mode of 
narration would be largely “invisible” in movies or television, within LA Noire these cut-scenes are 
often acutely foregrounded as movielike through excessive narrational devices like a gratuitous 
“letterbox” style matte which masks the top and bottom of the frame—implying an aspect ratio that 
is cinematic simply because it is relatively wider than gameplay sequences in which players maintain 
                                                                                                                                                             
gamasutra.com/view/news/27492/LA_Noire_Debuts_New_Animation_Capture_Solution_From_Depth_Analysis.php
. 
25 This narrative structure, in which periods of player agency are contained in between moments of narrative 
progression, is akin to what Epsen Aarseth described metaphorically as a “string of pearls”: “Within each pearl (or 
microworld) there is plenty of choice but on the level of the string there is no choice at all.” See Aarseth’s "Quest Games 
as Post-Narrative Discourse" in Ryan, Narrative across Media : The Languages of Storytelling, 361-77. 
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control over Phelps—constantly shifting camera angles, and disproportionately fast editing. These 
stylistic excessive or marked cut-scenes primarily occur at moments of lengthy exposition, like the 
beginning or end of cases. In these moments, players are decidedly relegated to role of spectators. In 
fact, it is also during these sequences that we might say that we encounter an unambiguously 
fictional, stylized version of Los Angeles. 
Notably, however, the game also utilizes cinematic narration in a more subtle manner during 
gameplay through unmarked cut-scenes designed to remain mostly inconspicuous to players. As such, 
the unmarked cut-scenes refrain from stylistic flourishes like letterbox mattes and excessive camera 
movement, and instead they utilize cinematic narration more economically, in a manner motivated 
by immediate narrative goals in game scenarios, for much shorter periods of time. We might say that 
these unmarked cut-scenes are embedded moments of cinematic narration that are supposed to feel 
as though they occur as a direct result of players’ input, thus concealing the fact that they do not 
actually maintain continuous agency over the synchronal narration. For example, during an 
interrogation scene players could direct Phelps to approach a suspect, and, when close enough, they 
can instruct Phelps to begin a conversation. In the following moment of the game’s narration, an 
unmarked cut-scene will occur, and the game seamlessly cuts to a reverse angle that frames Phelps as 
he sits down in a chair across from the suspect. Players did not instruct the movement into the chair 
so much as they provided the primary directive to “interact,” at which point the game responded 
with the unmarked cinematic narration showing Phelps sitting down and opening up his notepad. 
Further still, during the ensuing conversation, the game’s perspective might shift from moments 
awaiting players’ input, to a more cinematic shot-reverse shot based on the direction of the 
conversation as guided by players. While the dialogue’s general flow may result from players’ inputs, 
they lacks any synchronal control over the specifics of the narration—the dialogue, the editing, the 
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camera placement—during the majority of the exchange. That is to say, despite being a kind of 
hypertext, the specifics of both the narrative and the narration are all tightly scripted ahead of time.  
The mixture of marked and unmarked cut-scenes demonstrates how the narrative mode of 
gameplay explicitly and implicitly relies on a tremendous amount of cinematic narration. Thus 
players experience a particular, perhaps familiar characterization of the city, one stylized to feel like 
the setting of a fictional noir; it is the fictional version of Los Angles that “feels like a movie.” 
Alternatively, when players evade the central storyline and related scripted sequences, players are 
provided a significantly greater level of narrational agency. In this mode of gameplay, players avoid 
narrative version of the city, one that is curated to provide a particular story, and encounters a 
categorically distinct version of the city. To understand the distinction, it might be helpful to take a 
closer look at the first moment of an initial playthrough of the game, in which LA Noire essentially 
switches between the distinct modes of gameplay/narration, and the game cuts from its opening 
cinematic montage—a marked cut-scene (Figure 4.1-A)—to a high angle perspective directly behind 
the police cruiser containing Phelps where players takes over control (Figure 4.1-B). As with the 
countless subsequent instances in which narrational agency will be transferred to players, the game 
cuts to a third-person, high angle perspective that centers Phelps in relation to the world 
immediately in front of him, and the letterboxed mattes quickly recede out of the frame, to provide 
an aspect ratio that fills the entire screen. In concert, a non-diegetic “heads-up display”26 showing a 
small circular street map of the avatar’s immediate vicinity in Los Angeles appears in the lower left 
corner of the frame along with some non-diegetic instructions for players. It is a conventionally 
familiar way for video games to communicate to players that they now controls both the avatar’s 
                                                 
26 A “Heads-up Display,” or HUD, is essentially an image that overlays (or frames) the primary world image and 
provides information to the player without forcing their perspective to change. It is common for HUDs to tell the player 
how much “life” a character has left or how many seconds the player has to complete a level. 
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spatial location and the perspectival view—or camera—in the world.27 With this shift, comes a 
marked change of players’ relationship to the diegetic world. 
 
Figure 4.1-A. Shots from the “marked” cut-scene before players have any agency 
 
Figure 4.1-B. The perspective at the moment when players first have control over Phelps 
 
 
In contrast to the cinematic narration’s variation in shot-distances, editing, and camera 
mobility, in this mode, players now maintain significant agency over the game’s narration (albeit a 
                                                 
27 In Alexander Galloway’s terms, the game is switching from a mode of narration that only includes “diegetic machine 
acts,” to a mode that includes both “diegetic machine acts” and “diegetic player acts.” See Galloway, Gaming Essays on 
Algorithmic Culture. The “HUD” (see previous note), meanwhile, represents a kind of non-diegetic communication 
between the machine and the player. 
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narration that is procedurally limited in relation to the avatar). As evidenced in Donlan’s account, 
players can now eschew the central narrative altogether and instead direct the avatar to explore the 
extended 1940’s Los Angeles terrain. Outside the confines of the story arc, the motivation to 
investigate the city is not necessarily tied to solving a crime or completing a specific, structured task; 
instead, players maintain the possibility of experiencing a version of the city that mostly lacks a 
frame that charges the city and its locations with a particular noir-esque sentiment. This version of 
Los Angeles is mostly presented without the variations in shot-distances, editing, and camera 
mobility outside of those controlled by players in relation to Phelps. This version of the city is 
encountered based on the whims of players who control both the avatar’s spatial location and 
perspectival view of the city. In this mode, players can walk or drive around at their leisure, taking in 
the sights and exploring locations like a time-travelling flaneur. Players can, for instance, linger in the 
interstitial spaces and admire views of the city, spaces which fall outside the narrative framework but 
resonate with a lived experience of the city.  
In this open mode of gameplay, Los Angeles is mostly devoid of those narrative aspects that 
present a stylized, imagined, and mythic version of the city, and we instead encounter a version of 
Los Angeles more like the one experienced by Donlan—a historic version of the city that can 
somehow be described with the terms “real,” “authentic,” and “accurate.” While these are all very 
problematic terms, to better understand the experiences elicited by LA Noire’s alternating modes of 
narration it is helpful to recognize the game’s affinity with a specific cinematic lineage, the semi-
documentary, which, like LA Noire is torn between narrative and historic versions of cities.  
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4.1.3  “This is the City as it is” 
There are a few superficial explanations of LA Noire’s decision to adapt The Naked City as a stand-
alone case in the game.28 For one thing, the game and the film are each set in 1947, and, 
consequently they both choose to underscore the same moment in US history when young 
American veterans came back from WWII to a more cynical home front. Also, one of the film’s 
detectives, James Halloran, greatly resembles LA Noire’s Phelps in a number of ways: they are both 
are young, straight-laced veterans, family men, and novice detectives, and they even look alike. 
However, focusing on these superficial resonances largely misses the point of what makes The Naked 
City an atypical film, and, therefore, what makes LA Noire’s adaptation of the film so peculiar and 
suggestive. The fact is that the main plotline The Naked City is somewhat forgettable. What actually 
makes the film unique and interesting is its essential relationship to New York City where it was set 
and filmed. This point is explicitly emphasized by the film’s producer and narrator, Mark Hellinger, 
during the opening voice-over narration which runs over aerial shots of the city: 
Ladies and gentlemen the motion picture you are about to see is called The Naked City. 
…And I may as well tell you frankly that it’s a bit different from most films you've ever 
seen. …As you see, we're flying over an island. A city. A particular city. And this is a story 
of a number of people—and a story also of the city itself. It was not photographed in a 
studio. Quite the contrary… [the] actors... played out their roles on the streets, in the 
apartment houses, in the skyscrapers of New York itself. And along with them, a great 
many thousand New Yorkers played out their roles also. This is the city as it is.  
From the outset, the film openly insists that its images should not be apprehended in typical fictional 
terms, as the version of the city it is depicting, it contends, is not a fictional version. Like the tabloid 
                                                 
28 The game’s version of the case follows the general details of the crime of the film almost beat-for-beat: after a young 
in-store dress model is found dead in a bathtub, the detectives find out the victim was secretly working with her 
coworker’s fiancé to burglarize the rich friends of a love-struck doctor, before she was eventually murdered by a hired 
goon in an effort to cover up the crimes. According to players’ testimonials “The Naked City” case is possibly the 
longest in duration of the dozens of plotlines in the game. See lanoire.wikia.com/wiki/The_Naked_City 
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photographer Weegee’s infamous book of candid street photography, Naked City,29 which provided 
both the title and certain inspiration for the film, Hellinger and Dassin’s decision to take the film out 
of the studio set and shoot the film almost entirely on location is part of a rhetoric of authenticity. 
They are selling a notion that they are capturing “the city as it is,” rather than the creating another 
fictional version like those found in “most films.”30 And, what Edward Dimendberg describes as the 
film’s “insistence on apprehending an unmediated and architectural reality,”31 is essentially a mode 
of narration that asserts the film’s ability to capture a genuine, authentic, real, original version of 
New York City. The city which we will see captured visually, the film claims, is the historic version 
of the city, the same city that could be found in a non-fiction, documentary film.  
Notably, The Naked City was not the only noir-age film with a tendency to use certain 
documentary rhetoric to elicit a sense of authenticity within a narrative film. According to film 
scholar William Lafferty, the film can be included amongst other “semi-documentary” noir films, 
such as Henry Hathway’s The House on 92nd Street (1945) and Call Northside 777 (1947), Anthony 
Mann’s T-Men (1947) and He Walked by Night (1948), and Dassin’s own Night and the City (1950), each 
of which distinctly highlight their relationship to some combination of real events and/or real 
locations through documentary film conventions.32 More importantly here, as in LA Noire, the 
distinct modes of narration within the semi-documentary noir film similarly express certain tensions 
between their narrative and documentary ambitions. 
                                                 
29 Weegee, Naked City (New York: Da Capo Press, 1975). 
30 Edward Dimendberg, Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004), 50-53. 
31 Ibid., 41-43. 
32 William Lafferty has pointed out that the term “semi-documentary” is used by film historians and popular critics to 
refer to a cluster of American films from the mid-to-late 1940’s. Lafferty points out that the term was used regularly in 
newspapers from the time to describe films characterized by “the topicality of the subject matter, reliance upon ‘location’ 
shooting, and particularly, the influence of one producer, [Louis] de Rochemont, and one studio, Twentieth Century-
Fox.” William Lafferty, "A Reappraisal of the Semi-Documentary in Hollywood, 1945-1948," Velvet Light Trap, no. 20 
(1983): 24. Also see Randal Clark, "This Is Not: Falseness in Documentary Cinema," in Trompe( - )L'oeil : Imitation & 
Falsification, ed. Philippe; Aïssatou Sy-Wonyu Romanski (Mont-Saint-Aignan: Publications de l'Université de Rouen, 
2002), 341-58. 
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Most scholars characterize the significant driving forces behind the semi-documentary noir 
films to be the prominent producers Louis de Rochemont and Mark Hellinger, who both brought a 
certain investment in the journalistic notion of capturing the world rather than representing it. 
Rochemont was an Academy Award-winning documentarian who had previously co-created the 
widely seen 1930’s series of newsreels, The March of Time, and Hellinger was an immensely popular 
newspaper columnist in New York City prior to producing films. It is no wonder, then, that one of 
the documentary conventions routinely exhibited in these films is the “voice of god” narrator who 
often directly addresses the audience in an instructive or informational tone so reminiscent of the 
newsreels of the era. Further, when this spoken narration is present, the semi-documentary noir 
films essentially operate in a conventional expository documentary mode with a voiceover providing 
a contextual description of non-narrative sequences that would otherwise fall outside classical 
continuity editing.  
Like LA Noire, however, these films seem torn between relaying a plotted story using formal 
conventions of narrative cinema and establishing the veracity of their settings. As in the concurrent 
Italian neorealist films, the semi-documentary noir films are shot on location, include non-
professional actors, and demonstrate an interest in the quotidian happenings of urban residents.33 
However, unlike the Italian neorealist films, these features remain in the relative periphery because 
the “semi-documentary” noir films inevitably include a central criminal investigation. Looking a bit 
                                                 
33 Randal Clark argues that the semi-documentary was Hollywood’s “response” to Italian neorealism. Clark, "This Is 
Not: Falseness in Documentary Cinema," 341-42. However, arguing that the “semi-documentary” was a “response” is 
misleading considering the fact that these films were essentially developed concurrently to those films commonly 
classified as Italian neorealism. Lafferty additionally makes the points that neorealism did not invent “location shooting 
[which dates] from the commercial birth of the medium,” and, further, that the American “emphasis upon location [in 
the semi-documentary films] seems to have arisen out of economic necessity during the mid-to-late 1940s.” Lafferty, "A 
Reappraisal of the Semi-Documentary in Hollywood, 1945-1948," 24, 25-27. (Hyphenate altered slightly.) 
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more closely at what is often cited as the first semi-documentary noir film, Hathaway’s The House on 
92nd Street, provides a helpful illustration of this phenomena.  
In an attempt to fuse an apparently historical account of the FBI’s uncovering of a Nazi spy 
ring operating out of Manhattan with a filmic style of the period, The House on 92nd Street includes 
sequences of non-narrative, silently-filmed documentary footage, which plays underneath the 
confident voice of an anonymous narrator who explains narrative portions shot in a style more 
reminiscent of a typical film noir. 34 The “documentary” footage is stylistically distinct, looking more 
like a form found more often in social issue informational films from the era.35  One reason for this, 
according to the American Film Institute’s catalogue entry for the film, is that much of the 
documentary portions were taken directly from the FBI’s “photographic files,” which seems to have 
included what amounts to b-roll footage of daily work within the FBI and what is purportedly FBI 
surveillance footage of the German embassy during WWII.36 In one telling sequence, which includes 
the FBI footage, the film cuts from a distinctly professionally framed, exterior, medium shot of a 
window with a camera peeking through noir-esque, venetian blinds, to a reverse  shot (ostensibly 
point-of-view) of surveillance footage, with a markedly different style and quality, that shows a Nazi 
flag waving outside a building we are told is the German embassy. The ensuing, nearly two-minute 
montage of surveillance footage shows people walking to and from the building, each with a similar 
                                                 
34 This point is made by R. Barton Palmer who argues that these films “[follow] long-accepted documentary protocols, 
sequences shot silent are explained by the self-assured and omniscient narrator. R. Barton Palmer, "Crime Fiction and 
Film Noir," in A Companion to Film Noir, ed. Andrew Spicer and Helen Hanson (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 
134.    However, I disagree with Palmer’s claim that even the narrative portions of the film have “a neutral, unglamorized 
visual style [that] attests to the film's accurate reenactment of the official response to the discovered threat.” Ibid. 
35 For more on these types of films, see Arch A Mercey, "Social Uses of the Motion Picture," The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 250 (1947). 
36 The AFI entry underscores the FBI’s cooperation in its aim to produce a candid view of an otherwise clandestine 
realm: “Numerous contemporary sources note that J. Edgar Hoover gave approval for the film's production…. 
According to a studio press release, the Bureau's cooperation included providing the production crew with a special 
surveillance vehicle from which they could film street scenes on location in New York City without attracting a crowd.” 
American Film Institute, P.K. Hanson, and A. Dunkleberger, "Afi: American Film Institute Catalog of Motion Pictures 
Produced in the United States : Feature Films 1941-1950 Indexes," (University of California Press, 1999), 1100. 
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amateurish quality—readjusting focus, off-center subjects, jump cuts—as the narrator dramatically 
explains to the audience that “these are the actual films taken by the FBI.” (Figure 4.1-C)  
 
Figure 4.1-C. Shots cutting between fictional footage and actual FBI surveillance footage 
The House on 92nd Street initiates a trend found in the semi-documentary noir films that work to 
establish the veracity of their narrative worlds by interspersing sequences that retain the experiential 
affective qualities of a non-fictional, documentary tradition. Merging together what is essentially a 
reenactment with archival footage is not an unusual practice in documentary film, but it is certainly 
much more unusual to have extended documentary sequences edited into narrative films. Yet, this is 
something we find again and again with these films; both Call Northside 777 and T-Men employ actual 
newsreels to set up their narratives.  
At the same time, the documentary portions in these films often seem somewhat extraneous 
to their central narratives—providing, say, superfluous details of the FBI’s fingerprinting 
identification process or minutiae about one-way mirrors. The point seems to be less about 
confusing the narrative footage with the documentary footage, and more about bolstering the 
credibility of the central narrative by associating it with the primary sources of non-fictional, non-
narrative footage. The implicit argument is that documentary aspects of the films maintain their 
non-fictional status despite their associations with narrative portions. Meanwhile, the narrative 
portions should gain a sense of veracity from the documentary portions. This rhetoric is further 
expressed in the way these semi-documentary noir films frequently provide shots that include deep-
spaces or significant landscapes which showcase environments virtually impossible to replicate in a 
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studio at the time. In The Naked City, for instance, the detectives conduct a quick interview atop a 
skyscraper mid-construction, surrounded by New York’s downtown skyline. In Call Northside 777, 
long shots of Jimmy Stewart frame him from a distance walking through a massive panoptic prison 
complex. Even if the particular scenery is not immediately identifiable to the general viewer, the 
films implicitly corroborate the idea that the narratives take place in the “real” world, the world that 
the spectator exists in. 
On one hand, one might argue that the non-fictional rhetoric of the semi-documentary noir 
films are yet another in a line of techniques used to establish a sense of realism. Following this idea, 
the semi-documentary noir—as in Bill Nichols account of neorealism—would “retain the fictional 
quality of a metaphor: it presents a world like the historical world and asks that we view it, and 
experience the viewing of it, like the viewing, and experience of history itself.”37 The “like” in this 
statement is important here because it categorically distinguishes the semi-documentary noir from 
the documentary form, the latter which removes the “like” as it asks that we view its form as a 
history itself. If the semi-documentary noir’s rhetoric merely asks us to view its world like the 
historic world, then it should be understood like other fictional narrative films shot on location, in 
which a real world location “plays itself,” asking us to suspend our cognitive dissonance about the 
setting and to experience the world of the film effectively—and affectively—as a metaphor of our 
world, like our world. From this perspective, the use of location shooting and documentary rhetoric 
only works to reduce the amount we need to suspend our disbelief for this process.  
On the other hand, perhaps we can argue that the semi-documentary noir film’s rhetoric 
retains certain documentary aspects and such a suspension of disbelief is not even necessary. That is, 
perhaps its rhetoric claims not to represent a version of our world, but instead to capture and 
                                                 
37 Bill Nichols, Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 170. 
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document aspects of the historical world we live in. This is an essential part of how the documentary 
film is experienced differently from the fictional film. If the fictional image has the “quality of a 
metaphor” in being like the world, the documentary image somehow retains the affective quality of 
the original, being the world. (This is not to say that the documentary image can present reality, only 
that it retains the “quality” of something real in our affective experience. Whether or not it should—
an issue that comes up for Baudrillard and others—is a different question.) That is to say, the 
documentary image functions as a trace of reality, instead of a mere representation.  
Consider the idea that semi-documentary noir films—and perhaps even LA Noire—do not 
merely use the documentary form in the service of realism, but in their split modes of narration they 
manage to maintain certain documentary functions within their texts. To make such an argument we 
can look to the way that these texts privilege the documentation of their real-world locations over 
their narratives. The cities foregrounded in these works are not merely “playing versions of 
themselves” (as Andersen might phrase it), they are also consciously working to document the city 
in the same manner as a documentary film might. In these works, capturing and relaying the 
truthfulness of an experience, often the experience of a particular city, is effectively privileged over 
any individual story. One version of this comes in the consistent trend amongst the semi-
documentary noir films to begin with an opening spoken narration, which foregrounds its ability to 
reveal a city in an account that is supposed to seem honest and raw, often running over a montage 
of establishing shots of skylines and aerial, birds-eye-views of the urban grid. In these mythologizing 
introductions, the semi-documentary noir films exhibit their unabashed willingness to depict the 
setting as a character unto itself. He Walked by Night, for example, begins with a grandiose 
introduction to Los Angeles: 
This is Los Angeles. Our Lady, the Queen of the Angels, as the Spaniards named her. The 
fastest growing city in the nation. It's been called a bunch of suburbs in search of a city. And 
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it's been called the glamour capital of the world. A Mecca for tourists, a stopover for 
transients, a target for gangsters, a haven for those fleeing from winter, a home for the 
hardworking. It is a city holding the hopes and dreams of over two million people… 
In Call Northside 777, we get a parallel overture, this time for Chicago: 
In the year 1871 the great fire nearly destroyed Chicago. But out of the ashes of that 
catastrophe rose a new Chicago—a city of brick and brawn, concrete and guts with a short 
history of violence beating in its pulse… 
In fact, all of these opening voiceovers spend most of their time setting up their locations without 
expending nearly as much time setting up their central narrative.  
Following in the tradition of the semi-documentary noir film, LA Noire likewise introduces 
its narrative with a non-diegetic voiceover narration running over a montage of quotidian scenes 
from around the city.  
The city on the verge of greatness. A new type of city, based not on the man, but on the 
automobile. The car, symbol of freedom and vitality. Where every man can own his own home 
and have room to breathe and not be overlooked by his neighbors.... A city of opportunists. 
A city of dreams where Hollywood will shape the thoughts and desires of the entire planet. 
…A city of undercurrents, where not everything is as it seems. A twentieth century city that 
will become a model for the world. A city that has no boundaries, that will stretch as far as 
the eye can see. 
It is a montage that specifically foregrounds its location, Los Angeles, as the central object of 
interest, instead of introducing the game’s central characters and forthcoming story in any 
comprehensive way. In LA Noire’s opening montage, we see ordinary scenes including a man closing 
on a deal before driving off a lot with a new car, a uniformed police officer (soon to be identified as 
our protagonist and primary avatar, Cole Phelps) getting a kiss from his wife on his way out to work, 
a professor-like figure lecturing at a university, a film crew working on a movie, and a busy street 
where a massive building is under construction. In fact, the general strategy of LA Noire’s opening 
tableau of city scenes directly echoes The Naked City’s own opening montage, which similarly begins 
with an assortment of seemingly quotidian moments plucked from around the city, some of which 
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will be retrospectively relevant to the forthcoming plot and others which just express the range of 
experiences occurring simultaneously in the city. In both, the montage recognizes the multitudes of 
storylines the city contains at any given moment, too many to possibly represent within the confines 
of a film or game. What we understand on some level is that the plot we are about to experience is 
just one amongst countless plotlines existing simultaneously in the city. Actually, this notion is made 
quite explicit in The Naked City: after its montage of quotidian scenes from New York has come to 
a close and the opening aerial shots of Manhattan fade into a darkened but level shot of the city 
skyline, Hellinger’s voiceover states that the film will “begin [its] story this way” —the point of 
insertion, the particular narrative, was chosen somewhat arbitrarily from countless other possibilities 
for expressing the primary subject matter, that of New York City itself. In this way, LA Noire and 
The Naked City subjugate the narrative occurrences to the primary city setting—a point reiterated 
with The Naked City’s famous final voiceover: “there are eight million stories in the naked city—this 
has been one of them.”  
This idea may also help explain another key reason that The Naked City’s narrative is so 
amenable to being adapted into a case in LA Noire. The particular plotlines in the semi-documentary 
noir film are, in a sense, iterative and replaceable, which is one reason that Tom Gunning is more 
likely to characterize them as “police-procedurals” instead as examples of film noir.38 The point is 
that unlike like a more typical example of film noir which might rely on the distinctive methods of a 
                                                 
38 Tom Gunning and others are more likely to refer to these films as police-procedurals then film noir. In reference to 
He Walked by Night and The Naked City, Gunning explains that that these “police-centered films often adopted a semi-
documentary style that characterizes the series known as the police procedural, as opposed to the more expressionist 
treatment of crimes of passion and femme fatales found in…earlier film noirs” Tom Gunning, "Invisible Cities, Visible 
Cinema: Illuminating Shadows in Late Film Noir," in Tom Gunning, "Invisible Cities, Visible Cinema: Illuminating 
Shadows in Late Film Noir," in Cinematicity in Media History, ed. Jeffrey; Littau Geiger, Karin (Edinburgh, GB: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013), 161-62.  
Also, the idea of “procedurality,” which is an important part of how video games have been understood by Ian Bogost, 
helps express a kind of rules-based formula that these films follow. See Bogost, Persuasive Games : The Expressive Power of 
Videogames. 
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singular detective, The Naked City depicts the systematic process of the investigation, following a 
formula we know today as the “police procedural.” Consequently, the attention to procedure in The 
Naked City allows the causal chain of events to be converted fairly seamlessly into LA Noire’s 
gameplay. That is to say, the methodical steps of investigation in the film—examining the body, 
searching for evidence at crime scenes, interviewing and re-interviewing suspects—also comprise the 
bulk of LA Noire’s gameplay within the narrative. Consequently, the more bureaucratic, procedural 
elements of The Naked City, those which distinguish it from more paradigmatic examples of film 
noir, are also amenable to the vernacular of the iterative cases in LA Noire. Likewise, it makes sense 
that both The Naked City and He Walked by Night inspired police procedural television shows with a 
tremendous amount of location-shooting in New York and Los Angeles—The Naked City (1958-
1963) and Dragnet (1951-1959) respectively. The semi-documentary noir style was well-suited to the 
episodic structure of television in which the individual plotlines are essentially iterative.39 It is also 
something we see again in LA Noire’s many “cases” which, too, are repetitive formulas in which the 
variables are expendable, but the project to depict the city “as it really is” remains constant.  
The choice to elevate the city over the individual narrative, in a way that the narrative merely 
adds to the “cross-section of a day in the life,” is also what allows Edward Dimendberg to link the 
montage portions of The Naked City directly to the tradition of “city symphony films,”40 a group of 
non-narrative films from the 1920’s and early 1930’s, which illustrate the day-in-the-life of particular 
cities through thematic montages of scenes from those cities. Making the association is crucial 
                                                 
39 Jack Webb, the creator and star of Dragnet apparently hatched the idea for the show while working on the production 
of He Walked by Night. Much of the film’s style provided inspiration for the show. See Michael J. Hayde, My Name's 
Friday : The Unauthorized but True Story of Dragnet and the Films of Jack Webb (Nashville, Tenn.: Cumberland House, 2001), 
20. 
40 Dimendberg, Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity, 59.Some of the films include Berlin: Symphony of a Great City (Hans 
Richter, 1927), Manhatta (1921), Études Sur Paris (1928), São Paulo, Sinfonia da Metrópole (1929), À Propos de Nice (Jean Vigo, 
1930), and A Bronx Morning (1931). Bill Nichols sees the city symphony films as a documentary of the city by way of the 
“modernist avant-garde of the 1920’s.” Bill Nichols, "Documentary Film and the Modernist Avant-Garde," Critical 
Inquiry 27, no. 4 (2001): 580, 91. 
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because the city symphony films themselves demonstrate how documentary functions can essentially 
operate outside a traditional documentary format. Bill Nichols describes city symphony films as 
those that “imaginatively reconstruct the look of the world with images, or shots, taken of this 
world…[beginning] with images of a recognizable reality in order to transform it.”41 In this way, city 
symphony films function as hybrid forms that invite viewers to experience their cities from 
unexpected or inventive perspectives. More importantly, they do so by utilizing images that maintain 
their historical connection to the world of the viewer—the images never become metaphorical and 
are never fictionalized. That is, the version of the world presented in the city symphony film 
functionally remains a version of our historical world—not a version like the historical world, as in 
neorealism—even as it is aesthetically transformed through the radical form. Perhaps, then, the 
semi-documentary noir film and LA Noire are doing something quite similar. That is, by combining 
documentary and fictional forms, could we say that the semi-documentary noir films and LA Noire 
functionally aim to present a version of the historical world back to us in spite of their fictional 
elements?   
To consider this idea, we need to clarify the distinction between experiencing an image 
within either a documentary or a fictional context. And, to do so, it is essential to turn to Bill 
Nichols as an authority on the documentary form. Nichols makes the following point: 
Documentary evidence is … distinct, less because it is of an entirely different order from 
similar historical evidence in the fictional film (the authentic firearms, waistcoats, and wall 
hangings in a period film, for example), but because the evidence no longer serves the needs of 
the narrative as such. Documentary evidence is not a touch of the historically real used to 
embellish a world. It is not an element deployed and motivated according to the requirements 
of narrative coherence. Instead documentary evidence refers us to the world and supports an 
argument about that world directly. (It is still a representation but not a fictional one.) 
…[E]vidence of and from the historical world may appear in either fiction or documentary 
                                                 
41 Nichols, "Documentary Film and the Modernist Avant-Garde," 596. 
Hakimi/207 
 
 
film and may have the same existential bond to the world to the world in both. In [fiction] it 
supports a narrative; in the [documentary] is supports an argument.42 
We might say that the semi-documentary films and LA Noire attempt to challenge the relative 
mutual exclusivity of the fictional and documentary films in relation to evidence. In their dual modes 
of narration, the settings support the narrative, but more importantly the settings also make 
arguments concerning the authentic versions of the cities. The implicit argument made by the semi-
documentary noir films and LA Noire, whether perceived consciously or not, is that even if the 
individual narratives are fictional, the settings they take place in are real. If anything, the narratives 
are replaceable, and they either function extraneously alongside the city setting or as helpful 
structural devices for relaying a cross-section view of the city. In this way, these texts work to 
present a version of the world that is not just like our world, but, in preserving a documentary 
function, presents a version that affectively retains the quality of our historic world. These images 
retain the status as an argument about the historical version of the world despite their relation to the 
fictional form. 
4.2 RENDERING FUNCTIONS 
4.2.1 “The Slightly Uncomfortable Space” 
Even as we recognize resonances between LA Noire and the semi-documentary noir film, it is still 
important to not ignore some fundamental formal distinctions between these texts. In Nichols’ 
formulation, what counts as “evidence of and from the historical world,” relies heavily on what he 
sees as the photographic image’s “existential bond to the world.” That is, for Nichols, the 
documentary function in cinema relies on the camera’s implicit ability— filmic image’s “indexical 
                                                 
42Nichols, Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary, 116. My italics. 
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quality,” as it is often called—to accurately trace what appears in front of its filming eye so that the 
testimony about the historical world is fundamentally underwritten by the photographic images’ 
primary link with the world. Although notions of the photographic image’s indexical bond have 
been challenged in film scholarship43 and/or superseded by the prevalence of digital photography, 
Photoshop, and CGI (which, arguably, have turned the filmic image into a mediated graphic 
image),44 we can acknowledge that the documentary image’s truth claims have not gone entirely 
extinct. In the law, in our personal lives, and in our social relations, the filmed image is still 
experienced and functions as “evidence of and from” something that occurred in our historical 
world; this is likely because we have not completely lost faith in the photographic form’s ability 
record historical reality in some fashion. In other words, it is plausible to assume that truth claims of 
the documentary image hinge, at least in part, on a continued belief in filmic indexicality. 
Consequently, film’s indexical quality, then, seemingly provides an ontological distinction between 
the filmed image and the graphic image, the latter which is considered a mediated, more suspect 
secondary account of the historical world. Such an understanding, however, potentially precludes a 
game like LA Noire from seemingly ever maintaining a documentary function, in spite of the game’s 
possible resonance with a documentary form.  
                                                 
43 The argument that position the photographic image as exceptional for its indexical qualities often stems interpretation 
of the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce and/or certain readings of Andre Bazin. For more on this see Tom 
Gunning, "Moving Away from the Index: Cinema and the Impression of Reality," differences 18, no. 1 (2007). Also see 
Charles S. Peirce and James Hoopes, Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1991). 
44 Lev Manovich argues that film in the age of the digital image, the photograph has lost its “privileged indexical 
relationship to pro-filmic reality” because of its pixilated materiality, a form which does not distinguish an artificial origin 
from a pro-filmic origin. He goes further to argue that “cinema can no longer be clearly distinguished from animation” 
and “has become a sub-genre of painting. This is similar to a point made by Bill Nichols. See Manovich, Language, 254. 
Also see Nichols, Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary, 149-55. My point is simply that even the filmic 
image is suspect, it still functionally treated as a document recording historic reality which gains credibility from the 
indexical quality of the photographic image. 
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As the argument would go, the computer-generated images in a video game like LA Noire 
should not be equated with those from a live-action film like The Naked City precisely because any 
video game comprised of rendered, representational, mediated drawings which lack the primary link 
to what happened in the historical world. In this formulation, we should not equate LA Noire’s 
computer generated version of Los Angeles’ “Brown Derby” building and with the version the 
Brown Derby we see in photograph. Essentially, this line of thinking makes a fundamental 
distinction between a rendered version of a city and a recorded version of a city. Even if both LA Noire 
and The Naked City aim to create evidence of and from historical versions of their respective cities, 
LA Noire’s digitally animated version is a mediated rendering of the city, while The Naked City 
records a version of the world that can be functionally experienced as evidence of a time and place 
that existed in our historic world. (If nothing else, the camera’s apparatus at least records the process 
of making a movie.) Meanwhile, the rendering of Los Angeles in LA Noire would ostensibly always 
maintain the status of a metaphor—even at its most rhetorically realistic, it would still be 
experienced merely like a version the historical world.  
The question is, if the images in a video game like LA Noire have a different relationship 
with the world than those of film—if they lack the same existential bond with the historical world—
does that preclude them from being experienced as images that contain truth claims about our 
historical world? Can LA Noire still provide evidence to produce an argument about the historical 
world—Nichol’s idea of the documentary function—if those images are not comprised of indexical 
images of and from the historical world? If so, how would this work?  
Without disregarding the relevance of the material distinction between recording and 
rendering, perhaps Nichol’s notion that the same filmic image could be used to either “support” 
fictional narrative or “support” a documentary argument substantiates a more flexible notion of the 
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documentary function than one that relies on indexicality. In Los Angeles Plays Itself, when Andersen 
constructs what he calls a “city symphony in reverse” assembling a historical, documentary version 
of Los Angeles using footage culled from popular fictional films shot on location, part of what he 
demonstrates is how fictional filmic images can be transformed to reveal a documentary function in 
their periphery. That is, the same images of Los Angeles used to support a metaphoric, fictional 
version of Los Angeles could operate, within a different rhetoric, to make an argument about the 
historical version of Los Angeles. That is, if we notice the importance of context and reception—if 
we focus on the experience that occurs during the aesthetic encounter—the material distinctions 
between rendering and documenting seem less relevant.  
The elder Donlan’s firsthand account playing LA Noire—driving around familiar streets in 
utter nostalgic reverie—seems to support the notion that the moving image documentary function 
lies not in how an image was made, but in how that image is experienced. To understand this better, 
let us return to Donlan’s father’s articulation of his experience in playing LA Noire:  
For a few hours I was able to re-explore the LA I knew in the late forties and early fifties 
with my son. The city was dark, but even with the period's dim street lighting and within the 
slightly truncated map of the city, we were able to find our way around. … I was able to 
remember exactly how to get around from both the towering City Hall and the slightly 
uncomfortable space of Pershing Square. This seemed a refreshingly thoughtful-almost 
intellectual-scenario that I would not have expected in something called a game.45  
For Donlan’s father, LA Noire’s version of Los Angeles somehow maintains a primary connection to 
the historical world: the once existent “slightly uncomfortable spaces”—something that a recorded, 
filmic image may not have—are re-experienced through the sensorial occurrence of playing LA 
Noire. In this way, the documentary function—in which images make arguments about the historical 
world—seems to be less directly fueled by the image’s production or its material indexical bond, but 
                                                 
45 Donlan, "Night and the City". 
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instead based on something much more particular about how we experience the world and how 
those experiences can be externally referenced in the act of reception. For Donlan’s father, this 
process is quite personal, something that has to do with his own memory and familiarity of a time 
and place that could be brought back through an experience of the moving image. The distinction 
between the filmed and the rendered city is largely effaced when we turn our object of inquiry to the 
kinds of experiences which these media engender.  
For Donlan’s father, the rendered city is experienced as evidence of his personal version of 
the historic world, not unlike the way Anderson experiences his version of the historic Los Angeles 
through various fictional versions. That is, LA Noire’s Los Angeles which is fictional to most, is 
experienced as a trace of an actual lived occurrence for the elder Donlan, indicating that, under 
certain circumstances, rendered images, those which have been mediated and plasticized, can still 
somehow provide a documentary function. In Donlan’s case, the circumstances seem idiosyncratic, 
but, arguably, within the right kind of rhetoric—a video game version of a documentary rhetoric—it 
seems plausible that a broader range of reception could experience the rendered images within video 
games with a documentary function (i.e. as evidence in a way that can still support arguments about 
the historical world).46 None of this is to say that LA Noire’s potential to produce a documentary 
function should be understood as functioning precisely the same as it does in film. If anything, 
Donlan’s description begins to illustrate what makes the experience of playing a video game so 
different from watching a film precisely because it emphasizes something about time and space.  
To explore this idea further, LA Noire’s adaptation of The Naked City provides a particularly 
lucid way to begin exploring possible attributes of a video game documentary function. Specifically, 
                                                 
46 This is an idea that D.L Maheiu essentially imagines when he describes “new type of historical archive” which we will 
experience through an “increasingly an immersive, multi-sensory activity, bound inevitably by the limitations of its 
authors, but relived in ways that traditional written narratives could never capture.” D. L. LeMahieu, "Digital Memory, 
Moving Images, and the Absorption of Historical Experience," Film & History 41, no. 1 (2011): 82. 
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looking at parallel narrative sequences from both versions—for example, the moment when the lead 
detectives are assigned to investigate a murder and they make their way to the crime scene—
illustrates how differently these forms relate to time and space. In The Naked City, the sequence takes 
place in a succinct series of shots, paradigmatic of classical Hollywood efficiency, we see 1) one of 
the lead detectives exits his commanders’ office, 2) a police car pulls up to a building before the lead 
detectives exit the car and walk to that building, and 3) the detectives exit an elevator and walk 
through a hall to an apartment door. As a fine illustration of the classic Hollywood editing style, the 
sequences contain three economical shots separated by two dissolves; the film’s narration has moved 
the narrative from the police precinct to the crime scene while simultaneously communicating a 
number of interrelated details about the characters and the city itself in a span of less than 20 
seconds. The two dissolves in this sequence in The Naked City operate as ellipses, used to indicate the 
absence—but implied existence—of the quotidian interstices of time and space that the narration 
omits.  
The distinctiveness in experiencing LA Noire’s version of the world, meanwhile, is found 
precisely in these interstices. Playing LA Noire’s case of “The Naked City” begins with a marked cut-
scene of the detectives being assigned the case and beginning to exit the commander’s office. Where 
the film dissolves, though, the game transitions out of the cinematic mode by cutting to familiar 
third-person perspective behind Phelps as he is walking out of his commander’s office, indicating to 
players that they are now in control. Because it is an open-world video game, LA Noire now 
provides players with agency to make their way to the crime scene or, alternatively, to travel 
anywhere else in the game world. This entails controlling Phelps as he navigates the halls of the 
police station, gets into a car in the parking lot, and drives through the streets with his partner to the 
crime scene—a sequence which, if rushed, takes a few minutes, but is essentially indefinite. After yet 
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another marked cut-scene occurs providing an establishing shot of an apartment building, followed 
by three shots successively tighter shots showing Phelps and his partner getting out of the car and 
walking up to the building, the game returns the familiar third-person perspective, and players’ 
agency is returned. When approached, a uniformed police officer outside the building says simply 
“second floor, apartment six” and players’ next tasks are to guide Phelps up a flight of stairs to find 
the apartment in question.  
If the description of this sequence in the game seems tedious, then it begins to capture 
players’ concurrent experience throughout many of seemingly interstitial moments of LA Noire. The 
Los Angeles of LA Noire is experienced in a very different manner from a filmic version of a city in 
part because players can experience those the moments in between shots—those wearisome 
moments of a realistic depiction of time and space in a city that would sink momentum in a classical 
Hollywood narrative or even a documentary.47 One of the points Los Angeles Plays Itself really 
emphasizes is the way Los Angeles is almost always spatially misrepresented on film—what 
Andersen calls the “geographical license” that films take when, in one of his examples, a “car chase 
jump[s] from the Venice canals to the Los Angeles harbor thirty miles away.” The idea is that while 
narrative films take poetic license in their depiction of space (amongst many other things) they might 
still call their location “Los Angeles,” while misrepresenting the city spatially. Part of the point is that 
the Los Angeles depicted through film—fictional or otherwise—never remains one continuous 
space shot through long uninterrupted takes; it is of course depicted through basic editing 
conventions that foreshorten the city for the sake of a continuous narrative or for convenience.  
                                                 
47 I say “can” because the player is at times given the choice to let his partner drive and thus, “skip over” the driving 
sequences. The designers of LA Noire must have realized the tediousness of driving such long distances within their Los 
Angeles because after a few cases, the player is given the option to ride as a passenger, providing the player with the 
option to cut over the travel time between areas with a tap of a button. This feature, known as “quick travelling,” is a 
regular convention in video games for allowing players to skip over tedious journeys in open-world games. 
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LA Noire’s interest in presenting a historical version of Los Angeles means that players 
particularly experiences those uneventful ellipses which would be edited out of a parallel cinematic 
sequence. While players may, like the elder Donlan, marvel at the city while driving around, it 
quickly becomes something of a chore to spend upwards of 20 minutes driving a period car through 
traffic from one end of the city to the other. It is also during these moments that players have 
Phelps driving or walking down some of the more unremarkable streets of Los Angeles: those which 
were not meticulously designed based on actual buildings like the landmarks of the city, but are 
instead based on general types. We see repeating housing structures, the indistinguishable 
storefronts, and billboards advertising the same products over and over, to get from one point to 
another. Perhaps this is a depiction of Los Angeles, which seemingly resonates a bit more with 
Reyner Banham’s version of the city, is in fact more akin to one’s lived experience in which the 
liminal spaces of our version of any city can pass by without providing any sort of real impression. 
This “filler” urban space is bounded by iconic, recognizable, and historically accurate places which 
may even feel more true to one’s memory: landmarks with characteristic, but not necessarily 
memorable, fabric in between.48 
Regardless of the reasoning behind the decision not to model these streets meticulously, 
what we can understand here is that the imagery and architecture are sometimes secondary to the 
sense of producing an accurate experience of a city by traveling through extended distances over 
periods of time. In fact, it is because the game’s restricted narration stays so rigidly tied to Phelps 
that we experience the city’s sprawling spatial coherence and its geographical precision. The city as a 
                                                 
48 Schweizer makes the seemingly related point that by arguing that “using indexical references, games can develop 
senses of place by diagetically [sic] referring to locations and objects already imbued with strong meaning. See Schweizer, 
"Videogame Cities in Motion," 204. 
For more on this idea see Ian Bogost and Dan Klainbaum’s essay “Experiencing place in Los Santos and Vice City” in 
Nate Garrelts, The Meaning and Culture of Grand Theft Auto : Critical Essays (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2006). 
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subject matter is primed to trigger such traces of memory because it presents a spatial index 
reminiscent of the experience of the masses of people that cohabited the same spaces of the urban 
environment at the same moment. When we see an iconic building like the Los Angeles Public 
Library in the game, it is not being shown or narrated to us—we narrate it ourselves. We might 
approach it slowly on foot as Phelps remains a few blocks away at the corner of Wilshire and 
Figueroa. As he walks along the city’s sidewalks, we struggle to see it from our restrained perspective 
and as it remains optically obstructed by the surrounding architecture and infrastructure. It takes 
time to walk around the building, and it feels all that much more colossal when we get up close to it. 
The spatial configuration of built environment, despite being rendered, can still evoke an experience 
of being a tiny presence in a much larger space, the feelings of being a lost soul in a much larger city.  
What I am suggesting is that video games can maintain qualities of presenting historic 
version of city back to us in spite of their digital and manufactured qualities—whether filmed or 
rendered, a moving image can provide a documentary function as long as it resonates with our 
cognitive, affective, and phenomenological experience of the historical world. Admittedly, by 
privileging notions of receptive experiences over any material, ontological qualities, I seem to be 
fostering a pretty relativistic and somewhat circular notion of what it means to document the 
historical world. That is to say, I recognize that my point here assumes that if the spectator 
experiences the image as one of and from the historic world—however mendacious this image may 
be may be—then this image is, in some sense, a “documentary image.” Perhaps, though, this merely 
recognizes the ways in which the documentary function has always hinged on relativistic experience 
and receptive context. After all, the documentary image should not be synonymous with the 
historical accuracy or truth; characterizing something as a documentary image indicates only that it 
contains truth claims. What is more, they can really only be understood this way if spectators have a 
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frame of reference to recognize them as such (without a frame of reference, a spectator may not be 
able to perceive whether a given image is supposed to represent a version of the historical world or 
of a fictional world.).  
 My aim here is not to make arguments for what media forms are capable of presenting 
something historically accurate; it is to think about how images can be (re)presented to us in a way 
so that we experience those images as of and from the historical world, images that can present 
versions of the historical world by presenting images we take to be recordings from the historical 
world. Moreover, if photographs record a certain visual quality of a time and space, video games 
might be more suited to record other qualities that cannot be captured by the filmic image. As we 
continue this line of thinking, we should explore the ways that a video game like LA Noire, with its 
spatial coherence and adherence to a largely continuous experience of a historical city, seems suited 
record affective qualities related to scale, movement, spatial geography, topography, distance and 
maybe even architecture that the filmic image is less suited to record. That is to say, LA Noire 
perhaps suggests the video game form’s potential to record affective qualities of a version of the 
historical city in its images, experiences that might literally be left on the cutting room floor of a 
movie production. 
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CONCLUSION 
Experiencing Authored Expressions 
5.1 DISCURSIVE CATEGORIES AND MEDIA 
One principle preoccupation of this dissertation concerns instrumental cultural discourses which 
have neglected to think carefully about how video games fit into existing critical frameworks. That 
is, the effort to keep pace with the ascendant rise of video games as a dominant form of popular 
culture finds scholars struggling to carve a space for “game studies,” the American legal system’s 
adjudicating all video games in terms of protected speech, and museum curators classifying video 
games in their collections while largely failing to comprehend video games multifaceted relation to a 
range of material, experiential, technological, and aesthetic traditions. To an extent, my own 
continued reliance on the blanket label “video games”—as if this signifier constitutes a coherent 
group of objects—only reinforces this generalizing tendency. However, my aim throughout this 
dissertation has also been to disrupt principle assumptions about how video games should be 
critically comprehended going forward by formulating central questions about how video games 
relate to film studies in particular. 
One of the most important assumptions I have worked to dispel is that even if video games 
could be tied together as a medium through a material-based definition, such a designation would do 
little to offer a stable or practical critical approach for these objects once we begin to think about 
them as forms of expression. This point is easier to illustrate with the hindsight of decades of 
scholarly conversations about film and moving images, where analogous medium-specific 
determinations have proven, at the very least, unproductive. Noël Carroll made a version of this 
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point clear some three decades ago when he explained that “the physical trait that essentially defines 
film,…its flexible celluloid base,…[does not] suggest…the kinds of things that could or should be 
represented or expressed in the medium.”49 Carroll’s point is that the vast array of experiences 
evinced by film cannot be reduced to something divined from its material properties alone. This 
point runs counter to a trend of neo-materialist and object-oriented approaches to media studies 
exemplified by the work of Jussi Parrika and Matthew Kirschenbaum, but such phenomenology-
phobic arguments have always seemed like an odd fit when it comes to thinking about objects that 
are culturally defined to begin with. When it comes to video games, medium -specific arguments 
have a tendency to minimize the range of expressions engendered, and overlook the historical, 
social, and political contexts in which these objects are both made and experienced.  
Fortunately, the ever-evolving, humanities-centered, scholarly conversation unified around 
film—the discourse found in departments and programs with modifying labels like “media,” “visual 
arts,” “moving-image,” “cinema,” and “screen”—has thus far been flexible enough to acknowledge 
material distinctions without ensconcing impassible barriers between popular forms of media. This 
allows critical connections to be made between things like avant-garde 16mm films made by starving 
artists, live-television broadcasts only faintly recalled, streaming online recordings of competitive 
game Dota 2 (Valve, 2013) matches, sexist beer commercials, feature-length documentaries, fetish 
pornography, network television sit-coms, repeating gifs, Hollywood CGI children’s films, digitally-
shot melodramas, and global art films among many other objects. What unites these expressions is 
not their materiality, their platforms, their means of productions, their aims, their distribution 
procedures, their exhibition spaces, their reception, or their media forms; they are seemingly united 
by the notion that each conveys ideas, information, or feelings through moving images, images 
                                                 
49 Carroll, "The Specificity of Media in the Arts," 7. 
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which are experienced and cognized by an audience. This point alone justifies a set of shared critical 
references and approaches. 
Even still, this dissertation has never aimed to make an overly broad argument that all video 
games fit well within the discipline of film studies. Nor do I support ignoring key distinctions 
between video games and film. My goals center specifically on the observation that certain films and 
certain video games have far more in common with each other—in terms of how they are 
experienced—then each does with other objects common to their respective media. Put another 
way, the experiences engendered by certain films and video games converge enough to justify 
comprehending them within a largely shared critical framework. However, since I continue to 
qualify my argument by saying that only “certain” films and video games belong together, I 
should—by way of conclusion—better articulate this qualification.  
5.1.1 Theorizing Experiences 
In my introduction I explain that the prevailing narrative which places video games primarily within 
a lineage of other games—alongside activities like sports, board games, and schoolyard play—is 
problematic because it neglects to consider video games as media objects. Recognizing video games 
as media objects enables us to position them within a lineage of objects encoded with preplanned 
expressions. This allows us, for one thing, to understand video games cartridges more like LP 
records and DVDs than an analogue board game like chess. At the same time, overestimating the 
significance of video game’s material properties can also be a mistake, which is why Carroll’s point 
about the diversity of filmic expressions is an important lesson to keep in mind when considering 
the vast range of experiences that video games provide.  
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In this way, my dissertation critiques both injudicious generalizations about video games as 
games and generalizations about video games in terms of material properties. Instead, from the 
beginning of this dissertation, I suggest approaching video games through a consideration of how 
these objects are experienced. One potential problem with such an approach, however, is that it can 
seem like an equivocation that merely shifts generalizing claims over to interpretations of how video 
games are apprehended. After all, when it comes to theories of spectatorship in film studies, there is 
a perpetual tension between any specific claim about how a film works and the validity of other 
subjective responses.50 
Still, film scholars continue to operate under the assumption that we can make defensible 
arguments about a given film based on a close reading of its form in conjunction with various critical 
theories of spectatorship. And while theories of reception may lack the consistency or self-assurance 
we find in arguments about materiality and medium specificity, theories of reception are admirable 
precisely because they acknowledge how experiences shift with historic, social, and political 
conditions. there is something appealing about approaching video games through such conditional 
theories; recognizing uncertainty and the need for ceaseless revision counters the video game 
industry’s reliance on data analytics, mathematical probabilities, and statistical precision. Theories of 
                                                 
50 In the decades when film studies really secured its place in academia, the way to deal with the tension between formal 
interpretation and subjective receptive experience came in the form of the psychoanalytic and/or semiotic subject. This 
created a replicable spectatorial model, one that could be systematically discerned through a close formal analysis of a 
text combined with a suitable formula based on ideological and psychoanalytical subject formation. As time went on the 
subjects became more complicated as specialized modes of spectatorship (female spectatorship, queer spectatorship, 
etc.) came into usage as a way of critiquing a dominant, monolithic notion of the singular spectator—one whom 
detractors faulted for being too white and male—in favor of a more representational and egalitarian set of figures to 
characterize the reception end of the film encounter. 
 The problem with this reaction is that the increased need for specificity, means that subcategories of spectators could be 
divided ad infinitum with little satisfaction. Meanwhile the text itself is increasingly diminished as a site of import for 
deducing meaning. What we are left with is a range of theories and theorists navigating a precarious spectrum defined 
primarily by where they view the site where meaning is should be derived. 
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experience are helpful precisely because they admit their drawbacks and qualifications, and, in doing 
so, they also critique any claims of objectivity. 
This recognition of uncertainty also provides the background for my suggestion that the 
specific films and video games which warrant a shared critical framework are those that are 
experienced as authored expressions. This is an idea I reference throughout this dissertation. Here I can 
draw on some of the key lessons from the previous chapters in order to better explain this 
formulation.  
In Chapter 1 I establish that the “author” of an authored expression refers to Foucault’s notion 
of the “author function,” a practical focal point for enabling a mode of critical reception in relation 
to reading a cultural object as a text. The author is a projection on the part of the beholders, one that 
orients how a text is comprehended by serving as a guarantor for the beholder’s assumption that the 
film or video game has been encoded with some purposive expression. Another relevant point for 
my configuration of film and video games concerns the perceived aims of the expression. Chapter 2 
discusses how design objects are understood quite differently from aesthetic objects primarily on the 
basis of perceived functionality. Both design objects and aesthetic objects are purposively created, 
but design objects are perceived to have a functional purpose, whereas the purpose of the aesthetic 
objects is abstract, debatable, or perhaps ultimately unknowable. In this sense, those video games 
and films experienced as authored expressions should be identified with aesthetic objects, in that 
both are comprehended to have been purposively created, yet the nature of that purpose is the 
subject of some debate. 
We might recall, however, that our assessment of video games in terms of functionality is 
complicated by the fact that, as complex computational forms, they are effectively comprised of 
many individually designed components that must function together in order to be playable. Thanks 
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in part to the analysis of Chapter 3, however, we understand that most films might similarly be 
anatomized into individually functional components. We might, for instance, break down a narrative 
film in to elements like the print itself, the projector, the costumes, the set design, the editing, the 
spatial compositions, the narrative structure, and the dialogue, understanding all of these as 
functional components that work in concert to create a comprehensible experience.51  
Perhaps more than anything, the fact that both film and video games can be understood as a 
collection of functional components reminds us that distinctions between design and art are often 
subject to context and critical norms. This is one reason it is difficult to make any definitive claims 
about which video games and films will be experienced as authored expressions. Still, it is important 
to recognize the formal characteristics and critical contexts which engender certain films and video 
games to be apprehended as such. I would like to compare films and video games further in this 
regard because it provides an instructive way to understand both where these media overlap and 
where they diverge. 
5.1.2 Filmmaking as Authoring Images 
Are all photographs authored expressions? Are all photographs perceived as authored expressions? 
These questions may be more difficult to parse than they seem at first. One of the most important 
myths among film theorists has long been that some part of film’s power is drawn from the 
recognition that photographic images may—on some level—be perceived as lacking conscious 
mediation. One way of thinking about this idea is through David Rodowick’s fairly extreme 
                                                 
51 It is worth recognizing work of this nature produced within critical rigid structuralist approaches like where films 
broken down into functional components to understand how the larger object “works.” 
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suggestions in The Virtual Life of Film which seemingly privileges the photographic image’s indexical 
function above all else: 
This transcription is inseparable from the automated processes of a time-bound 
fixing of reflected light spatially organized by a lens. In other words, as an 
automated instrument, the camera is designed to register and preserve a profilmic 
event to which it was once present. The photograph has no sense apart from this 
function. The photochemical reaction to reflected light takes place continuously 
throughout the photogram in a given unit of time, which then persists as a trace or 
index, preserving the framed event as a record of spatial duration fixed in a 
homogeneous substance. As a result of its particular circumstances of production, 
this index is very much a historical document.52 
For Rodowick, the fact that the photograph’s existence may depend on a purposive subject 
positioning a camera in a particular place, taking the actual picture, and developing the film negative, 
does not change the very nature behind the camera’s function of passively recording a time and 
space. In this view, the camera’s indexical capacity stems from a reflexive chemical production 
which traces the historical world, without regard to content or context. The camera’s ability to 
document a moment—or successive moments, as it may be—provides an unconscious vestige that 
exists without forethought, intention, or design.53  
                                                 
52 David Norman Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007), 55-56. 
53 In this way, Rodowick’s logic here shares something with the neo-materialists stemming from Ernst and Kittler 
discussed in Chapter 1. This conception is seemingly unconcerned with the human perception, only in the material index 
which reflexively records via media lacking an adulterating will. Implicit is a certain technological determinism blind to 
the vast range of experiences provided by different subject matter of images. 
Benjamin’s quote about how “photography freed the hand,” raised in the previous chapter suggests that photography 
effectively removes a layer of mediation within the artistic practice of image making because from the most important 
artistic tasks in the process of pictorial reproduction—tasks that now devolved upon the eye alone.” At first glance this 
passage seems to indicate a way that authorship is removed in pictorial reproduction as the artist’s intercession, 
symbolized by the “hand,” is excised from the process. However, we should note that when Benjamin places the onus of 
pictorial reproduction on the “eye alone,” he is not referring to the camera’s eye but the artist’s eye: “since the eye 
perceives more swiftly than the hand can draw, the process of pictorial reproduction was enormously accelerated, so that 
it could now keep pace with speech.”53 In this sense, photography is a technological development providing a more 
streamlined process of image production for Benjamin, still human subjectivity is never quite eliminated from the 
process. Even when a split-second camera shutter is triggered through an automated mechanical procedure, it is a 
human subject who has invented the camera, who placed the camera, who will develop the film, and who will behold the 
eventual image. Benjamin, Eiland, and Smith, Selected Writings, 3, 102. 
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More relevant for this dissertation, Rodowick considers the photographic image’s existence 
as a “historical document” to be distinct, or perhaps even contrary, to its capacity to be apprehended 
as an aesthetic object. This is because the photographic image’s indexicality lacks “autographicality” 
and “notationality,” two attributes which Rodowick argues are “functional concepts defining the 
aesthetic nature of creative acts.” We should note that categories of “autographicality” and 
“notationality” respectively parallel “authored” and “expressive,” so Rodowick’s effectively argues is 
that the photographic image cannot be perceived as an authored expression precisely because of its 
historical function. Put another way, the photographic image’s automated processing justifies 
conceiving of the image more like a found object, rather than one purposively created to engender 
an experience. this line of thinking leads Rodowick to ponder the “terrible conclusion [that] every art 
has aesthetic value except film.”54  
While Rodowick’s determinism regarding the photographic image is problematic for a few 
reasons,55 his extreme suggestion helps articulate the more modest point that filmic images might be 
perceived as lacking authored expression. surveillance footage or the images captured by a 
malfunctioning camera are just two relatable examples to consider along these lines. Here we find 
images that exist as indexical traces and evidence, but lack a sense that they were consciously 
created. Even if the images are beautiful, so long as we know their origin we will not apprehend 
them as authored expression. This is not to say that these images cannot subsequently be 
                                                 
54 Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film, 15-16. Rodowick derives “autographicality” and “notationality” in part from Nelson 
Goodman. In many ways Rodowick’s logic aligns with the conception of the aesthetic object that I have been 
developing through this dissertation: an object must be apprehended as an authored expression in order to provide an 
aesthetic experience.  
55 Where my account diverges most acutely from Rodowick’s is in his assumption that the photographs’ ontological 
properties are paramount in distinguishing between film and digital images including those of video games. As my 
attention has always been about how the objects or images are apprehended and experienced, the ontological is only as 
determinate as much it is perceptible and as much as it shapes the conditions of how that image is experienced. This is 
not to deny film’s indexicality as potential factor of reception; only that indexicality does not alone determine how the 
image will be experienced. 
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apprehended as authored expressions either by mistake or by their placement into a new context, 
but, without cause or context, these images will continue to function as historical documents and 
indexical traces, and will not be apprehended as authored expressions.  
Filmmaking in this sense is effectively the process by which photographic images are charged 
with significance, provided with a context and understanding that allows us to experience the images 
as authored expressions. When we watch films under the supposition that they are authored, we 
implicitly apprehend these images as mediated, chosen, and manufactured to provide some 
subsequent experience.56 Realizing this allows us to articulate the notion that film and video games 
are at their greatest ontological and experiential distance from one another at their respective 
inceptions.  
5.1.3 Video Game Orientations 
When I claim that only certain films and video games are experienced as authored expressions, I 
imply that not all films and video games will be perceived in this manner. As I have just pointed out, 
films in theory can avoid this mode of reception because we do not necessarily assume that the 
images captured are the product of deliberate design. Consequently, the idea that some video games 
will not be experienced as authored expressions is seemingly complicated by Eric Zimmerman’s 
astute observation relayed in Chapter 1 that, unlike many analog games, all video games are 
“deliberately designed.” Zimmerman’s point is that analog games —like jump-rope, soccer, or “go 
fish”—are not so much consciously devised, as they “evolve” over time (more like a folktale in an 
oral story-telling tradition). a video game, on the other hand, can only exist—it can only be 
                                                 
56 Even the accidental photograph can be beheld as an authored expression.  For example, this image can be provided 
with an anterior significance once it is placed into a meaningful context (like a found object). Also, the accidental photo 
may apprehended mistakenly to have been created with intentionality. 
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experienced—if some person or group of people intentionally coded and calculated it as a video 
game to be playable on some computational platform.57 This point remains true even in regard to 
video games ported from pre-existing analog games—computer solitaire must still be deliberately 
designed to render it operable as a video game.58 At the same time, it is important to recognize what 
is “deliberately designed” is not always experienced as an authored expressions.  
One way of thinking about this is that while video games are composed from deliberately 
designed components, these components can be organized in such a way that any sense of their 
deliberate design—and room for the sense of author’s expression—will be effectively displaced. 
One way of understanding this idea is through the claim I made in Chapter 1 concerning the 
importance of recognizing vast differences in mode of gameplay engendered by games. As I argued 
then, video games that operate chiefly through the gameplay modes of competition and/or 
chance—Caillois’ categories of agôn and alea—will not be apprehended in terms of authorship 
(which is why these video games have significantly less in common with film). The chief reason for 
this is that these types of games are composed in a way so that the game’s makers actually 
relinquishes significant agency and control. That is, whereas The Stanley Parable helped demonstrate 
that many video games provide what is mostly an illusion of ceding agency, games operating through 
competition and chance actually forfeit enough control that the experiences engendered are credited 
to someone besides an author figure.  
                                                 
57 Elias, Garfield, and Gutschera, Characteristics of Games, 4-5.  
58 It is worth noting that the very existence of video game ports of preexisting analog games like solitaire allows us to 
better recognize more than one design act within the development of a video game. On the one hand there is the 
abstracted design of the game itself, with its rules and procedures. On the other hand, there is the design of the 
computer program which expresses that game as a playable form. To the extent the computer program’s design could be 
compared to cinematography or set-design or perhaps the craft of carving a marble chess set, is a question worth 
considering further at some other point. 
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In competition-based video games we find room for player agency through scenarios and 
encounters which are enabled—but not directed—by the game itself. In competition-based video 
games like StarCraft (Blizzard, 1998), Counter Strike: Global Offensive (Valve, 2012), the FIFA soccer 
(EA Sports) series, and Super Smash Bros. Melee (HAL Laboratory, 2001), players primarily understand 
themselves engaged with other players and are into thinking about the game in terms of fate or 
competition.59 Once players fully comprehend the rules of the game and the arena which they are 
operating within, their orientations turn away from the game’s composition and toward their 
opponents. At this point, the range of experiences within the game are not traced back to some 
presumed creator’s master plan; instead, the players’ focuses are on one another. In this way, video 
games operating primarily through either chance or competition enable a wide range of experiences 
that will remain unmanaged to some extent. They do little to encourage—or actively work against—
players thinking about games as authored expression precisely because any sense that what occurs is 
a function of some premeditated plan detracts from the sense of fair competition.   
We find a somewhat different orientation altogether when it comes to games involving 
chance. Whereas competition games orient players toward attributing their experiences to 
themselves and one another, video games based purely in chance, such as video poker or video slot 
machines, orient players to attribute their experiences to fate rather than some imaginary author. 
This becomes much more complicated, however, when single-player adventure video games begin 
incorporating elements of chance into the compositions of their worlds through advanced 
computation. In these specific games the line between what we can attribute to the conscious 
decisions of some author function become quite muddled.  
                                                 
59 Games of pure chance we can think of in terms of machines used for gambling. Competition-based games would 
include many of the most popular multiplayer-games that dominate much of the industry and the entire range of games 
now being professionalized as “e-sports.” 
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While there are a few ways developers use stochastic elements, the technique with perhaps 
the broadest potential applicability is what is called “procedurally generated content.” This refers to a 
technique in game design in which aspects of a game are not created through the precisely calculated 
efforts of any individual or purposive author but through an algorithmic system and intersecting 
rules. The scheme is calculated to contain contingency and a degree of random variation within a 
larger set of rules. While the degree of randomization depends on how much a particular system 
relies on procedurally generated content, in some games the very environment is generated 
algorithmically, and procedural generation allows a computer to adhere to certain underlying design 
conditions or principles built into an algorithm to produce random, essentially unique variations. In 
effect, it a system capable of creating game worlds that are somehow simultaneously predictable and 
unpredictable, controlled and free, involving prefigured, infinitely variable components within a set 
of parameters.  
In video games like the influential Rogue (Michael Toy; Glenn Wichman; Ken Arnold,1980), 
NetHack (Mike Stephenson, 1987), Spelunky (Derek Yu, 2008), Minecraft, The Binding of Isaac (Edmund 
McMillen, Florian Himsl, 2011) and No Man’s Sky (Hello Games, 2016), procedural generation 
becomes the driving mechanism behind creating environments that are both meticulously adherent 
to a kind of reproducible order, yet infinite and inconstant. In each of these games, the central 
configuration of the game world along with many other components which greatly shape the 
player’s affective experience, are not manually configured by any specific designer, but instead 
calculated stochastically through fairly complex algorithms designed to balance randomness and 
coherence. This allows environments to maintain standard properties and to abide by a set of 
conditions, but also ensure that no specific manifestation is certain. The spaces are built 
probabilistically—so that uncertainly, chance, contingency, and a range of disorder can be features 
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of the design. The rule-based parameters provide infinite variable possibilities, within a finitely 
defined space.  
Rogue, Minecraft, and No Man’s Sky also illustrate how the potential scale of procedural 
generation has progressed by orders of magnitudes over the past few decades. As a pioneering video 
game to use procedural generation, the 1981 game Rogue’s graphically rudimentary style renders a 
distinct dungeon layout for each and every playthrough of the game. Within the defined limits, there 
will be different size rooms, different kinds of rooms, different numbers of rooms, different items, 
different enemies, etc. Even in this case, when the architectural configurations operate within a 
relatively limited number of parameters, each playthrough provides a novel experience of 
discovering, navigating and exploring a unique spatial configuration. That is to say, procedural 
generation provides a way for the video game to be simultaneously authored and unauthored. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1-A Examples of variations in dungeon layouts in Rogue in its original ASCII style 
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By the time, Minecraft comes along some thirty years later, the equivalent of the procedurally 
generated dungeon in Rogue is now a navigable environment several times larger than the surface of 
earth.60 The variation within the designed environment is also vastly more complex compared to 
Rogue, as each time the player loads a new world in Minecraft it creates a unique landscape containing 
variable formations of forests, mountains, caverns, seas, villages, among other eco-systems. Unlike 
Rogue, Minecraft does not necessarily provide its player with a predetermined goal, so the world is 
there to be inhabited, reshaped, and explored. This gameplay style essentially allows endless 
reconfigurations of the world as long as those configurations abide by the properties of the in-game 
materials provided. Minecraft’s “blocky” graphical style and geometrical simplicity in the basic 
underlying shapes, orthogonal structures, and unrefined textures, enable scalability and endless 
reproducibility, yet the game maintains variable iterative schemas. Consequently, Minecraft’s promise 
is that exploring the environment will involve discovering and cataloguing the existence of 
environments that no one else—not even the game’s designers—have previously encountered. 
 
Figure 5.1-B Minecraft (as it looked in 2011) 
 
In video games that include computationally assisted procedural generation, we learn that 
customizability and variation are effectively strategies used to offset a mass-produced schema’s 
                                                 
60 Jeff Marchiafava, "How Big Is a Minecraft World," Game Informer, 
http://www.gameinformer.com/b/news/archive/2012/02/09/how-big-is-a-minecraft-world.aspx. 
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tendency towards uniformity and authorial control. These games are rhetorically centered on 
catering to the individual user’s experience by providing each player a sense of ownership over their 
own destiny and removing the sense that their experience is the subject of some author’s expression. 
The extent to which the games mentioned have been successful in this regard is debatable, but the 
existence of them allows us to better articulate the qualities of an authorial expression.  
What it helps us recognize is that for most video games to be experienced as authored 
expressions, they must provide the player with the sense that the games can effectively be “beaten,” 
mastered, or finished. This is less about the game having an actual end than the player being able to 
operate under the assumption that there is an end-point, that that players will be able to discern the 
edges of what has been designed, and, in theory, encounter the entirety of the world that can be 
uncovered. The created worlds must be experienced as finite worlds and embedded with histories 
and unfolding narratives, placed there by some conscious agent. Players’ orientations shift when 
elements of the experience are thought to be random or wholly contingent on their own actions. 
This is effectively the same tension inherent in increasingly dynamic artificial intelligence and 
machine learning. Although a designer may code an initial algorithm, that logic can surpass the 
expectations of the designer to the extent that the logic mass-produces experiences that the designer 
has no control over. While the existence of these games provides an interesting avenue to explore 
further, it does not stop us from recognizing that most single-player video games are still effectively 
experienced as authored expressions. 
5.2 CRITICAL GAMES 
So, what does it mean to experience films and video games as authored expressions? Why is it 
helpful to recognize these forms together as such? In “What is an Author?” Foucault argues that “if 
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a text should be discovered in a state of anonymity—whether as a consequence of an accident or the 
author’s explicit wish—the game becomes one of rediscovering the author.”61 Foucault refers to a 
somewhat literal process, but he is also outlining the premise behind a critical orientation essential to 
convey what it means to experience films and video games together as authored expressions. In this 
approach, beholders imagine themselves as engaged with objects they assume to have been encoded 
as meaningful though someone’s conscious act. In this mode, both films and video games are 
structured as play-spaces, spaces we assume to have been devised according to an author’s plan. 
Even if this plan is imaginary, it allows a reception geared to “rediscovering” the affordances and 
parameters embedded within the text. 
We play video games because they are already thought of in terms of terms of objects that 
are planned out ahead of time by a conscious author. In this way, we are oriented to them as if they 
can be solved or completed.62 Still, because we think of this activity as a game, we are granted a 
freedom to experiment and find new strategies and creative ways to work toward a sense of 
resolution. This is similar to how film critics operate under similar conditions when they make 
arguments about a given film’s “meaning.” We orient ourselves to the film as if it is something 
playable, as if it is a puzzle. There is a larger argument to make about how any aesthetic object 
should be thought of in terms of gameplay, both in terms of the aesthetic experience but also in 
terms of the formal discursive strategies we use to critically engage with that object. The aesthetic 
encounter designates a particular relationship between an object and its beholder, one in which the 
                                                 
61 Foucault and Rabinow, The Foucault Reader, 109. 
62 Theoretically some competitive games can be solved in that one can devise an optimal strategy. In fact, some games 
can be “solved” to different degrees. “Ultra-weakly solved means that the game-theoretic value of the initial position has 
been determined, weakly solved means that for the initial position a strategy has been determined to achieve the game-
theoretic value against any opposition, and strongly solved is being used for a game for which such a strategy has been 
determined for all legal positions.” H Jaap Van den Herik, Jos WHM Uiterwijk, and Jack Van Rijswijck, "Games Solved: 
Now and in the Future," Artificial Intelligence 134, no. 1 (2002). 
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beholder experiences the object as simultaneously intentional and mysterious, meaningful and 
purposeless, definite yet endlessly vague. To an extent, what we apprehend as the aesthetic object 
itself provides a kind of game-space or arena in providing some of the conditions of its reception. 
When we formulate an interpretive framework, we are devising rules for yet another sub-game or 
strategy to be played. Concepts like medium-specificity, genre and other interpretive frameworks can 
be understood as enabling game strategies. At the same time gameplay can productively be used to 
help us understand the way we engage the aesthetic object in a manner that speaks to the creative 
agency implicit within the act of reception. 
The way one critically approaches a video game compared to a film is determined less by the 
form itself, than it is by the way we conceive of the form. Conceptualizing video games as authored 
expressions is not about rediscovering a literal author or working towards a specific end-point; 
rather, it is about recognizing an experiential orientation that is already present in the form. The 
assumption that the medium of video games impedes or negates the possibility of even rhetorically 
imagining an author is a key problem with the way these video games have been critically 
understood. Properly assessing a given video game, like a film, requires a close reading and, more 
broadly, a better sense of what can be understood as the text of the video game form. As I have 
demonstrated through this dissertation, video games contain much of the same elements of 
receptive experiences found in our experience of film and thus the lessons of film studies are vital to 
understanding this wide-ranging medium. At the same time, we can also recognize how video games 
create new formal, ontological and affective positions—some of which can be accounted for in film 
studies and others which require more thought and engagement with other fields. 
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Fig 2.1 A: Image of Distellimap (Pac-Man), copyright Ben Fry. Used with permission from the artist. 
Figs 2.2 A, C-E, H-I: Images from The Stanley Parable (2011) copyright Galactic Café/Davey Wreden. 
Screenshots by the author. Used with permission from artist. 
Fig 2.2 B Image by Anonymous (user1032613) on gaming.stackexchange.com (2013). 
https://gaming.stackexchange.com/questions/136182/how-many-endings-are-in-the-2013-edition-
of-the-stanley-parable/136418#136418 
Figs 2.2 F, G: Images from Halo: Combat Evolved (2001), copyright Bungie/Microsoft. Screenshot by 
author. 
Figs 3.1 A-J; 3.3 A-D: Images from The Truman Show (1998), copyright Paramount Pictures—
screenshots by the author. 
Fig 3.2 E: Images from Horizon Zero Dawn – The making of the game (2017), copyright VPRO Backlight 
April 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A0eaGRcdwpo. Screenshots by the author. 
Fig 3.2 F: Image from Grand Theft Auto: III (2001), copyright Take Two Interactive/Rockstar 
Games. Screenshot by unknown.  
Fig 4.1 A, B: Images from LA Noire (2011), copyright Take Two Interactive/Rockstar Games. 
Screenshots by author.  
Fig 4.1 C: Images from The House on 92nd Street (1945), copyright 20th Century Fox. Screenshots by 
the author;  
Fig 5.1 A: Images from Rogue. screenshots by the author;  
Fig 5.1 B: Image from Minecraft (2011),cCopyright Mojang/Microsoft. Screenshot by author. 
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